It was in the kitsch decor of his Mar-a-Lago residence that Donald Trump convinced allied central bankers and finance ministers that he was going to make them pay the United States’ debts
De-dollarization, that is, using the dollar only at the national level of the United States and no longer in international trade, is the sea serpent of finance. However, following the unilateral coercive measures that the United States imposed on its allies, first against Iran, then against Russia (measures wrongly described as "sanctions" by Atlantic propaganda), Russia created a Financial Message Transfer System (SPFS), China the Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and the European Union the European Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). As a result, the use of the dollar has declined by about a quarter in international trade.
However, the US public debt has now reached the astronomical sum of 34,000 billion dollars, of which only a third is held by foreign investors, according to Forbes [1]. If some of the US creditors, mainly China and Saudi Arabia, were to ask for repayment, a gigantic economic crisis would occur as in 1929.
Many economists regularly warn of this prospect. However, according to Jon Hartley of the Hoover Institution, central banks have not reduced the share of the dollar in their foreign exchange reserves since the war in Ukraine. However, on February 20, a videoconference by analyst Jim Bianco, taken up by the Bloomberg agency [2], rekindled concerns. According to this analyst, the Trump administration is following a plan, the "Mar-a-Lago Agreement". It intends to radically restructure the US debt burden by reorganizing world trade through tariffs, devaluing the dollar and, ultimately, reducing the cost of borrowing, all with the aim of putting US industry on an equal footing with its competitors in the rest of the world.
The idea of the “Mar-a-Lago Accord” refers to an article by Stephen Miran of the Manhattan Institute [3]; Miran was appointed by President Trump to chair the White House Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and he himself, Donald Trump, gave a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 22 that seems to go in this direction.
The expression “Mar-a-Lago Accord” refers to the “Plaza Accord” when, in 1985, the United States implemented a policy of weakening its currency in order to boost its exports. In practice, the financial mechanisms having been poorly controlled, the US economy restarted by causing a very serious recession in Japan.
On January 21 and 22, Donald Trump had gathered the central bankers and finance ministers of the G7 in his Mar-a-Lago residence. He is said to have welcomed them by telling them: "No one will leave this room until we have found an agreement on the dollar." [4]. The agreement in question would therefore have been approved by the allies.
The main idea would be for the US Treasury to issue government bonds that do not pay interest (what are called "zero coupons") and that would not mature for a century (that is, could not be exchanged for cash for 100 years). Washington would therefore have to force its allies to convert their debts into "zero coupons".
If we accept this analysis, we must reinterpret various actions of President Trump, in terms of customs duties or the creation of a sovereign wealth fund. They no longer seem as erratic as the international press describes them, but on the contrary very logical.
We must therefore consider that Donald Trump is trying to manage the possible economic collapse of Joe Biden’s "American empire" as Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko and Mikhail Gorbachev tried to manage that of Leonid Brezhnev’s "Soviet empire".
I am all the more attentive to this hypothesis because, in my opinion, the coup of September 11, 2001 had no other goal than to postpone the foreseeable collapse of the “American empire”. The last two decades have been only a reprieve that, far from solving the problem, have only made it much more complex.
Let us recall: in 1989, the Russian Mikhail Gorbachev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, decided to reduce state spending. He abruptly stopped aid to the USSR’s allies and gave everyone their freedom. Simultaneously, the East Germans toppled the Berlin Wall, while the Poles elected members of Solidarity to the Diet and the Senate. This is the end of the imperialism of the Ukrainian Leonid Brezhnev who, in 1968, had imposed on all the allies of the USSR to adopt, defend and preserve the economic model of Moscow.
This is probably what we are witnessing today: Donald Trump, President of the United States, is dissolving the “American empire” as he had tried to undo it in 2017 [5]. On July 28, 2017, he had reorganized the National Security Council by liquidating the permanent seats of the director of the CIA and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was followed by three weeks of war in Washington and, ultimately, the resignation of the National Security Advisor, General Michael T. Flynn. The latter, who has disappeared from the radar, is in fact still active today and organizes meetings at Mar-a-Lago for opponents of the allied countries.
This time, cautiously, President Trump is lulling his public opinion to sleep by evoking the annexation of the entire North American continental shelf, from Greenland to the Panama Canal, while liquidating the war in Ukraine and the European Union.
If my hypothesis is correct, we must not believe a word of the threats of annexation of new territories, such as Canada, and not imagine that the United States is withdrawing militarily from Europe to confront China, but admit that it is militarily abandoning its European allies. We see that it is abandoning Germany and relying on Poland to organize Central Europe, even if it means letting Warsaw annex Eastern Galicia (currently Ukrainian). Similarly, we must prepare to see the United States abandon its Middle Eastern allies, with the exception of Israel. Indeed, it has just resumed arms deliveries to Tel Aviv and begun secret talks with Iran via Moscow. They let Saudi Arabia and Turkey divide up the Arab world.
The competition between Paris and London to take the lead in European defense should therefore not be understood as opposition to peace in Ukraine. Neither the French nor the British armies have the possibility of replacing Washington’s military support. It is rather a question of determining the role that the two capitals will subsequently play on the continent. Emmanuel Macron, the French president, hopes to develop his defense concept around the French strike force, while Keir Starmer, the British prime minister, intends to take advantage of the situation. The former is aware that the European Union, around Germany, is disintegrating and that President Trump prefers the "Three Seas Initiative", around Poland. He could therefore reawaken the Weimar Triangle (Germany/France/Poland) to maintain some room for maneuver. While, from the same analysis and taking into account the disappearance of NATO, the second will ensure that Germany is kept as far away from Russia as possible, thus continuing his country’s foreign policy for a century and a half. Note that if the European allies, the Chinese and the Saudis should consider it a scam to exchange their debts for “zero coupons”, Russia should on the contrary support the United States in this maneuver. Indeed, during the dismantling of the Soviet Union, Russia went through a decade of recession and unrest, but today it needs the United States to avoid finding itself face to face with China.
[1] «Why Trump’s ‘Mar-A-Lago Accord’ Would Financially Matter To You», Erik Sherman, Forbes, February 23, 2025.
[2] «"Mar-a-Lago Accord" chatter is geting Wall Street attention» and «Jim Bianco on What a "Mar-a-Lago Accord" could mean for the economy», Tracy Alloway & Joe Wiesenthal,Bloomberg, February 20 and 25, 2025.
[3] «A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System», Stephen Miran, Hudson Bay Capital, November 2025.
[4] «Et Donald Trump fit entrer Mar-a-Lago dans la légende du dollar», Nessim Aït-Kacimi, Les Échos, 25 février 2025.
[5] « Donald Trump dissout l’organisation de l’impérialisme états-unien », par Thierry Meyssan, Réseau Voltaire, 30 janvier 2017.
Christoph Heusgen, former permanent representative of Germany to the United Nations and current president of the Munich Security Conference, cries upon discovering the divorce between the United States and the Europeans.
The last two weeks, we have experienced a turning point in History comparable to that of the Battle of Berlin, in April-May 1945, when the Red Army took Berlin and overthrew the Third Reich: this time, it was the Trump administration which definitively put the European Union back on the ropes.
For the moment, the EU, the G7 and the G20 have not yet been dissolved, but these three structures are already dead. The World Bank and the United Nations could follow.
Let’s look back at these events, which happened so quickly that almost none of us followed them and understood their consequences.
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12
The major European powers (i.e. Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom and the European Union), who feared what the Trump administration might decide, met in Paris on February 12 to develop a common position on the Ukrainian conflict. In this case, they agreed to continue what they have been doing for three years:
* deny having violated the commitments made during German reunification not to extend NATO to the East,
- deny that Ukraine is in the hands of “integral nationalists” (i.e. the party of Nazi collaborators)
-and continue the Second World War, no longer against the Nazis, but against the Russians.
Meanwhile, in Kiev, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent presented the US aid bill: $500 billion and proposed paying it by exploiting the rare earths of which the country is proud. I have already explained that this proposal was only a response from the shepherd to the shepherdess: Ukraine having falsely claimed to ultimately offer Westerners the opportunity to exploit these riches which do not exist. However, from a European point of view, what was going on was frightening: if the United States seized these so-called riches, they excluded the Europeans from benefiting from the sharing they had agreed upon. Without informing their fellow citizens, they shared Ukraine between them during its reconstruction: to the British, the ports, to the Germans, the mines, etc. They had already done this during the invasions of Iraq and Libya and during the war against Syria.
Above all, while Washington and Moscow were exchanging prisoners, the American presidents, Donald Trump, and Russian presidents, Vladimir Putin, spoke by telephone for an hour and a half. This summit was preceded by a conversation, in the Kremlin, between President Putin and Steve Wilkoff, President Trump’s special envoy who came to organize the prisoner exchange. Wilkoff had given his president a report on his mission that shattered everything NATO claimed to know about Ukraine.
Both bosses now had the same information.
The direct line between the White House and the Kremlin had just been reestablished.
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14
On February 14, the Vice President of the United States, JD Vance, addressed the diplomatic and military elite of the EU at the Security Conference in Munich. He drew up an indictment against the autism of European leaders: They refuse to respond to the concerns of their fellow citizens in terms of freedom of expression and immigration. However, if they are afraid of their people, the United States will be able to do nothing for them, he asserted, making the president of the conference, the German ambassador Christoph Heusgen, cry.
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 17
A second meeting was held on February 17, still in Paris, with the same participants, plus Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO. They agreed to stand together against Donald Trump and not to accept any questioning of Western policy towards Russia.
Olaf Scholz, outgoing German chancellor, declared after the summit: “There must be no
division of security and responsibility between Europe and the United States. NATO is built on the fact that we always act together and share risks […]. This should not be questioned. »
Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of Poland, said: “No matter what everyone may say to each other, sometimes in harsh words […], there is no reason why the Allies cannot find a common language among themselves on the most important issues. [It is] in the interest of Europe and the United States to cooperate as closely as possible. »
Also on February 17, the Ukrainian army attacked US, Israeli and Italian interests in Russia. It bombed facilities partially owned by Chevron (15%), ExxonMobil (7.5%) and ENI (2%). Around twenty drones caused serious damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which supplies Israel with Russian oil.
The Europeans reacted no more to this operation than when the CIA sabotaged the Nord Stream gas pipeline (September 26, 2022), although it is owned not only by the Russian Gazprom (50%), but also by the Germans BASF/Wintershall and Uniper, the French Engie, the Austrian OMV and the British Royal Dutch Shell. This sabotage has thrown Germany into an economic recession, which continues to spread to the rest of the EU, not to mention increasing energy prices for all EU households.
In both cases (the Nord Stream sabotage and the CPC attack), the Europeans were unable to defend their interests. They successively let their main ally hurt them, then their allies fight each other.
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18
The European powers learned with astonishment that, at their first meeting in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), on February 18, the US and Russian delegations agreed:
to denazify and neutralize Ukraine,
to respect the commitments made during German reunification and to withdraw NATO troops from all countries that joined the Atlantic Alliance after 1990.
President Trump had suddenly abandoned the plan of General Keith Kellogg, his special envoy for Ukraine, as it had been published in April 2024 by the America First Foundation. On the contrary, he had used the plan of his friend Steve Witkoff, special envoy for the Middle East, who had met Vladimir Putin in Moscow through the Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (known as “MBS”), hence the choice of Riyadh for these negotiations. Kellogg reasoned with NATO’s ideas, while Witkoff listened, heard and verified the validity of the Russian position.
The European powers were quickly able to verify that the order to withdraw had been transmitted to certain US troops, in the Baltic countries and in Poland. The security architecture in Europe, that is to say the system ensuring peace, was destroyed. Of course, there is no immediate threat of invasion, Russian or Chinese, but in the long term and given the time required for rearmament, everyone must immediately prepare for the best or the worst.
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 19
On February19, EU ambassadors approved the 16th package of unilateral coercive measures (misleadingly called “sanctions” by Atlantic propaganda) against Russia. It was to be officially approved on 24 February by the Foreign Affairs Council on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine. In addition, the EU decided to disconnect 13 banks from the Swift system and to ban three financial institutions from trading. In addition, 73 ships of the Russian “ghost fleet” were sanctioned, and 11 Russian ports and airports that circumvent the oil price cap were banned from trading. Finally, 8 Russian media outlets also had their broadcasting licenses in the EU suspended.
Meanwhile, on the same day, February 19, President Donald Trump vented his anger at his unelected Ukrainian counterpart, calling him a “modestly successful comedian” and an “unelected dictator,” and then accusing him of provoking the war. Meanwhile, General Kellogg, the White House’s special envoy to Kiev, canceled his press conference with Volodymyr Zelensky. The Trump administration had broken with the Kiev government that the Biden administration had praised to the skies.
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20
Libertarian Senator Mike Lee (Utah) introduced a bill in the Senate on February 20 to completely withdraw the United States from the United Nations. Representative Chip Roy (Texas) introduced the same bill in the House of Representatives the following day.
While President Donald Trump is a “Jacksonian” (i.e., a disciple of Andrew Jackson, who wanted to replace war with business), Washington has now embraced “American exceptionalism.” This is a political theology according to which the United States is a chosen people who must bring the light they have received to the rest of the world. As such, they do not have to negotiate anything with others and especially not be accountable to them.
“American exceptionalism” should not be confused with the “isolationism” that led the Senate to refuse to join the League of Nations in 1920. This organization, unlike the UN that succeeded it, had provided for military solidarity between states that recognized international law. Consequently, the United States would have had to maintain troops to maintain peace in Europe and the Europeans could have intervened in Latin America (Washington’s “backyard” according to the “Monroe Doctrine”) to maintain peace there.
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 22
Without waiting, Polish President Andrzej Duda went to Washington uninvited on February 22. He managed to meet President Donald Trump for ten minutes, not at the White House, but on the sidelines of the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC). He asked him not to withdraw US troops from his country, giving Poland time to complete its military restructuring. Since Warsaw has already initiated a profound internal revolution by reestablishing universal military service and building a very large army, he managed to get him to postpone, not cancel, his order.
Andrzej Duda is Polish President, at least until the May elections. Constitutionally, he does not exercise executive power, but he is nonetheless the head of the armed forces. His Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, had promised in Paris not to negotiate separately with the United States.
So, whatever one might say, the united front of the Europeans was broken. It had only lasted ten days.
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 24
On the third anniversary of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, on 24 February, Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament, António Costa, President of the European Council and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, issued a completely out-of-place joint statement. In it, they called for “a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the Ukrainian peace formula”, meaning they stuck to the old narrative: there are no Nazis in Ukraine and Russia is the aggressor. In doing so, they contradicted not only the facts, but also the recent statements of their economic and military overlord, the United States.
On the same day, French President Emmanuel Macron travelled to Washington, on behalf of all Atlanticist Europeans. Before receiving him, President Donald Trump had his chief of staff take him to a wing of the White House to participate in a G7 video conference that he was chairing… from another room.
For two hours, the heads of state and government of the G7, plus the Spanish Prime Minister and the unelected Ukrainian president, tried in vain to make their overlord relent. He would not budge: the Ukrainian conflict was not started by Russia, but by the Ukrainian fundamentalist nationalists hiding behind Zelensky alone. In any case, as a matter of principle, it is not possible to defend people who have just attacked US interests, even if they are located in Russia. To make himself clearly understood, Donald Trump refused to sign the final communiqué prepared by the Europeans and announced to them that, if this text were published (it had already been distributed under embargo to journalists), he would deny it and his country would leave the G7.
Only after this scandal did he receive President Emmanuel Macron. The latter chose not to confront him, but to celebrate transatlantic friendship. At the joint press conference, he interrupted his host when the latter repeated that Ukraine, not Russia, had provoked the war, but ultimately did not dare contradict him.
Meanwhile, in New York, the UN General Assembly was debating a resolution proposed by Ukraine. It denounced “the total invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation” and demanded that it withdraw “immediately, completely and unconditionally all its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within the internationally recognized borders of the country and that the hostilities conducted by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in particular all attacks against civilians and civilian objects, cease immediately.”
For the first time in history since World War II, the US delegation voted against a text, along with that of Russia, against those of Canada, the Europeans and Japan who approved it.
Then, the United States presented a second resolution itself so that “the conflict be ended as soon as possible.” This text aimed to align the General Assembly with the position of the US negotiators in Riyadh. But Russia voted against it because the text “advocates for a lasting peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation” and not for a “lasting peace within Ukraine.” As a result, the United States, considering that it had poorly drafted its proposal, abstained on its own text, while Canada, the Europeans and Japan condemned it.
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25
Kaja Kallas, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, travelled to Washington to meet with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The meeting, which had been announced for a long time, was cancelled at the last minute by Mr Rubio’s secretariat, officially due to his overbooked schedule.
Ms Kallas said that instead, she would meet “with senators and (…) members of Congress to discuss Russia’s war against Ukraine and transatlantic relations”.
After EU members voted against the US at the UN, the Secretary of State refused to meet his European counterpart.
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26
At a press conference in kyiv, Volodymyr Zelensky assured on February 26 that without security guarantees from the United States and NATO, any peace agreement would be unfair and there would be no real ceasefire.
THURSDAY 27 FEBRUARY
Before leaving Washington, Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, gave a lecture at the Hudson Institute on February 27. She said: “We need to put pressure on Russia to also want peace. It is in a position where it does not want peace.”
Keir Starmer, British Prime Minister, went to the White House, carrying an invitation from King Charles III for a second state visit to the United Kingdom. Her Majesty’s diplomats believe that President Trump greatly enjoyed the premiere and that, given his pride, he would be sensitive to the pomp of the Crown.
During the two leaders’ press conference, President Trump claimed not to remember calling Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator” (“Did I say that? I can’t believe I said it!”). In addition, he expressed openness to the idea of the 25% tariff hike not affecting the United Kingdom and to London returning the Chagos Islands (including the Diego Garcia base) to Mauritius.
On the substance, Keir Starmer managed to renew his country’s "special relationship" with the United States. This includes the "Five Eyes" global interception and espionage system and the delegation of the strike force (remember that the British atomic bomb could not work without the support of US military scientists).
Meanwhile, US and Russian negotiators met for six and a half hours at the US Consulate General in Istanbul for a second round of negotiations, at a "technical level". It was not a question of progress on the substance, but of resolving problems that had been addressed by the ministers in Riyadh. Namely, the operating conditions of the respective embassies in Washington and Moscow, which President Joe Biden had considerably supervised and to which Moscow had responded identically.
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 28
The unelected Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, visited the White House on February 28. President Trump and Vice President Vance received him, not to listen to his version of events, but to sign an agreement on rare earths that Ukraine claims to possess. Of course, he could not have done so, since they do not exist, but it was a way for the Trump administration to show the man who is no longer known whether it considers him a “democrat” or a “dictator” that he no longer had any cards in his hand.
The welcome press briefing will be remembered. The Western press was shocked by the altercation between President Trump and his guest. We must be wary of images here: they do not say the same thing at all if we stick to a selected excerpt or if we listen to the entire exchange. In an excerpt, we remember the arguments that are stated, while overall, we understand why they are stated.
During the fifty minutes of this press briefing, President Donald Trump constantly recalled that he was not aligned with either party, Russian or Ukrainian, but that he was negotiating with Russia to defend the interests of his country and, ultimately, for all of Humanity. As President of the United States, he speaks with everyone, is careful not to insult anyone and recognizes the positive points of each. On the contrary, Volodymyr Zelensky has constantly accused Russia of aggression since 2014, of murders, kidnappings and torture. He even claimed that President Vladimir Putin had violated his own signature 15 times.
Contrary to what the Western press saw, this press briefing did not focus on military aid, rare earths and even less on a division of territories. It escalated when Vice President Vance noted that his host’s narrative was “propaganda,” then returned to the charge, declaring of both versions of the facts: “We know you’re wrong!” Ultimately, President Trump noted that Ukraine was in bad shape and that his guest not only was not grateful for U.S. support, but did not want a ceasefire. Exasperated, he observed that Vladimir Putin had never violated his signature, neither with Barack Obama nor with him, but only with Joe Biden because of what the latter did to him. He then recalled the repeated false accusations made against Russia by President Biden.
SUNDAY, MARCH 2
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said Europe is “at a crossroads of history” as he welcomed to Downing Street the leaders of Ukraine, France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Canada, Finland, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Romania, as well as the Turkish foreign minister, the NATO secretary general and the presidents of the European Commission and European Council.
The UK and France are competing to replace the US and guarantee peace on the European continent. Both countries are said to be prepared to guarantee the security of others with their nuclear weapons. However, no one seriously considers that these would be sufficient to ensure peace in the absence of serious conventional forces, which neither London nor Paris has. At most, Warsaw began reorganising its armies and generalising conscription for its young people more than two years ago, but it still does not have enough weapons.
After the meeting, which aimed to create a “coalition of the willing”, Keir Starmer said on behalf of all participants:
“Today I welcomed to London counterparts from across Europe, including from Türkiye, as well as the Secretary General of NATO and the Presidents of the European Commission, the Council of the EU and Canada, to discuss our support for Ukraine.
Together, we reaffirmed our determination to work towards a permanent peace in Ukraine, in partnership with the United States. Europe’s security is our primary responsibility. We will tackle this historic task and increase our investment in our own defence.
We must not repeat the mistakes of the past when weak agreements allowed President Putin to invade again. We will work with President Trump to secure a strong, just, and lasting peace that ensures Ukraine’s future sovereignty and security. Ukraine must be able to defend itself against future Russian attacks. There must be no talks on Ukraine without Ukraine. We agreed that the United Kingdom, France, and others will work with Ukraine on a plan to end the fighting that we will discuss further with the United States and move forward together (…) In addition, many of us have expressed our readiness to contribute to Ukraine’s security, including through a force of European and other partners, and will intensify our planning. We will continue to work closely together to advance next steps and make decisions in the weeks ahead.”
The participants in this summit have not changed their analysis of the Ukrainian conflict at all. They remain deaf to the United States and, as a result, no longer understand it. They managed to unite not to deploy a peace stabilisation force in Ukraine, but to protect critical infrastructure in western Ukraine or in similar strategic areas. They agreed not to make fragmented national efforts, but to take advantage of the economic power of the European Union (EU) by redirecting its recovery funds. They therefore convened a special European Council on March 6. However, to transform the EU from a common market to a military alliance, they will need not a majority, but the unanimity of the 27 Member States, including Hungary and Slovakia.
And yet, already, Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian Prime Minister, has responded to the draft final declaration of the European Council by stressing that there are “strategic differences” between the EU states. He therefore advocates that there should be no written conclusions, because "any attempt to do so would project the image of a divided European Union."
Translation
Roger Lagassé
There is a bedrock of Russian public opinion on how the war in the Ukraine should end.
There is also a bedrock of American public opinion on whether President Donald Trump is to be believed when he speaks of ending the war under the new American “Golden Dome” of peace with Russia.
Between this rock and this hard place, there are the politics and the business of enlarging power and making money. According to Trump in his March 4 speech to Congress, he aims at “building the most powerful military of the future. As a first step, I am asking Congress to fund a state-of-the-art golden dome missile defence shield to protect our homeland — all made in the U.S.A.”
For “most powerful military of the future”, Trump means new hypersonic weapons for a first strike against Russian and Chinese nuclear forces. For his “golden dome”, Trump means first-strike capacity without fear of retaliation — without mutually assured destruction by the Russians and Chinese. The word for this isn’t peace – it’s a new US arms race.
In the recent statement by Howard Lutnick, Trump’s long time business friend and now US Commerce Secretary, Trump’s strategy for ending the current war on the Ukrainian battlefield means a cash dividend payable on a ceasefire at the frozen line of contact; this peace with Russia means business with Russia. “The President,” said Lutnick, “is going to figure out what are the tools he can use on Russia, and what are the tools he can use on Ukraine. Like any great mediator, he’s going to beat both sides down, to get them to the table…We’ve given three hundred billion dollars to the Ukraine. Is it difficult to see what side we’re on? Gimme a break…Let’s go force Russia into a reasonable peace deal…Enough already.”
Between the rock, the hard place, and the Golden Dome, there is plenty of hopeful, wishful thinking. This is understandable, especially at this time of Lent. It’s also religious faith. The Roman Catholic bishops of Europe have just issued their Lenten proclamation that “as Christians prepare to embark on the journey of Lent, a time of repentance and conversion leading to Easter, the feast of hope and new life, we continue to entrust Ukraine and Europe to our Lord Jesus Christ, through the intercession of Mary, the Queen of Peace.”
Because the bishops are as unconfident of Mary’s mediation and Christ’s intervention, as they are of Trump’s, they say they are still for holy war against “Russia the aggressor”, and for British and French guns to enforce it. “Amid deepening geopolitical complexities and the unpredictability of actions taken by some members of the international community,” the bishops say, meaning the US and Trump, “we call on the European Union and its Member States to remain united in their commitment to supporting Ukraine and its people. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a blatant violation of international law… A comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine can only be achieved through negotiations. Any credible and sincere dialogue effort should be supported by continued strong transatlantic and global solidarity and it must involve the victim of the aggression: Ukraine. We firmly reject any attempts to distort the reality of this aggression. In order to be sustainable and just, a future peace accord must fully respect international law and be underpinned by effective security guarantees to prevent the conflict from re-erupting.”
Under their mitres, when the bishops are saying complexity, unpredictability, and distortion of reality, they are thinking Trump.
Reviving the crusade against the Russian infidels is also what the regimes of the UK and Europe want. But the public belief in this crusade is waning, especially in the UK, creating another rock-and-hard- place squeeze for Prime Minister Keir Starmer; his military, intelligence and other Deep State institutions; the City business lobby; and the British media.
The Russian response is as sceptical of Trump as it is of the combination of Europe’s rulers and their bishops.
In nationwide polling in the second half of January, the Levada Centre of Moscow reported the high level of support for President Vladimir Putin, is qualified by the conviction of the majority of voters that the end of the war terms must not (repeat not) concede the return of the four new regions – Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye. “Although there is talk of Russia’s interest in rare metals and other resources in the depths these provinces, in some industrial enterprises, etc., [public opinion is] not about the material side. Russian society is showing what Lenin called the’ national pride of the Great Russians’. The level of solidarity is very high…What would the majority want? They are for peace, but their peace plan is that it stops at the point when they can feel victory.”
Listen to the new podcast here.
By the end of February, Trump’s first month in office, Russian public support for the Army has reached the 80% peak expressed at the beginning of the Special Military Operation (SVO) in March 2022. Public confidence that the SVO is progressing successfully has now hit a peak of 72%.
At the same time, Russian support for end-of-war negotiations between Russia and the US is high. According to Levada’s poll of February 20-26, “the most preferred conditions for concluding a peace agreement for respondents are: the exchange of Russian and Ukrainian prisoners of war – 92%; ensuring the rights of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine – 83%; protecting the status of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine – 79%; establishing a friendly Russian government in Ukraine – 73%; lifting Western sanctions against Russia – 71%; demilitarization of Ukraine and , reducing its army – 70%; an immediate ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine – 69%.”
Wariness towards Trump and the Americans is the watchword of Russian policymakers. Dmitry Rogozin, the senator for Zaporozhye and commander of a combat unit at the front, is urging scepticism towards press announcements that the US is halting deliveries of new weapons to the Ukraine, and stopping intelligence-sharing with the Ukrainian General Staff.
Source: https://t.me/rogozin_do/6804
Rogozin’s scepticism has been corroborated by the Central Intelligence Agency Director, John Ratcliffe: “"I think on the military front and the intelligence front, the pause I think will go away. I think we'll work shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine as we have to push back on the aggression that's there, but to put the world in a better place for these peace negotiations to move forward.”
In today’s hour-long podcast with Nima Alkhorshid, we discuss the Special Inspector General’s (SIG) recent report to Congress, revealing that the total spent and sent by the US for military, other security and infrastructure assistance to the Ukraine is only $83.4 billion; that’s just a quarter fraction of the $350 billion figure Trump, Lutnick and other US officials have been publicizing. Most of this money, the SIG report also reveals, is for replenishment of weapons stocks taken out of the Army and other Pentagon stocks and sent to the battlefield; and for equipping and operating US military forces in eastern Europe, outside the Ukraine.
Read the accounting details here.
Source: https://johnhelmer.net/
Finally, as discussed in the podcast, here is the evidence from dozens of US opinion polls that Trump’s claims about American voter support are false. In his speech to Congress, the President said “for the first time in modern history, more Americans believe that our country is headed in the right direction than the wrong direction. In fact, it’s an astonishing record: 27-point swing, the most ever.”
The week before, the White House Press Office published the headline claim of “massive support for President Trump and his agenda”. In point of fact, the poll revealed that on the question of whether the country is moving in the right direction or not, despite the improvement on the positive side since the end of the Biden Administration, the majority of Americans think the country is going in the wrong direction, 48% to 42%. Black Americans were significantly more pessimistic; 59% said the wrong direction.
Source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/
Source: https://harvardharrispoll.com/
A closer look at the February 19-20 panel interview poll cited by the White House also reveals strong voters majorities opposed to Trump’s line on negotiating peace with Russia. One of the reasons, the poll identifies, is that most Americans still believe Russia is expansionist and will move into other countries unless restrained by US forces.
Source: https://harvardharrispoll.com/
Compilations of this and 36 other national polls by Realclearpolitics.com, reporting as recently as March 2, reveal that since the Inauguration, public disapproval of Trump’s performance has been growing, and approval shrinking until this week there is just 1.3% between them. The Harvard Harris poll cited by the White House was the second most favourable to Trump of all 37 polls reporting.
Source: https://www.realclearpolling.com/
When the direction of the country, right or wrong, was questioned by the pollsters, the average of the poll results as of March 2 was a negative spread of 9%; that’s to say, 51.4% believe the country under Trump is going in the wrong direction, while 41.4% believe it is going in the right direction.
Source: https://www.realclearpolling.com/
Trump’s negative job approval rating after his first month in office contrasts with Biden’s positive job approval for his first seven months. President Barack Obama’s job approval remained positive for the first 18 months of his term. “We’ve done more in two weeks than Obama and Biden!” Trump said in February. The majority of US voters don’t believe him.
How to make losing the war in the Ukraine look like a win – this is President Donald Trump’s purpose in presenting himself and his administration as in favour of peace and of cashback to the United States. If he succeeds, he won’t appear to be running away from the battlefield, as the Ford Administration did in Saigon in April 1975, and the Biden Administration in Kabul in August 2021.
This is a hustle – it is an attempt by a combination of threats and rewards to convert a political and military defeat into a ready money profit; call the process peacemaking, Trump himself the peacemaker, and the outcome peace.
Trump believes this will be easier to negotiate with President Vladimir Putin than the military terms for an end-of-war armistice, capitulation by the Ukrainian military, and demilitarization of what remains of Ukrainian territory. About these issues, no US official has had anything certain to say yet. A money-for-peace deal is also simpler to manage than the creation of a new mutual security architecture for Russia, Europe and NATO which was first proposed by the Russian Foreign Ministry in December 2021.
“Lemme me tell ya wha’ the set-up was,” said Howard Lutnick, one of Trump’s chief hustlers and now US Commerce Secretary. Lutnick has explained that what the plan is, and what has been and still is expected from Vladimir Zelensky in Kiev. “The President wants peace…Like any great mediator, he’s going to beat both sides down, to get them to the table…We’ve given three hundred billion dollars to the Ukraine. Is it difficult to see what side we’re on. Gimme a break…Let’s go force Russia into a reasonable peace deal….Enough already.”
With Dimitri Lascaris we discuss each of the elements of this hustle as it is being applied to French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and then turned into economic war against Canada.The podcast runs for an hour. We focus on Canada starting at Minute 33:50. Click to view and listen. The Youtube version is here.
For more about Melinda McCracken with whom I first began to love Canada, read this.
Her memoir of growing up in Winnipeg before Americanization began in the 1950s can be read here
In describing Glenn Gould, the greatest of Canadians and defender against US political pressure campaigns in his time, I misspoke in quoting his defence of his driving. “I suppose it can be said that I’m an absent-minded driver,” he said. “It’s true that I’ve driven through a number of red lights on occasion, but on the other hand, I’ve stopped at a lot of green ones but never gotten credit for it.”
This week, on March 2, Chrystia Freeland has claimed she played a “leading role” in the operation to steal the Russian Central Bank’s reserves in February 2022, and then “a key role” in transferring $50 billion of the stolen Russian money to the Ukraine. “I led that charge politically,” she swears, hand on heart.
In this new clip, Freeland is campaigning for Liberal Party member votes to succeed Justin Trudeau as party leader — acting prime minister until the election which must be held within eight months.
Freeland misrepresents the financial transfers to the Ukraine and her own role. She claims that $50 billion of the frozen Russian Central Bank reserves has been transferred to the Ukraine but this is false. The $50 billion has been loaned to the Ukraine — $20 billion by the US, €18.1 billion by the European Union, ¥473 billion ($3.2 billion) from Japan, £2.3 billion by the UK ($3 billion), and C$5 billion from Canada. Interest payments on the loan are being paid out of interest earned on the confiscated Russian funds by the Belgian clearing fund, Euroclear. For the time being, the Russian money is paying loan interest only; Freeland implies that it will be Russian money to pay the $50 billion principal when the loan falls due.
For details of the scheme, read this. In its latest financial report, the Belgium-based clearing house Euroclear reveals how the scheme is making profit for itself and tax revenue for the Belgian government.
The Euroclear report also exposes another of Freeland’s fabrications. Canada’s finance minister between 2020 and 2024, Freeland claims that very little of the Russian reserves were in Canadian dollars because “Putin knew we were not his pals even before the war.” In fact, according to Euroclear, there were more Canadian dollars in the Russian Central Bank holdings than US dollars.
Source: https://www.euroclear.com/
Trump and his team have been busy dismantling – and exposing to public view – the mechanism to the all-encompassing narrative control machine which has been shown to be both authoritarian and industrial in its global scope.
The Musk investigations have begun to peer into the USAID complex. They reveal
The big picture however is not that USAID has been a sub-silo for CIA; that is not revelatory. What is revealing, however, is the evidence that USAID was so heavily involved in domestic influence operations. This latter aspect serves to highlight USAID’s relationship with the CIA and the fact that CIA, FBI, Dept. of Homeland Security and USAID were one big Intelligence Community structure, held together (in flimsy legal terms) by the Office of Director of National Intelligence (the role that Tulsi Gabbard will fill now she has been confirmed in post).
Trump’s insistence on Gabbard for the post reflects his absolute need for Intelligence ‘truth’; but it is also likely that the DNI will become the locus for unscrambling and revealing the shadow ‘Intelligence Control Machine’ that is twin to the narrative manipulation complex.
Likely more revelations will follow, as part to a carefully managed release of further exposés – adding to the atmosphere of a breathless hurtling towards a new era. And keeping the opposition off-balance.
The Spectator magazine correctly observes that the head-spinning acceleration towards a new era is not confined to America, Canada, Greenland and Panama: “There is a wind of change blowing through the West. It emanates from Washington DC”, Gavin Mortimer writes.
A number of EU leaders congregated last weekend at a ‘Patriots for Europe’ (PfE) summit in Madrid. Geert Wilders declared:
“We are living in an historic age, and my message to all the old leaders from Macron to Scholz, to your own Pedro Sánchez?: It’s time. It’s over now. They are history”.
Viktor Orbán said:
“The Trump tornado has changed the world in just a few weeks … Yesterday we were heretics, today we’re mainstream”.
Marine Le Pen claimed that the West is “facing a truly global turning point … Meanwhile, the European Union seems to be in a state of shock … [in the consensus Brussels view however], Trump isn’t an inspiring figure – but an antagonizing one”.
Nonetheless, in the U.S., the first CBS-YouGov snapshot poll; n) shows what public sentiment thinks of Trump: 69% see him as tough; 63% as energetic; 60 % as focussed, and 58% as effective. His overall job rating stands at 53%. Just how Trump would like his image to be, we imagine.
Trump’s ‘showman’ image and ‘shock psycho-therapy’ clearly works for domestic America. In the world beyond, it is another story. There they have only Trump’s ‘reported’ rhetoric by which to judge. They do not get to see the full theatrical ‘global leadership show’, so his conjuring is understood more literally. And the rest of the world is only too aware of America’s history of broken-words (and withdrawals from agreements).
Overseas, Trump sticks with this same strategy of presenting shock interventions, or rather, an image (Gaza, for example) of an aspirational outcome that is intended to be novel, and to evoke surprise and evenshock. The purpose seems to be to toss a psychological grenade into congealed and stultified political paradigms, hoping to find movement and intending perhaps, to trigger changed conversations.
There can be validity to such an approach, providing it does not just stick a wrench into complex geo-politics. And for Trump, this is a real danger: Advancing extreme and unrealistic notions that can simply confuse and undermine confidence that his outcome could be realistic.
The inescapable fact is that the three key foreign policy issues which Trump faces however, are not ‘conversations’ – they relate to existential wars; to death and destruction. And wars are not so susceptible to off-hand grenade tossing. Worse, ‘careless words’ fired from the hip, have real import and may produce unintended and distinctly adverse consequences.
The cease-fire between Israel and Hamas remains close to the brink of collapse, as [“the magician” [Netanyahu] continues working to sabotage it](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-02-12/ty-article/.premium/netanyahu-works-to-derail-gaza-cease-fire-but-trumps-agenda-could-override-his/00000194-f9d8-df1c-ad94-fbfe38a00000 "https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-02-12/ty-article/.premium/netanyahu-works-to-derail-gaza-cease-fire-but-trumps-agenda-could-override-his/00000194-f9d8-df1c-ad94-fbfe38a00000"evertheless Hamas’ pressure in recent days worked, and the ceasefire (for now) continues.
Trump may have believed that by unilaterally raising the stakes (demanding publicly the release of “all” Israeli hostages this Saturday) – thereby collapsing a complex process down to just one single release – he would be able to bring more hostages home quicker. However, in so threatening, he risked the complete collapse of the deal, since the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails, and the withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza in Phase Two, form the absolute bedrock to Hamas’ continued participation in the negotiations.
Any resulting resumption of the Israeli destruction of Gaza would also constitute a black stain on Trump’s aspiration to end wars – for he would then ‘own’ the consequences to a renewal of war in the Middle East.
Netanyahu’s principal concern primordially lies with not completing the deal, but with the continued survival of his government. This was the meaning to his statement in reaction to Trump’s ‘threats’ (hell let loose) that Israel would halt negotiations on Phase Two of the Gaza deal, and in Netanyahu’s echoing of Trump’s demand that Hamas release “all” the hostages on Saturday – or else. The Israeli government however, duly has backtracked under pressure from Hamas – Israel, officials report, has conveyed the message to Hamas that the ceasefire will continue, should the three hostages be released this Saturday.
Whilst it is now obvious from the Trump Team’s discourse that the U.S. is intent to present a new face to the coming multipolar world – “with multi-great powers in different parts of the planet”, as Marco Rubio outlined in a recent interview – it is also true, however, that this change came about (was driven, in fact) by a seismic shift in how the world views America. Rubio effectively admits to this ‘truth’ when he adds that “the postwar global order is not just obsolete; it is now a weapon being used against us”.
Some members of the Trump Team, however, persist with threats (‘inflicting maximum pain’, ‘bombing to extinction’) that hark back to the old era of U.S. imperium. That is to say, some of Trump’s Team repeat Rubio’s rubric well enough, but without showing any indication that they have been affected or transformed by the new understanding. The ‘seismic shift’ is two-way.
The World is in a new era too. It has had enough of western unlateral impositions. It is this that triggered their shift. Their swivel of ‘the face that the U.S. presents to the world’ – the one outlined by Rubio. Understanding that both Hegemon and its vassals have transformed demands new approaches by all sides.
When Trump signed a Presidential Order for maximum pressure on Iran, the Supreme Leader simply said “No” to all talks with the U.S. Trump was just too unpredictable and untrustworthy, Khamenei said. Kellogg’s exaggerated claim that Iran ‘is scared’ and effectively defenceless, didn’t bring the expected response of talks. It brought defiance.
The West’s insensibility to what is going on in the world – and why the world is what it is – has been made possible because it was partially disguised through the ability of the U.S. – in the past era – to be able to impose itself on crises, and control the way that those problems were presented across the global narrative machine.
Trump’s Ukraine Envoy Kellogg said recently that Russia’s current sanctions ‘pain level’ is at about 3 out of 10, and that Trump has much more room to raise that ‘pain level’ by putting sanctions pressure on Russian oil and gas:
“You have to put economic pressure; you have to put diplomatic pressure, some type of military pressures and levers that you’re going to use underneath those to make sure [this goes] where we want it to go”.
The arrogance and misreading of the Russian position in Kellogg’s statement is so complete that it brought Russian Deputy FM Sergei Ryabkov to warn that Moscow-Washington relations are “teetering at the brink of complete rupture”; the ‘antagonistic content’ of Russian-U.S. relations has become ‘very critical’ today, Ryabkov cautioned:
“Washington’s attempts to give Moscow demands or to demonstrate the alleged doing of ‘a great favour’ in exchange for unacceptable U.S. demands are bound to end with failure in the dialogue with Russia”.
This ominous signal was stated by Ryabkov, despite Russia actively wanting a strategic, big-picture, written security deal with the U.S. – albeit one achieved on equal terms.
Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism has cataloged the deep-seated Russian experience (and resentment) for the West’s history of duplicity. It runs deep, and begs a question whose answer is yet to be seen: ‘The elephant in the room’. Drafting a paper of understandings on Ukraine is one thing. But Russians remain sceptical as to whether it can achieve a process that is written, binding and trustworthy.
Behind this lies a second question: Russia can see Trump searching for leverage over Moscow. But time (what Yves Smith calls “military time”) runs to a different tempo to that of “political time”. Trump wants to end the conflict, AND be seen to have ended it. The point here is that Russia’s slower military time may end with Trump falling into what Steve Bannon warned could be a deadly trap: ‘Too long, and you (Trump) will end by owning it’ (as Nixon ended up ‘owning’ Vietnam).
Trump Team members may, at one level, ‘understand’ the new balance of power. Yet culturally and unconsciously, they adhere to the notion that the West (and Israel) remain exceptional, and that all other actors only change behaviour through pain and overwhelming leverage.
What did emerge from the transcript of Trump’s long call with Putin was that it touched on big issues and did not at all stay captive to the Ukraine issue.
Yves Smith puts the ‘elephant in the room’ issue this way:
“It took a full 17 years from Putin’s 2008 Munich Security Conference speech, where he called for a multipolar world order, for the U.S. to officially acknowledge, via Mark Rubio, that the U.S. unipolar period was unnatural and had ended”.
Let us hope it will not take as long for Russia to achieve a new European security architecture. As The Telegraph avers: “This is Putin and Trump’s world now”.
(Republished from Strategic Culture Foundation by permission of author or representative)
Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin (photo from 2018).
US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin have officially begun negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Whatever the territorial solutions, they will not resolve the entire dispute. It will probably persist beyond peace.
Three problems overlap:
1) NATO’s expansion to the East and the Brzeziński Doctrine
When the East Germans themselves tore down the Berlin Wall (November 9, 1989), the West, taken by surprise, negotiated the end of the two Germanys. Throughout 1990 the question arose whether German reunification would mean that East Germany, by joining West Germany, would enter NATO or not.
When the Atlantic Alliance Treaty was signed in 1949, it did not protect certain territories of certain signatories. For example, the French territories in the Pacific (Réunion, Mayotte, Wallis and Futuna, Polynesia and New Caledonia) were not covered. It would therefore have been possible that, in a unified Germany, NATO would not have been allowed to deploy in East Germany.
This issue is very important for the Central and Eastern European states that were attacked by Germany during the Second World War. In the eyes of their populations, seeing sophisticated weapons being installed on their borders was worrying. Even more so for Russia, whose immense borders (6,600 kilometres) are indefensible.
At the Malta Summit (2-3 December 1989) between the US and Russian Presidents, George Bush (the father) and Mikhail Gorbachev, the US argued that it had not intervened to bring down the Berlin Wall and that it had no intention of intervening against the USSR at that time [1].
West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher stated that "the changes in Eastern Europe and the process of German unification must not lead to an ’attack on Soviet security interests’". Consequently, NATO should rule out an ’expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. a rapprochement with the Soviet borders’"
The three occupying powers of Germany, the United States, France and the United Kingdom, therefore made repeated commitments not to expand NATO towards the East. The Moscow Treaty (12 September 1990) assumed that a reunified Germany would not claim territory from Poland (Oder-Neisse line), and that no NATO bases would be present in East Germany [2].
At a joint press conference in 1995 at the White House, President Boris Yeltsin described the meeting they had just had as "disastrous", provoking laughter from President Bill Clinton. It is indeed better to laugh than to cry.
However, the Russians were informed that Deputy Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke was touring the capitals to prepare the NATO membership of former Warsaw Pact states. President Boris Yeltsin therefore harangued his counterpart, Bill Clinton, at the Budapest summit (5 December 1994) of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). He declared: "Our attitude towards NATO’s enlargement plans, and in particular the possibility of infrastructure progress to the East, remains and will remain invariably negative. Arguments such as: enlargement is not directed against any state and is a step towards the creation of a unified Europe, do not stand up to criticism. This is a decision whose consequences will determine the European configuration for years to come. It may lead to a slide towards the deterioration of trust between Russia and the Western countries. […] NATO was created at the time of the Cold War. Today, not without difficulty, it is seeking its place in the new Europe. It is important that this approach does not create two zones of demarcation, but on the contrary, that it consolidates European unity. This objective, for us, is contradictory to NATO’s expansion plans. Why sow the seeds of distrust? After all, we are no longer enemies; we are all partners now. The year 1995 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Half a century later, we are increasingly aware of the true significance of the Great Victory and the need for historic reconciliation in Europe. There must no longer be adversaries, winners and losers. For the first time in its history, our continent has a real chance of finding unity. To miss it is to forget the lessons of the past and to call into question the future itself. Bill Clinton replied: "NATO will not automatically exclude any nation from membership. […] At the same time, no external country will be allowed to veto expansion.” [3].
At this summit, three memoranda were signed, including one with independent Ukraine. In exchange for its denuclearization, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States committed to refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.
However, during the Yugoslav wars, Germany intervened, as a member of NATO. It trained Kosovar fighters on the basis of the Incirlik Alliance (Türkiye), then deployed its men there.
However, at the NATO summit in Madrid (8 and 9 July 1997), the heads of state and government of the Alliance announced that they were preparing for the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In addition, they are also considering that of Slovenia and Romania.
Aware that it cannot prevent sovereign states from entering into alliances, but worried about the consequences for its own security of what is being prepared, Russia intervened in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at the Istanbul summit (18 and 19 November 1999). It had a declaration adopted establishing the principle of free membership of any sovereign state in the alliance of its choice and that of not taking measures for its security to the detriment of that of its neighbours.
However, in 2014, the United States organised a colour revolution in Ukraine, overthrowing the democratically elected president (who wanted to keep his country halfway between the United States and Russia) and installing a neo-Nazi regime that was publicly aggressive against Russia.
In 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO. In 2009, it was Albania and Croatia. In 2017, Montenegro. In 2020, North Macedonia. In 2023, Finland, and in 2024, Sweden. All promises have been broken.
To understand how we got to this point, we also need to know what the United States was thinking.
In 1997, former security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, the Polish-American Zbigniew Brzeziński, published The Grand Chessboard. In it, he discusses “geopolitics” in the original sense, that is, not the influence of geographical data on international politics, but a plan for world domination.
According to him, the United States can remain the world’s leading power by allying itself with the Europeans and isolating Russia. Now retired, this democrat offers the Straussians a strategy to keep Russia in check, without however proving them right. Indeed, he supports cooperation with the European Union, while the Straussians wish on the contrary to slow its development (Wolfowitz doctrine). In any case, Brzeziński would become an advisor to President Barack Obama.
Monument in Lviv to the glory of the criminal against Humanity Stepan Bandera
2) Nazification of Ukraine
At the beginning of the special operation of the Russian army in Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin declared that his first goal was to denazify the country. The West then pretended to ignore the problem. They accused Russia of exaggerating some marginal facts although they had been observed on a large scale for a decade.
This is because the two rival US geopoliticians, Paul Wolfowitz and Zbigniew Brzeziński, had formed an alliance with the “integral nationalists” (i.e. with the disciples of the philosopher Dmytro Dontsov and the militia leader Stepan Bandera) [4], at a conference organized by the latter in Washington in 2000. It was on this alliance that the Department of Defense had bet, in 2001, when it outsourced its research into biological warfare to Ukraine, under the authority of Antony Fauci, then Health Advisor to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. It was also on this alliance that the State Department had bet, in 2014, with the Euromaidan color revolution.
The two Ukrainian Jewish presidents, Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelensky, allowed memorials to be built throughout their country paying tribute to Nazi collaborators, particularly in Galicia. They allowed Dmytro Dontsov’s ideology to become the historical reference. For example, today, the Ukrainian population attributes the great famine of 1932-1933, which caused between 2.5 and 5 million deaths, to an imaginary desire of Russia to exterminate the Ukrainians; a founding myth that does not stand up to historical analysis [5], in fact, this famine affected many other regions of the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is on the basis of this lie that Kyiv managed to make its population believe that the Russian army wanted to invade Ukraine. Today, several dozen countries, including France [6] and Germany [7], have adopted, by overwhelming majorities, laws or resolutions to validate this propaganda.
Nazification is more complex than we think: with NATO’s involvement in this proxy war, the Centuria Order, that is to say the secret society of Ukrainian integral nationalists, has penetrated the Alliance forces. In France, it is already present in the Gendarmerie (which, by the way, has never made public its report on the Boutcha massacre).
The contemporary West wrongly perceives the Nazis as criminals who primarily massacred Jews. This is absolutely false. Their main enemies were the Slavs. During the Second World War, the Nazis murdered many people, first by shooting and then, from 1942, in camps. The Slavic civilian victims of Nazi racial ideology were more numerous than the Jewish victims (about 6 million if we add the people killed by shooting and those killed in the camps). Moreover, since some victims were both Slavic and Jewish, they are included in both assessments. After the massacres of 1940 and 1941, approximately 18 million people from all backgrounds were interned in concentration camps, of whom 11 million in total were murdered (1,100,000 in the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp alone) [8]..
The Soviet Union, which was torn apart during the Bolshevik revolution, did not reunite until 1941 when Joseph Stalin formed an alliance with the Orthodox Church and put an end to the massacres and political internments (the "gulags") to fight against the Nazi invasion. The victory against racial ideology founded today’s Russia. The Russian people see themselves as the slayers of racism.
3) Russia’s rejection from Europe
The third bone of contention between the West and Russia arose not before, but during the Ukrainian war. The West adopted various measures against what symbolized Russia. Of course, unilateral coercive measures (abusively called “sanctions”) were taken at the government level, but discriminatory measures were also taken at the citizen level. Many restaurants were banned for Russians in the United States or Russian shows were canceled in Europe.
Symbolically, we accepted the idea that Russia is not European, but Asian (which it also partially is). We rethought the Cold War dichotomy, opposing the free world (capitalist and believer) to the totalitarian specter (socialist and atheist), into an opposition between Western values (individualist) and those of Asia (communitarian).
Behind this shift, racial ideologies are resurfacing. I noted three years ago that the New York Times’ 1619 Project and President Joe Biden’s woke rhetoric were in reality, perhaps unwittingly, a reverse reformulation of racism [9]. I note that today President Donald Trump shares the same analysis as me and has systematically revoked all of his predecessor’s woke innovations. But the damage is done: last month, Westerners reacted to the appearance of the Chinese DeepSeek by denying that Asians could have invented, and not copied, such software. Some government agencies have even banned it from their employees in what is nothing other than a denunciation of the “yellow peril.”
Should Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), the author of "War and Peace", be censored as Ukraine does, where his books are burned because he was Russian?
4) Conclusion
Current negotiations focus on what is directly palpable by public opinion: borders. However, the most important thing is elsewhere. To live together, we need not to threaten the security of others and to recognize them as our equals. This is much more difficult and does not only involve our governments.
From a Russian point of view, the intellectual origin of the three problems examined above lies in the Anglo-Saxon refusal of international law [10]. Indeed, during the Second World War, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed at the Atlantic Summit that after their common victory, they would impose their law on the rest of the world. It was only under pressure from the USSR and France that they accepted the UN statutes, but they continued to flout them, forcing Russia to boycott the organization when they refused the People’s Republic of China the right to sit on it. The glaring example of Western duplicity is given by the State of Israel, which tramples on a hundred resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and opinions of the International Court of Justice. This is why, on December 17, 2021, when the war in Ukraine was looming, Moscow proposed to Washington [11] to prevent it by signing a bilateral treaty providing guarantees for peace [12]. The idea of this text was, nothing more, nothing less, that the United States renounce the "rules-based world" and fall in line with international law. This right, imagined by the Russians and the French just before the First World War, consists solely of keeping one’s word in the eyes of public opinion.
There’s an old saying, “Fool around and find out.” On November 19, Ukraine fired six US-made missiles at a target located on Russian soil. On November 20, Ukraine fired up to a dozen British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles against a target on Russian soil. On November 21, Russia fired a new intermediate-range missile against a target of Ukrainian soil.
Ukraine and its American and British allies fooled around.
And now they have found out: if you attack Mother Russia, you will pay a heavy price.
In the early morning hours of November 21, Russia launched a missile which struck the Yuzmash factory in the Ukrainian city of Dnipropetrovsk. Hours after this missile, which was fired from the Russian missile test range in Kapustin Yar, struck its target, Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared on Russian television, where he announced that the missile fired by Russia, which both the media and western intelligence had classified as an experimental modification of the RS-26 missile, which had been mothballed by Russia in 2017, was, in fact, a completely new weapon known as the “Oreshnik,” which in Russian means “hazelnut.” Putin noted that the missile was still in its testing phase, and that the combat launch against Ukraine was part of the test, which was, in his words, “successful.”
Russian President Putin announces the launching of the Oreshnik missile in a live television address
Putin declared that the missile, which flew to its target at more than ten times the speed of sound, was invincible. “Modern air defense systems that exist in the world, and anti-missile defenses created by the Americans in Europe, can’t intercept such missiles,” Putin said.
Putin said the Oreshnik was developed in response to the planned deployment by the United States of the Dark Eagle hypersonic missile, itself an intermediate-range missile. The Oreshnik was designed to “mirror” US and NATO capabilities.
The next day, November 22, Putin met with the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Sergey Karakayev, where it was announced that the Oreshnik missile would immediately enter serial production. According to General Karakayev, the Oreshnik, when deployed, could strike any target in Europe without fear of being intercepted. According to Karakayev, the Oreshnik missile system expanded the combat capabilities of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces to destroy various types of targets in accordance with their assigned tasks, both in non-nuclear and nuclear warheads. The high operational readiness of the system, Karakayev said, allows for retargeting and destroying any designated target in the shortest possible time.
Scott will discuss this article and answer audience questions on Ep. 215 of _Ask The Inspector
“Missiles will speak for themselves”
The circumstances which led Russia to fire, what can only be described as a strategic weapons system against Ukraine, unfolded over the course of the past three months. On September 6, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin traveled to Ramstein, Germany, where he met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who pressed upon Lloyd the importance of the US granting Ukraine permission to use the US-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile on targets located inside the pre-2014 borders of Russia (these weapons had been previously used by Ukraine against territory claimed by Russia, but which is considered under dispute—Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Lugansk). Zelensky also made the case for US concurrence regarding similar permissions to be granted regarding the British-made Storm Shadow cruise missile.
Ukraine was in possession of these weapons and had made use of them against the Russian territories in dispute. Other than garnering a few headlines, these weapons had virtually zero discernable impact on the battlefield, where Russian forces were prevailing in battle against stubborn Ukrainian defenders.
Secretary Austin listened while Zelensky made his case for the greenlight to use ATACMS and Storm Shadow against Russian targets. “We need to have this long-range capability, not only on the divided territory of Ukraine but also on Russian territory so that Russia is motivated to seek peace,” Zelensky argued, adding that, “We need to make Russian cities and even Russian soldiers think about what they need: peace or Putin.”
Austin rejected the Ukrainian President’s request, noting that no single military weapon would be decisive in the ongoing fighting between Ukraine and Russia, emphasizing that the use of US and British weapons to attack targets inside Russia would only increase the chances for escalating the conflict, bringing a nuclear-armed Russia into direct combat against NATO forces.
On September 11, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, accompanied by British Foreign Secretary David Lammy, traveled to the Ukrainian capital of Kiev, where Zelensky once again pressured both men regarding permission to use ATACMS and Storm Shadow on targets inside Russia. Both men demurred, leaving the matter for a meeting scheduled between US President Joe Biden and British Prime Minister Kier Starmer, on Friday, September 13.
The next day, September 12, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke to the press in Saint Petersburg, Russia, where he addressed the question of the potential use by Ukraine of US- and British-made weapons. “This will mean that NATO countries – the United States and European countries – are at war with Russia,” Putin said. “And if this is the case, then, bearing in mind the change in the essence of the conflict, we will make appropriate decisions in response to the threats that will be posed to us.”
President Biden took heed of the Russian President’s words, and despite being pressured by Prime Minister Starmer to greenlight the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow by Ukraine, opted to continue the US policy of prohibiting such actions.
And there things stood, until November 18, when President Biden, responding to reports that North Korea had dispatched thousands of troops to Russia to join in the fighting against Ukrainian forces, reversed course, allowing US-provided intelligence to be converted into data used to guide both the ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles to their targets. These targets had been provided by Zelensky to the US back in September, when the Ukrainian President visited Biden at the White House. Zelensky had made striking these targets with ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles a key part of his so-called “victory plan.”
After the approval had been given by the US, Zelensky spoke to the press. “Today, there is a lot of talk in the media about us receiving a permit for respective actions,” he said. “Hits are not made with words. Such things don’t need announcements. Missiles will speak for themselves.”
The next day, November 19, Ukraine fired six ATACMS against targets near the Russian city of Bryansk. The day after—November 20—Ukraine fired Storm Shadow missiles against a Russian command post in the Kursk province of Russia.
The Ukrainian missiles had spoken.
The Russian response
Shortly after the Storm Shadow attacks on Kursk occurred, Ukrainian social media accounts began reporting that Ukrainian intelligence had determined that the Russians were preparing an RS-26 Rubezh missile for launch against Ukrain[
Trident D5 missile launch from an Ohio-class submarine
e. These reports suggested that the intelligence came from US-provided warnings, including imagery, as well as intercepted radio communications from the Kapustin Yar missile test facility, located east of the Russian city of Astrakhan.
Test launch of an RS-26 missile
The RS-26 was a missile that, depending on its payload configuration, could either be classified as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM, meaning it could reach ranges of over 5,500 kilometers) or an intermediate-range missile (IRBM, meaning it could fly between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers). Given that the missile was developed and tested from 2012-2016, this meant the RS-26 would either be declared as an ICBM and be counted as part of the New Start Treaty, or as an IRBM, and as such be prohibited by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The INF Treaty had been in force since July 1988 and had successfully mandated the elimination of an entire category of nuclear-armed weapons deemed to be among the most destabilizing in the world.
In 2017, the Russian government decided to halt the further development of the RS-26 given the complexities brought on by the competing arms control restrictions.
In 2019, then-President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the INF Treaty. The US immediately began testing intermediate-range cruise missiles and announced its intention to develop a new family of hypersonic intermediate range missiles known as Dark Eagle.
Despite this provocation, the Russian government announced a unilateral moratorium of producing and deploying IRBMs, declaring that this moratorium would remain in place until the US or NATO deployed an IRBM on European soil.
In September 2023, the US deployed a new containerized missile launch system capable of firing the Tomahawk cruise missile to Denmark as part of a NATO training exercise. The US withdrew the launcher from Denmark upon conclusion of the training.
In late June 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would resume production of intermediate-range missiles, citing the US deployment of intermediate-range missiles to Denmark. “We need to start production of these strike systems and then, based on the actual situation, make decisions about where — if necessary to ensure our safety — to place them,” Putin said.
At that time the western media speculated about the mothballed RS-26 being brought back into production.
When Ukraine announced that it had detected an RS-26 being prepared for launch on November 20, many observers (including me) accepted this possibility, given the June announcement by President Putin and the associated speculation. As such, when on the night on November 21, the Ukrainians announced that an RS-26 missile had been launched from Kapustin Yar against a missile production facility in the city of Dnipropetrovsk, these reports were taken at face value.
As it turned out, we were all wrong.
Ukrainian intelligence, after examining missile debris from the attack, seems to support this assertion. Whereas the RS-26 was a derivative of the SS-27M ICBM, making use of its first and second stages, the Orezhnik, according to the Ukrainians, made use of the first and second stages of the new “Kedr” (Cedar) ICBM, which is in the early stages of development. Moreover, the weapons delivery system appears to be taken from the newly developed Yars-M, which uses independent post-boost vehicles, or IPBVs, known in Russian as blok individualnogo razvedeniya (BIR), instead of traditional multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, or MIRVs.
In the classic weapons configuration for a modern Russian missile, the final stage of the missile, also known as the post-boost vehicle (PBV or bus), contains all the MIRVs. Once the missile exits the earth’s atmosphere, the PBV detaches from the missile body, and then independently maneuvers, releasing each warhead at the required point for it to reach its intended target. Since the MIRVs are all attached to the same PBV, the warheads are released over targets that are on a relatively linear path, limiting the area that can be targeted.
A missile using an IPBV configuration, however, can release each reentry vehicle at the same time, allowing each warhead to follow an independent trajectory to its target. This allows for greater flexibility and accuracy.
The Oreshnik was designed to carry between four and six IPBVs. The one used against Dnipropetrovsk was a six IPBV-capable system. Each war head in turn contained six separate submunitions, consisting of metal slugs forged from exotic alloys that enabled them to maintain their form during the extreme heat generated by hypersonic re-entry speeds. These slugs are not explosive; rather they use the combined effects of the kinetic impact at high speed and the extreme heat absorbed by the exotic alloy to destroy their intended target on impact.
Oreshnik missile impact on the Dnipropetrovsk military industrial complex
The military industrial target struck by the Oreshnik was hit by six independent warheads, each containing six submunitions. In all, the Dnipropetrovsk facility was struck be 36 separate munitions, inflicting devastating damage, including to underground production facilities used by Ukraine and its NATO allies to produce short- and intermediate-range missiles.
These facilities were destroyed.
The Russians had spoken as well.
Back to the future
If history is the judge, the Oreshnik will likely mirror in terms of operational concept a Soviet-era missile, the Skorost, which was developed beginning in 1982 to counter the planned deployment by the United States of the Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile to West Germany. The Skorost was, like the Oreshnik, an amalgam of technologies from missiles under development at the time, including an advanced version of the SS-20 IRBM, the yet-to-be deployed SS-25 ICBM, and the still under development SS-27. The result was a road-mobile two-stage missile which could carry either a conventional or nuclear payload that used a six-axle transporter-erector-launcher, or TEL (both the RS-26 and the Oreshnik likewise use a six-axle TEL).
In 1984, as the Skorost neared completion, the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces conducted exercises where SS-20 units practiced the tactics that would be used by the Skorost equipped forces. A total of three regiments of Skorost missiles were planned to be formed, comprising a total of 36 launchers and over 100 missiles. Bases for these units were constructed in 1985.
The Skorost missile and launcher
The Skorost was never deployed; production stopped in March 1987 as the Soviet Union prepared for the realities of the INF Treaty, which would have banned the Skorost system.
The history of the Skorost is important because the operational requirements for the system—to mirror the Pershing II missiles and quickly strike them in time of war—is the same mission given to the Oreshnik missile, with the Dark Eagle replacing the Pershing II.
But the Oreshnik can also strike other targets, including logistic facilities, command and control facilities, air defense facilities (indeed, the Russians just put the new Mk. 41 Aegis Ashore anti-ballistic missile defense facility that was activated on Polish soil on the Oreshnik’s target list).
In short, the Oreshnik is a game-changer in every way. In his November 21 remarks, Putin chided the United States, noting that the decision by President Trump in 2019 to withdraw from the INF Treaty was foolish, made even more so by the looming deployment of the Oreshnik missile, which would have been banned under the treaty.
On November 22, Putin announced that the Oreshnik was to enter serial production. He also noted that the Russians already had a significant stockpile of Oreshnik missiles that would enable Russia to respond to any new provocations by Ukraine and its western allies, thereby dismissing the assessments of western intelligence which held that, as an experimental system, the Russians did not have the ability to repeat attacks such as the one that took place on November 21.
As a conventionally armed weapon, the Oreshnik provides Russia with the means to strike strategic targets without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. This means that if Russia were to decide to strike NATO targets because of any future Ukrainian provocation (or a direct provocation by NATO), it can do so without resorting to nuclear weapons.
Ready for a nuclear exchange
Complicating an already complicated situation is the fact that while the US and NATO try to wrestle with the re-emergence of a Russian intermediate-range missile threat that mirrors that of the SS-20, the appearance of which in the 1970’s threw the Americans and their European allies into a state of panic, Russia has, in response to the very actions which prompted the reemergence of INF weapons in Europe, issued a new nuclear doctrine which lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons by Russia.
The original nuclear deterrence doctrine was published by Russia in 2020. In September 2024, responding to the debate taking place within the US and NATO about authorizing Ukraine to use US- and British-made missiles to attack targets on Russian soil, President Putin instructed his national security council to propose revisions to the 2020 doctrine based upon new realities.
The revamped document was signed into law by Putin on November 19, the same day that Ukraine fired six US-made ATACMS missiles against targets on Russian soil.
After announcing the adoption of the new nuclear doctrine, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov was asked by reporters if a Ukrainian attack on Russia using ATACMS missiles could potentially trigger a nuclear response. Peskov noted that the doctrine’s provision allows the use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional strike that raises critical threats for Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Peskov also noted that the doctrine’s new language holds that an attack by any country supported by a nuclear power would constitute a joint aggression against Russia that triggers the use of nuclear weapons by Russia in response.
Shortly after the new Russian doctrine was made public, Ukraine attacked the territory of Russia using ATACMS missiles.
The next day Ukraine attacked the territory of Russia using Storm Shadow missiles.
Under Russia’s new nuclear doctrine, these attacks could trigger a Russian nuclear response.
The new Russian nuclear doctrine emphasizes that nuclear weapons are “a means of deterrence,” and that their use by Russia would only be as an “extreme and compelled measure.” Russia, the doctrine states, “takes all necessary efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and prevent aggravation of interstate relations that could trigger military conflicts, including nuclear ones.”
Nuclear deterrence, the doctrine declares, is aimed at safeguarding the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state,” deterring a potential aggressor, or “in case of a military conflict, preventing an escalation of hostilities and stopping them on conditions acceptable for the Russian Federation.”
Russia has decided not to invoke its nuclear doctrine at this juncture, opting instead to inject the operational use of the new Oreshnik missile as an intermediate non-nuclear deterrence measure.
The issue at this juncture is whether the United States and its allies are cognizant of the danger their precipitous actions in authorizing Ukrainian attacks on Russian soil have caused.
The answer, unfortunately, appears to be “probably not.”
Rear Admiral Thomas Buchanan
Exhibit A in this regard are comments made by Rear Admiral Thomas Buchanan, the Director of Plans and Policy at the J5 (Strategy, Plans and Policy) for US Strategic Command, the unified combatant command responsible for deterring strategic attack (i.e., nuclear war) through a safe, secure, effective, and credible global combat capability and, when directed, to be ready to prevail in conflict. On November 20, Admiral Buchanan was the keynote speaker at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Project on Nuclear Issues conference in Washington, DC, where he drew upon his experience as the person responsible for turning presidential guidance into preparing and executing the nuclear war plans of the United States.
The host of the event drew upon Admiral Buchanan’s résumé when introducing him to the crowd, a tact which, on the surface, projected a sense of confidence in the nuclear warfighting establishment of the United States. The host also noted that it was fortuitous that Admiral Thomas would be speaking a day after Russia announced its new nuclear doctrine.
But when Admiral Buchanan began talking, such perceptions were quickly swept away by the reality that those responsible for the planning and implementation of America’s nuclear war doctrine were utterly clueless about what it is they are being called upon to do.
When speaking about America’s plans for nuclear war, Admiral Buchanan stated that “our plans are sufficient in terms of the actions they seek to hold the adversary to, and we are in a study of sufficiency,” noting that “the current program of record is sufficient today but may not be sufficient for the future.” He went on to articulate that this study “is underway now and will work well into the next administration, and we look forward to continuing that work and articulating how the future program could help provide the President additional options should he need them.”
In short, America’s nuclear war plans are nonsensical, which is apt, given the nonsensical reality of nuclear war.
Admiral Buchanan’s remarks are shaped by his world view which, in the case of Russia, is influenced by a NATO-centric interpretation of Russian actions and intent that is divorced from reality. “President Putin,” Admiral Buchanan declared, “has demonstrated a growing willingness to employ nuclear rhetoric to coerce the United States and our NATO allies to accept his attempt to change borders and rewrite history. This week, notwithstanding, was another one of those efforts.”
Putin, Buchanan continued, “has validated and updated his doctrine such that Russia has revised it to include the provision that nuclear retaliation against non-nuclear states would be considered if the state that supported it was supported by a nuclear state. This has serious implications for Ukraine and our NATO allies.”
Left unsaid was the fact that the current crisis over Ukraine is linked to a NATO strategy that sought to expand NATO’s boundaries up to the border of Russia despite assurances having been made that NATO would not expand “one inch eastward.” Likewise, Buchanan was mute on the stated objective of the administration of President Biden to use the conflict in Ukraine as a proxy war designed to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia.
Seen in this light, Russia’s nuclear doctrine goes from being a tool of intimidation, as articulated by Admiral Buchanan, to a tool of deterrence—mirroring the stated intent of America’s nuclear posture, but with much more clarity and purpose.
Admiral Buchanan did couch his comments by declaring from the start that, when it comes to nuclear war, “there is no winning here. Nobody wins. You know, the US is signed up to that language. Nuclear war cannot be won, must never be fought, et cetera.”
When asked about the concept of “winning” a nuclear war, Buchanan replied that “it’s certainly complex, because we go down a lot of different avenues to talk about what is the condition of the United States in a post-nuclear exchange environment. And that is a place that’s a place we’d like to avoid, right? And so when we talk about non-nuclear and nuclear capabilities, we certainly don’t want to have an exchange, right?”
Right.
It would have been best if he had just stopped here. But Admiral Buchanan continued.
“I think everybody would agree if we have to have an exchange, then we want to do it in terms that are most acceptable to the United States. So it’s terms that are most acceptable to the United States that puts us in a position to continue to lead the world, right? So we're largely viewed as the world leader. And do we lead the world in an area where we’ve considered loss? The answer is no, right? And so it would be to a point where we would maintain sufficient – we’d have to have sufficient capability. We’d have to have reserve capacity. You wouldn’t expend all of your resources to gain winning, right? Because then you have nothing to deter from at that point.”
Two things emerge from this statement. First is the notion that the United States believes it can fight and win a nuclear “exchange” with Russia.
Second is the idea that the United States can win a nuclear war with Russia while retaining enough strategic nuclear capacity to deter the rest of the world from engaging in a nuclear war after the nuclear war with Russia is done.
To “win” a nuclear war with Russia implies the United States has a war-winning plan.
Admiral Buchanan is the person in charge of preparing these plans. He has stated that these plans “are sufficient in terms of the actions they seek to hold the adversary to,” but this clearly is not the case—the United States has failed to deter Russia from issuing a new nuclear war doctrine and from employing in combat for the first time in history a strategic nuclear capable ballistic missile.
His plans have failed.
And he admits that “the current program of record is sufficient today but may not be sufficient for the future.”
Meaning we have no adequate plan for the future.
But we do have a plan.
One that is intended to produce a “victory” in a nuclear war Buchanan admits cannot be won and should never be fought.
One that will allow the United States to retain sufficient nuclear weapons in its arsenal to continue to “be a world leader” by sustaining its doctrine of nuclear deterrence.
A doctrine which, if the United States ever does engage in a “nuclear exchange” with Russia, would have failed.
There is only one scenario in which the United States could imagine a nuclear “exchange” with Russia which allows it to retain a meaningful nuclear weapons arsenal capable of continued deterrence.
And that scenario involves a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Russia’s strategic nuclear forces designed to eliminate most of Russia’s nuclear weapons.
Such an attack can only be carried out by the Trident missiles carried aboard the Ohio-class submarines of the United States Navy.
Hold that thought.
Russia is on record as saying that the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles by Ukraine on targets inside Russia is enough to trigger the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation under its new nuclear doctrine.
At the time of this writing, the United States and Great Britain are in discussions with Ukraine about the possibility of authorizing new attacks on Russia using the ATACMS and Storm Shadow.
France just authorized Ukraine to use the French-made SCALP missile (a cousin to the Storm Shadow) against targets inside Russia.
And there are reports that the United States Navy has just announced that it is increasing the operational readiness status of its deployed Ohio-class submarines.
It is high time for everyone, from every walk of life, to understand the path we are currently on. Left unchecked, events are propelling us down a highway to hell that leads to only one destination—a nuclear Armageddon that everyone agrees can’t be won, and yet the United States is, at this very moment, preparing to “win.”
A nuclear “exchange” with Russia, even if the United States were able to execute a surprise preemptive nuclear strike, would result in the destruction of dozens of American cities and the deaths of more than a hundred million Americans.
And this is if we “win.”
And we know that we can’t “win” a nuclear war.
And yet we are actively preparing to fight one.
This insanity must stop.
Now.
The United States just held an election where the winning candidate, President-elect Donald Trump, campaigned on a platform which sought to end the war in Ukraine and avoid a nuclear war with Russia.
And yet the administration of President Joe Biden has embarked on a policy direction which seeks to expand the conflict in Ukraine and is bringing the United States to the very brink of a nuclear war with Russia.
This is a direct affront to the notion of American democracy.
By ignoring the stated will of the people of the United States as manifested through their votes in an election where the very issue of war and peace were front and center in the campaign, is an affront to democracy.
We the people of the United States must not allow this insane rush to war to continue.
We must put the Biden administration on notice that we are opposed to any expansion of the conflict in Ukraine which brings with it the possibility of escalation that leads to a nuclear war with Russia.
And we must implore the incoming Trump administration to speak out in opposition to this mad rush toward nuclear annihilation by restating publicly its position of the war in Ukraine and nuclear war with Russia—that the war must end now, and that there can be no nuclear war with Russia triggered by the war in Ukraine.
We need to say “no” to nuclear war.
I am working with other like-minded people to hold a rally in Washington, DC on the weekend of December 7-8 to say no to nuclear war.
I am encouraging American[
Trident D5 missile launch from an Ohio-class submarine
s from all walks of life, all political persuasions, all social classes, to join and lend their voices to this cause.
Watch this space for more information about this rally.
All our lives depend on it.
What if there simply is no alternative to America's permanent war party?
[The firing of an Iskander ballistic missile. Photo Credit: By Mil.ru, CC]
What if politics in America plays out not so much via presidential elections, but through a constant, if often obscured, struggle between the permanent war party (the hawks) and, well, everyone else? If this is the case, then it is not going to be enough to just hold our breath and wait for a more peace-loving Trump to assume office on January 20, at which time, supposedly, the threat of WWIII will be called off. Instead, a strategy must be devised that hard-headedly accepts that the permanent war party is not going anywhere, even after January 20, and therefore a strategy must be devised which accepts this tragic circumstance, while still giving us a chance to survive. Such is the conceptual framework which political historian Victor Taki uses as his starting point for discovering a response to the Ukraine war. -The Editors
In the old Soviet anecdote, Radio Armenia is asked about the likelihood that a Third World War will take place. Upon reflection, Radio Armenia declares that a Third World War is unlikely, but it expects such a ferocious fight for peace that not a single stone will be left standing. This joke about Soviet-American relations at the time of the (first) Cold War acquires an uncanny relevance today, now that President Biden’s permission to Ukraine to use American missiles for strikes inside Russia has shifted the discussion from possible scenarios for building a stable peace to ways of avoiding WWIII.
Paradoxically, an ostensible willingness on the part of the nascent Trump administration to end the war in Ukraine has helped the globalist hawks to secure Biden’s consent to take this highly provocative measure. Its limited potential impact on the purely military aspect of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation has long been emphasized by this policy’s opponents. After all, the Russians have already placed their bombers out of range of those few ATACMS missiles and launchers that Ukraine currently has. However, any analyst who attempts to describe the actions of the Ukrainian leadership and its Western backers in terms of purely military rationality will necessarily miss the intended political and psychological effects of those actions.
Subscribe
For almost a year the theme of “permitting” Ukraine to use the ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles for strikes into Russia’s interior has served as clickbait to offset Ukraine’s steady loss of ground. It has helped create the impression that it is Russia’s and not Ukraine’s fate that hangs in the balance, and that the articulate representatives of smaller or bigger (East) European nations can decide this fate by convincing the American president to call Putin’s bluff. After the clearly disappointing results of the US presidential elections from the perspective of Zelensky and his American and European backers, this “permission” becomes the last trump card to be thrown on the table in a reckless attempt to thwart Trump’s announced pacification of Ukraine.
The move is Machiavellian enough. In view of Putin’s September announcement that “authorization” of such strikes would be tantamount to NATO’s entry into the conflict, it will indeed be difficult for the Russian leader not to retaliate without losing face once these strikes actually take place. Russia’s retaliatory measures will in turn make it difficult for Trump to continue presenting Ukraine as “Biden’s war.” Apart from the danger of nuclear escalation that this scenario harbors, it will surely bury the prospect of a stable peace in Ukraine, however much the returning American president and his unchanging Russian counterpart would like to see it happen.
The desire of some to stop the war turns out to be what gives others the opportunity to continue it. Given this circumstance, the doves might have to focus on ways of keeping the conflict within acceptable limits and forsake for the time being the different peace formulas meant to bring the war to a rapid end. Even if some variant of the “Vance Plan” (i. e. Ukraine’s neutral and demilitarized status plus the [existing] frontline as the new de factor Russian-Ukrainian border) could ultimately be accepted by Moscow, last Sunday’s news demonstrates that the global war party will not step back and simply let such an outcome materialize.
Conclusion
When an escalating provocation becomes the only way for the sidelined hawks not to lose badly from a prospective peace, the doves might need to reappraise their attitude towards the conflict itself. Continued within certain limits, the conflict represents the lowest common denominator between the otherwise incompatible interests and stakes of the different parties involved. At the same time, once the conflict becomes routine, the logic of de-escalation is likely to eventually prevail, if only because of the implacable law of universal entropy.
Taking this into consideration, the doves’ strategy should be the opposite of the strategy of the Sicilian aristocracy at the time of Risorgimento, which was famously expressed in Giuseppe Lampedusa’s novel The Leopard (1958). Lampedusa’s characters repeatedly state that “[i]f [they] want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.” By contrast, today’s doves should realize that if they want things to change, things will have to stay as they are. This minimalist approach to conflict resolution in Ukraine might strike some as cynical in light of the daily losses of hundreds of soldiers on both sides of the frontline. However, a straighter road to peace contains the even deadlier traps that have been set by those who would rather flip over the grand Eurasian chessboard than admit their defeat.
A guest post by
I am a historian interested in imperial Russia’s Balkan entanglements and the intellectual history of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. My latest book Russia’s Turkish Wars was published by the University of Toronto Press in 2024.
I’ve written a number of times now about the unreality with which the West habitually approaches the continuing crisis in and around Ukraine, and the almost clinical dissociation from the real world that it displays in its words and its actions. Yet as the situation deteriorates and Russian forces move forward everywhere, there is no real sign that the West is becoming more reality-based in its understanding, and every probability that it will learn nothing, and continue to live in its constructed alternative reality until it is dragged out forcibly.
True, some daring leading-edge thinkers in the West are starting to wonder about the need for negotiations, even if they are on the West’s terms. They have begun to accept that perhaps some of Ukraine’s 1991 territory will have to be considered lost, if only in the short term. Perhaps, they muse, there will be a Korean-style DMZ in place, guaranteed by neutral troops, until such time as Ukraine can be rebuilt to take the offensive again. And then they look at the map of Russian advances, and they look at the size and power of the two armies, and they look at the size and readiness of NATO forces and they fall into despair.
But actually, no: scrub that last sentence. They don’t look, and if they did, they wouldn’t really be able to understand what they were seeing anyway. The “debate” (if you can call it that) in the West largely excludes real life factors. It takes place at a high normative level, where certain facts and truths are simply assumed. Why that is so, and what its consequences are, is the subject of first part of this essay, and then because these subjects are inherently complex, I go on to set out how to understand them as straightforwardly as possible.
We’ll start with some practical considerations of political sociology and psychology. The first is that politics is the classic example of the Sunk Costs phenomenon in action. The longer you continue with a course of action, no matter how stupid, the less willing you are to change it. Changing it will be interpreted as acknowledging error, and acknowledging error is the first stage in losing power. In this case the old defence (“personally I always had doubts…”) is just not going to wash, give the gratuitously psychopathic terms in which western leaders have expressed themselves about Russia.
The second is the absence of any articulated alternative. (“So, Prime Minister, what do you think we should do instead then?) The very fact of not understanding the dynamics of a crisis means that you are helpless to propose a sensible solution to it. It’s better to stay with a sinking ship in the hope of rescue than to jump blindly into the water. Maybe a miracle will happen.
The third is to do with group dynamics, in this case the dynamics of nations. In a situation of fear and uncertainty like the present, solidarity comes to be seen as an end in itself, and nobody wants to be accused of “weakening the West” or “strengthening Russia.” If you have to be wrong, best be wrong in the company of as many others as possible. There are enormous disincentives to being the first to suggest that maybe things are looking pretty bleak, and in any event what are you going to propose instead? The chances of thirty-odd nations being able to agree on a different approach to the present one are effectively zero, not helped by the fact that the United States, which might otherwise give a lead, is politically paralysed until perhaps the spring of next year.
The fourth is to do with isolation and groupthink. Everybody in your own government, everybody you speak to in other governments, every journalist and pundit that you come across says the same thing: Putin can’t win, Russia is taking massive casualties, we must rebuild Ukraine, Putin is scared of NATO blah blah. Everywhere you turn, you get the same messages, and your staff write the same messages for you to deliver to others. How could you not wind up assuming all this is true?
These are what we might call Permanently Operating Factors in politics, common to any crisis. But there are also a number of special factors operating in this particular crisis which seem obvious to me, but which I haven’t seen much discussion of. So let’s look at a few.
To begin with, the current generation of western politicians is especially incapable of understanding and managing high-level crises of any kind. The modern western political class—the Party as I call it—resembles more and more the ruling party in a one-party state. That is to say, the skills that lead to success are those of advancement in the Party apparatus itself: climbing the greasy pole and backstabbing rivals. Even managing a purely national crisis—as we saw during Brexit, or as we are seeing now in France and Germany—is actually beyond their abilities, except perhaps the ability to turn a crisis to their own personal political advantage. The result is that they are utterly overwhelmed by the Ukraine crisis, which is of a scale and a type that occurs perhaps once every couple of generations. The fact that it’s also a multilateral crisis means that it ideally requires advanced skills of political management just to ensure that things don’t fall apart, and they don’t even have those. In turn, the ever-increasing reliance on “advisers” linked to the personal fortunes of the politician concerned means both that professional advice is increasingly excluded, and also that professional advisers are often selected and promoted because they are willing to give the advice that politicians want.
So far, so generic. But we are also confronted here with a security crisis, and our political classes and their parasites are completely ignorant of how to deal with such crises, or even how to understand them. During the Cold War, governments were forced to confront security issues regularly: often, they were also domestic political issues. Security issues were also objectively important, as East and West glared at each other across a militarised border, with the possibility of nuclear annihilation never very far away. None of that is true now. NATO summits still happen of course, but until recently they have been concerned with peacekeeping deployments, counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and the endless succession of new members and partnership initiatives. No fundamental security decisions of any kind have been needed in the political lifetime of any current head of a NATO (or EU) country, until now.
This is the more unfortunate because a security crisis is a highly complex thing, and involves a whole series of levels from the political down to the military/tactical. And a security crisis is just about impossible to manage multilaterally: the only remotely comparable example I can think off is the 1999 Kosovo crisis, when a much smaller NATO effectively stopped working after the first week, and came quite close to breaking down completely.
I’ve pointed out before that NATO has no strategy for Ukraine, and no real operational plan. It just has a series of ad hoc initiatives, glued together by vague aspirations unrelated to real life, and by the hope that something will turn up. In turn, this is because no individual NATO nation is in a better state: our current western political leadership has never had to develop these skills. But it’s actually worse than that: not having developed these skills, not having advisers who have developed these skills, they cannot actually understand what the Russians are doing and how and why they are doing it. Western leaders are like spectators who do not know the rules of Chess or Go trying to work out who is winning.
Now, western leaders are not themselves expected to be military experts. It’s common to sneer at Defence Ministers with no military background, but this is to misunderstand how defence works in a democracy, and for that matter how a democracy itself works. Let me put on my lecturer’s hat for a moment, and explain that.
Governments have policies at different levels. One of those policies will be a national security policy, which in turn is the basis for more detailed policies in subordinate areas: in this case, defence. Conventionally, these policies are managed by Ministries, headed by political figures or appointees, who have advisers, and in most cases operational organisations to turn policy into actual activity on the ground. In the case of the Education Ministry, the operational units are schools and universities. In the case of the Defence Ministry, they are the armed forces and the specialist defence establishments. You would no more expect a defence minister to be a former soldier than you would an education minister to be a former teacher or, for that matter, a transport minister to be a former train driver. The responsibility of a Minister is to make and apply policy within the larger government strategic framework, and to manage the budget and programme of their area.
So it’s the responsibility of the political leadership—normally including the head of state or government—to say what the strategic purpose of any military operation actually is, and to set out a situation (the “end-state”) where this purpose will have been realised. If this is not done, military planning and operations are pointless, no matter how good your forces and how destructive your weaponry is, because you won’t actually know what you are trying to do, and so you won’t’ be able to tell whether you’ve done it. This, not lack of military knowledge, is the fundamental problem of western political leaderships today. Indeed, it would be better to call them “managerships,” because they have no aspiration to lead. They are just MBA-trained fiddlers and bodgers, for who the concept of a strategic goal in the true sense of the term is basically meaningless. Instead of actual strategic objectives, they have slogans and fantasy outcomes. It is, after all, obvious that the strategic objectives government sets have to be actually realisable, or there is no point in pursuing them. They must also be clear enough that they can be passed to the military for the military to make an operational plan to deliver the “end-state.” And in addition, the political leadership has to set out constraints and requirements within which the military have to work. Because western leaders and their advisers do not know how to do this, they cannot understand what the Russians are doing, either.
After that, of course, you need a politico-military layer that is capable of doing operational planning, and so answering a series of questions like: what military outcomes will deliver the political end-state? how do we get there? what forces will we need? how should they be structured and equipped? how do we cope with political imperatives and limitations? Whilst these questions are generic, and it can be argued that they apply even to peacekeeping operations, they obviously apply with more and more force as operations become larger and more demanding.
And this is the essential problem. The war in Ukraine involves forces which are an order of magnitude larger than those sent on operations by any western nation since 1945. Indeed, it can be argued that the only time that forces of comparable size have been deployed in Europe is between 1915 and 1918, and again in 1944-45. European armies certainly studied these campaigns at one time, but with the passing of time they became historical examples, not things to learn applicable lessons from. And the planning from about 1950 to 1990 was for a short, defensive war which would probably go nuclear. It’s questionable whether there is actually anything at all in recent western military history that would help today’s commanders really understand what they are seeing.
Nor do they have the recent professional experience. It’s become fashionable also to sneer at western military commanders, but in many ways that’s unfair. In peacetime, the role of senior military leaders is only partially to prepare for war. There are also a thousand other issues to do with budgets, programmes, personnel questions, contracts, the future size and shape of the military, and many others. Senior military figures need of be capable of understanding all these issues and dealing with political leaders, diplomats, civil servants and their opposite numbers in other governments, as well as with parliament and the media. It is obvious that in peacetime you are not going to select a Chief of the Army just for putative war-fighting skills, if that person is an abrasive individual who is always arguing with the Minister.
This is why it is almost universally the case that military commanders are replaced wholesale at the start of a war. Some commanders may turn out to be natural war-fighters and others will not. Widespread personnel changes are therefore common because the task is very different: we have seen this with the Russian Army since 2022. Likewise, a peacetime army as a whole takes time to adjust to being a war-fighting one. The problem western experts have is that they are watching this process from a distance, without going through it themselves. Armies that still only know peacetime modes of operation are trying to understand the activities of armies that have completely transitioned to war-fighting.
Finally, western military specialists are limited by their own experiences. Imagine you are the Chief of Operations in a medium-sized western country. You joined the military in the 1990s, when the last senior officers who had known the Cold War were retiring. Your actual experience has been on peacekeeping operations and a couple of deployments in Afghanistan. The largest unit you have ever commanded on operations is a Battalion (say 5-600 personnel) and the last time you actually came under fire, you were a Company commander. How can you be reasonably expected to grasp the mechanics and complexities of manoeuvring armies hundreds of thousands strong, along lines of contact hundreds of kilometres long, and understand what the commanders involved are doing, and how they think? You will unconsciously focus on the things you can understand, at the scale that you can understand them. You will inevitably concentrate on the detail—some tanks destroyed here, a new variant of artillery deployed there—rather than the big picture.
All this seems to me to explain several things, including the curiously episodic nature of Ukrainian initiatives. Some of these were clearly suggested by the West, others by a political class in Ukraine which is highly westernised and thinks in western terms. (Ironically, the Army is probably more realistic and more able to grasp the wider picture.) But there has been very little sense of any long-term strategy, or even thinking. Take the attacks on the bridge to Crimea, for example. What were they supposed to achieve exactly? Now replies like “sending a message to Putin” or “complicating Russian logistics” or “improving morale at home” are not allowed. What I would want to know is, what is expected to follow, in concrete terms? What are the tangible results of this “message” supposed to be? Can you guarantee that it will be understood? Have you gamed out possible Russian reactions and what will you do then? Supposing, again, that you complicate Russian logistics? What will be the direct result, and how easy will it be for the Russians to get round the problem. (Answer, fairly.)
Western political and military leaders have no answer to these questions, because they have no strategy, and do not really understand what a strategy is. What they have is a consistent habit of coming up with clever, publicity-generating ideas that are disconnected from each other, but all sound good at the time. Broadly, they reflect the following “logic.”
-
do something that humiliates Russia.
-
miracle happens.
-
change of government in Moscow and end of war.
And I’m not exaggerating. This is all the “strategic planning” that the West is capable of, and all it ever has been capable of. I’ve stressed before the necessity of separating aspirations from strategy. For a good twenty years, important constituent parts of western governments have had the aspiration of removing Putin from power, and somehow creating a “pro-western” government in Moscow. From time to time they have come up with disconnected initiatives—sanctions, for example—which they believed might move events in that direction. But mostly it’s just hope, manured with the belief that no “anti-western” leader can ever be representative of his or her people, and so will not last very long anyway. But this approach ignores the most fundamental issues of strategy: what is the clearly-defined end-state you are seeking, how precisely will you achieve it and is it, in fact, achievable? Because if you can’t answer those questions, then any amount of “strategic” planning is pointless. As regards the last question, any military expert will tell you that although the military can create the conditions for political developments to take place, they can’t make them happen. The actual relationship between the two is very complex. Recall that in 1918, the German Army, badly hurt by the Allies’ attrition strategy, was in full retreat but still on Allied soil, and that the Allied armies advancing from the Balkans were still well outside German territory. What ended the War earlier than expected was a nervous breakdown in the German High Command.
And the West cannot answer those questions. The end-state is vaguely defined as “Putin gone,” the mechanism is “pressure” of an ill-defined nature, and the idea that a “pro-western” government will emerge is just an article of faith. So even if a “strategy” could somehow be constructed from these fragments, it would stand no chance of working. Thus the essentially reactive nature of western actions. I’ve talked before about the Boyd Cycle, of Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action. Whoever can go round this circle faster, and “get inside” the Boyd Cycle of the enemy, controls the development of the battle, or the crisis. This is essentially what the Russians (who understand such things) have been doing since the start of the crisis, well before 2022.
Conversely, the West, confusing vague aspirations with an actual strategy, has not understood what the Russians are trying to do, and has treated every Russian setback, or presumed setback, as a step on the road to victory without looking at the bigger picture. Take one simple example. From the beginning of the war, the Russian strategy was to bring about specified political changes in Ukraine by degrading and destroying Ukrainian forces, and so removing Ukraine’s ability to resist Russian political demands. Once the West became involved, this strategy, whilst the same overall, was nuanced to include the destruction of western-supplied equipment and, to a degree, western-trained units. (Though the latter without the former were not so much of a threat.) Two things followed from this.
The first was that the reduction of Ukrainian fighting capability on terms favourable to the Russians was independent of the larger ebb and flow of battle. Destroying stored equipment was if anything better than destroying that equipment in combat. Destroying stored ammunition was better than destroying it once it was deployed in units. Now generally, defenders in a military conflict have fewer casualties than attackers. If your objective is to destroy your enemy’s fighting power, especially if you know that it will be difficult and expensive for them to replace it, then it makes more sense to let the enemy attack you, where they will lose more resources than you. If you have a functioning defence industry and ample reserves of manpower and equipment, this is unarguably the best strategy, and was practised by the Russians in 2022-23. But the West seems incapable of understanding this, and massively over-interpreted Russian strategic withdrawals as crushing defeats which would soon “bring Putin down.”
The second is that, to the extent that Russia has territorial objectives, it is better to degrade Ukrainian forces to the point where they cannot defend territory and have to withdraw either preemptively or after a cursory defence, than it is to stage deliberate attacks to seize territory. The Russians have a whole series of technologies which enable them to attrit Ukrainian forcers from a position a long way behind the contact line. They can thus progressively destroy the Ukrainian ability to hold ground without needing to risk their own troops and equipment in direct attacks. Over the last few months, we have seen that this stage has effectively been reached, and that the Russians are advancing quite quickly in certain key areas. But the West, which is obsessed with the control of terrain as an index of success, cannot understand this, having forgotten how the War in the West ended in 1918, when Allied territorial gains were still quite modest.
To be fair (assuming that one wants to be fair), these issues are very complex: not more complex, perhaps, than neurosurgery or the taxation of multinational companies, but not any less complex either. They require years of study and experience, and a willingness to master strange and sometimes counter-intuitive concepts. The western Liberal mind has never wanted to do this: its ideology of radical individualism is incompatible with discipline and organisation, and its search for instant gratification is incompatible with any long-term planning and careful implementation. In retaliation, it likes to dismiss the military as stupid and war-mongering. When Liberalism was constrained by other religious or political forces all this was less obvious, but with the emancipation of Liberalism from all controls over the last generation, and its dominance of political and intellectual life, western societies have now pretty much lost the ability to understand conflict and the military. It is striking, indeed, that most western military personnel are still recruited from the more conservative and traditional elements of society where Liberalism has made less of an impact, and not from Liberal urban elites.
Since the nineteenth century, and especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, the Liberal mind has oscillated between dislike and disdain for the military in normal times, and panicked demands for their use in periods of crisis, or when Liberal norms need to be enforced somewhere. The spread of the Liberal mindset to countries like France, which has historically been proud of its military, has produced a European political and media class largely unable to understand military issues. American Liberals, so far as I can see, themselves oscillate between fear of the military and endless citation of the warnings by Eisenhower’s speechwriter about the Military-Industrial Complex, and demands for the use of the military to enforce their norms. (Eisenhower’s remarks were, of course, a cliché of the time: there was nothing original in them.)
The result is a decision-taking and influencing class that has no real idea about strategy and conflict at all, and just repeats words and phrases it has heard somewhere, as magical incantations. One minute “F16s” (whatever they are precisely) will save the day, the next, “deep strikes” are going to bring Putin down.
So for example, it is impossible for a society brought up on just-in-time delivery and impulse purchases on Amazon to understand the importance of logistics and the nature of the attrition war the Russians are fighting. If you look at a map and try to understand it (I know!) you can see the the Ukrainian forces are fighting at the end of very long supply lines, especially for western equipment and ammunition, whereas the Russians are only a few hundred kilometres, at most, from their borders. The fuel consumption of heavy armoured vehicles is measured in gallons per mile, and even if they can be delivered to the area of operations by train or transporter (which has its own problems) they consume frightening amounts of fuel, all of which has to be brought, dangerously and expensively, into the operational area. They also break down, require new tracks and new engines and an endless supply of ammunition, all of which has to be brought forward. So Leopard tanks are not just teleported into the battle area, and when they are damaged they have to be sent back to Poland for repairs. And just about every aspect of military operations requires electrical power: yes, even drone operations.
The Russians of course know this, and have been targeting power generation and distribution systems, bridges and railway junctions, ammunition and logistic storage sites and troop concentrations and training areas. But they are not capturing large amounts of territory with daring armoured thrusts, so the Ukrainians must be winning, mustn’t they? Yet tanks without fuel or ammunition, or whose engines have broken down, are useless, and once Ukrainian forces are operationally isolated from their supply lines it’s only a question of time before they lose their combat capability and have to surrender or make a run for it. This is what appears to be happening now around Kursk. And if you are fighting an attrition war, and your stocks and replenishment capabilities are greater than your enemy’s, you want your enemy to use up those stocks as quickly as possible. So why not send, for example, large numbers of cheap drones that can be replaced, to soak up large numbers of defensive missiles that can’t? But this is too much for most alleged western experts to wrap their neurones around.
Of course the logic applies both ways. It defies belief that anyone with a functioning brain-cell would ever have thought that the Russians planned to “occupy Ukraine,” let alone in a matter of days. Insofar as the idea had anything real behind it at all, it was a folk memory of the rapid advance of US forces to Baghdad in 2003, against no opposition and with complete air supremacy. A simple practical example: a NATO Mechanised Division (in the days when NATO had them), advancing against no opposition, would take up some 200km of road, and take several days just to organise, leave, arrive and deploy into combat formations. And that’s just one Division. The idea of doing this against a battle-hardened Army two to three times the size of the attacking force, and beating them in a few days at that, is beyond ridiculous. Again, look at the map. And while you are at it, think about the current hysterical cries that “Putin wants to invade NATO.” Everything I’ve said about the difficulty of NATO going Eastward applies to the Russians going Westwards, should they be insane enough to consider the idea.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Russians chose Kursk as a jumping-off point, then it’s about 2000 kilometres to Berlin, which is the first remotely plausible objective I can think of. (Oh, they would have to go to Poland to get there.) Just to give you an idea, in the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s Group of Forces in Germany was about 350,000 strong, supplemented by recalled reservists in an emergency. They would have attacked NATO forces in Germany, but they were only the first echelon, and were expected to be wiped out. Two more echelons would therefore follow them. The total distance needing to be travelled was a couple of hundred kilometres. As far as we know, subduing and occupying Western Europe alone would have required perhaps a million men in combat units, never mind the western flanks and countries like Turkey. This was in the context of an existential struggle, probably involving nuclear weapons, which a victorious Russia would take a generation to recover from. We are a little way from that at the moment.
I think that what we are seeing, as well as culpable deliberate ignorance, is the beginning of a gnawing realisation that NATO is not strong but weak, that NATO equipment is mediocre, that talk of “escalation” is meaningless in the absence of something to escalate with, and that if the Russians felt so inclined they could do a lot of damage to the West. But even there, western pundits are stuck in narratives of armoured warfare and territorial conquest. The Russians don’t need to do that, of course. With their missile technology, which the West has consistently ignored and downplayed, they can make a mess of any city in the western world, and no western state is in a position to respond. Of course the Russians, who understand these things, realise that they don’t need to actually use these missiles: the psychological leverage they have from just possessing them will do quite nicely. Ironically, I think the Ukrainians do understand these things, better than their supposed NATO mentors. Their Soviet heritage and the large Army they retained gave them an awareness of how large-scale operations are conducted at the political and strategic levels even if, since then, they have been got at by NATO
The French historian and Resistance martyr Marc Bloch, who fought in the Battle of France in 1940, wrote a book about it, only published posthumously, after the war, called L’Étrange défaite, or The Strange Defeat, in which he tried to explain what had happened. His central conclusion was that the failure was intellectual, organisational and political: the Germans employed a more modern style of war that the French were not expecting and could not cope with. Time has nuanced that conclusion: the German tactics were certainly innovative, involving fast-moving, deep penetration armoured units and close cooperation with aircraft, but they were also extremely risky and required a lot of luck to pull off successfully. But Bloch was right that the Germans had developed a style of warfare, dictated by the need to avoid long wars, to which there was no counter at the time, and which posed unexpected and, for a period insoluble, problems for the defender.
There’s something about the dazed incomprehension of the French political and military class and the people themselves, in the summer of 1940 that seems very relevant today. The defeat of the West—not yet even recognised as such—is at once intellectual, organisational and political. The ruling classes of the West seem to have no idea at all what has happened to them and why, nor what is likely to follow.
In one hour our conversation with host Nima Alkhorshid covered the waterfront of current international issues. We opened with discussion of the results of last week’s BRICS Summit in Kazan and then moved on to war in Ukraine and in particular to the latest stunning Russian successes in Donbas. The presence of North Korean troops in Russia, possibly in Kursk to assist in the mopping up operation there, was a further issue. We concluded with consideration of what a Trump win next week will mean both for shutting down the war in Ukraine and for possibly advancing towards war with China, an eventuality that I see as most improbable.
As I say out the outset of this video, the lighting is less than optimal and the possible intrusion of the sound of the refrigerator’s compressor is what you get when recording from the best lit room in a Petersburg apartment, the kitchen. Accordingly I ask viewers for their indulgence and hope that you will find that the content of this discussion justifies your time.
Nima R. Alkhorshid: 0:05
Today is Friday, November 1st. Gilbert is here with us. Welcome back.
Gilbert Doctorow, PhD:
Thanks. Good to be with you.
Alkhorshid:
You are in Russia right now.
Doctorow:
I’m in my apartment in St. Petersburg right now. So the lighting is not ideal. The sound is a little bit distorted when you’re talking in a kitchen and you have a refrigerator compressor behind you, but this is the way it is.
Alkhorshid:
Yeah. Let’s start with BRICS summit in Russia. You believe that there are a lot of misinterpretation of what has happened in BRIC Summit. What’s your take on what has happened?
Doctorow: 0:48
First, the overriding observation that I have is not very different from what my peers are saying. That is to say, I believe as well as they do that this is a world-changing event. But how it changes the world, what time frame it changes the world, here we have differences. I take as my basis for interpretation, not the declaration of the BRICS summit, not papers, but words, words by the most influential person at the event, the host, Vladimir Putin, in particular in a couple of speeches that he made. One is on the second day, the so-called outreach day, when more than 30 heads of government and foreign ministers from various states, both BRICS members, BRICS designate partner countries, and just those who are onlookers. His speech there, and then still more importantly, his press conference at the conclusion of the summit, were useful to see the dynamics, not a static statement of what our values are, but a dynamic statement of where the organization is headed and what are its priorities.
2:15
And there I find myself in a slightly different position from what others are saying, other Russia followers are saying. And what I have to say I think is quite important to anyone who follows markets, because the number one issue is, is BRICS about de-dollarization, or is BRICS about something much bigger? And a lot of focus has been placed on de-dollarization as if this were the whole objective of BRICS. It isn’t. The objective of BRICS is to create parallel structures for an emerging multipolar world.
2:58
That is the objective of BRICS. And breaking the American domination of finance is a part of the process, but you do this with a sledgehammer or do this with more subtle means that are not off-putting, that do not alienate prospective future members and partners of BRICS. And I would like to call out the real sophistication and the realism as opposed to the wishfulness of the organizers of this summit. And I direct my attention first and foremost to the Russians, to Mr. Putin, to the Chinese, Mr. Xi, and of course to Mr. Modi of India. They are the moving forces in what we saw last week. And above all, for, I think it’s Mr. Putin, not just because of his intellectual leadership, but because of the team that he has managed, that successfully organized a very delicate operation.
4:09
These are all, all the guests are being told that they are equal and that BRICS organization does not put one country above the other. And these principles had to be realized, they had to be put into action when the heads of government were assembled. You can’t have Mr. Xi having a ten-room suite and the president of Bolivia having a two-room or a studio. This is, they have to be matched.
4:45
And that is not an easy thing to do, particularly in a place like Kazan, which is of course an important center, an organizational center, but is not Moscow. I think it was very important for the whole purpose of BRICS and for the whole message of BRICS, that it was held precisely not in Moscow, but in a provincial center, a very wealthy provincial center, because Kazan is the capital of Tatarstan, is the main city in an oil-producing part of Russia. But nonetheless, it is not a normal center for receiving 30 heads of government and the like. So to have pulled this off, to have organized it in a way that left smiles on the faces of all the participants, as we saw from the television coverage, that was quite a feat.
5:40
Now, what did they agree on? As I said, they did not agree on dollarization as their prime objective. They agreed, it appears, to significantly raise the capital, the number of projects, the outreach of the New Development Bank, which is intended as an instrument to be built in parallel to the World Bank and the IMF. These are leading institutions of the American-dominated financial order in the world. And they are very cruel structures to emerging nations.
6:18
To anyone who is in financial trouble, they come to your aid, but they virtually decapitate your country. They take control of your budget and they impose this austerity, which of course is very cruel to the lower and middle classes of the country involved, and has political consequences. Well, the New Development Bank doesn’t do that. It doesn’t impose conditions of a political nature, and it is a very interesting point of attraction that BRICS has and will further grow in making itself a place, a safe harbor for emerging countries or for the global south. So that is one vector.
7:08
Another obvious point which has as the necessary consequence de-dollarization is who has been invited as the last round of 2023 and who as core members. I have in mind the United Arab Emirates and Iran. This is United Arab Emirates are a main repository of reserves from the oil-producing countries in the Middle East, and Iran, which is itself a major producer of oil and a lesser producer of gas. Now, in this round, in which no new core members are added, but 13 candidates have been named for partnership, we find two major producers of oil, and that is Nigeria– and gas– Nigeria and Algeria. The point that I’m making is that at its center, the core is growing, the BRICS is growing its control over global supplies of hydrocarbons. And that all bears on the dollar, because the dollar’s dominance and place as a reserve currency is bolstered by its position as the currency of exchange of the single biggest-traded commodity in the world, which is oil.
8:49
If BRICS has in it so many producers and so much, such control essentially, of the trade in hydrocarbons, it is working to de-dollarize the petroleum exchange. And that means that the petrodollar is in peril. And the petrodollar, as I said, is a major bolster, support, for American financial dominance. Mr. Putin announced also at the BRICS summit the planned creation of a bourse and a commodity exchange, global commodity exchange for grain trading.
9:33
The argument that was given is that this will take grain trading out of the hands of the speculators in Chicago and put it into safe hands of an exchange that seeks to reduce speculation and to assure the emerging countries of the world of food security. That is the humanitarian explanation for it. I can give you another explanation for it. It is another move against the dollar. Grain, wheat, corn, they are traded in dollars.
If the BRICS has an exchange, you can be sure they will not be dollar based. The same is true of the metal exchange. Putin announced that the BRICS is going to create a gold and silver exchange. That will not be denominated in dollars. These are all kicking the supports out from under the dollar. So there you have it, a very subtle but powerful move on the dollar.
10:46
But that is the sidelines of BRICS, not the central focus of BRICS. And why is there no effort to create a parallel to SWIFT, that is the global Brussels-based American-dominated messaging system between all banks of the world, except those that have been sanctioned by the United States, like Russia and Iran. The world trades, does its banking through SWIFT. It would be off-putting to perspective new members of BRICS if they had to forego the use of this existing functional system, if they had to self-isolate and turn themselves by their own efforts into sanctioned countries. So by their realism and maturity, the guiding hands of BRICS are saying to the world, “Look, this is a system we are working to change global management, financial management, and political management, but it doesn’t happen in one day. And there will be a period of coexistence. And as two systems exist in tandem, the one that we know till now and the one that is being created under the aegis of BRICS.”
12:19
“We do not require that you put all eggs in one basket, that you turn your back on the West and come running to us. No, no, you can keep one foot there. We don’t mind that. It’s just a matter of practicality that you do that.” So aside from the very serious technical issues of creating an alternative to SWIFT, there is a more important political consideration not to pressure prospective new adherents to BRICS by imposing conditions that they can object to.
So countries can have a foot in both camps. Turkey is an outstanding case, member of NATO. How could they possibly let it into BRICS? Well, into the core of BRICS, they’re not letting it. But as a partner, yes, all our partners will have, will be allowed to sit on the fence, sort of have, as I said, a foot in both camps.
13:16
That is a sign of real maturity and of self-confidence, that they don’t have to destroy the existing things to create a new system. They can tolerate a period of coexistence when they emerge and become more influential and more powerful than the G7 and all the other mechanisms. So these are the, I think what I saw as the main achievements and main directions for further development of BRICS, which none of us, and I put myself in that group as well, none of us foresaw. That was quite remarkable.
Alkhorshid: 13:58
What have we learned from what has happened between China and India in terms of their border problems?
Doctorow:
Well, I understand that in preparation for BRICS, the two sides had an agreement that they would take measures to reduce the tensions and to find a practical solution to the border dispute. It was kept quiet. It was announced just as BRICS was about to assemble. And at the very start of BRICS, the body language of Modi and Xi made it clear that they have reached an accommodation and they intend to proceed as good working partners in BRICS, notwithstanding the past differences they have and notwithstanding the fact that, let’s face it, they are serious competitors for global manufacturing. The United States has been playing India off against China in that way as a way of reducing the reliance of global supply chains on China. Nonetheless, the leaders of these two countries, I say, are quite mature and realistic, and they’re looking for accommodation and a way forward as leaders within BRICS. So that is all to the good. I don’t say that BRICS made this happen, but BRICS helped this to occur.
Alkhorshid: 14:58
And you mentioned Turkiye. On the other hand, we had Saudi Arabia being part of BRICS, and nobody knows what’s the situation in Saudi Arabia. Do they have any sort of solid understanding of what’s going on with Saudi Arabia?
Doctorow:
Certainly nothing in the public domain. The fact is that Saudi Arabia was at the summit one year ago; they were on the list of invitees. There should have been ten members of BRICS, or more actually, but Argentina dropped out and Saudi Arabia held off giving an answer. Still, the relationship of Saudi Arabia with BRICS members is much closer than appears to the naked eye. After all, the OPEC-plus is managed jointly by Russia and Saudi Arabia.
16:41
This is of key importance to the economic welfare of Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, that they have this ongoing, long-lasting partnership, very close cooperation with Russia. So, Saudi Arabia may not be in BRICS proper, but it’s on the fringes of BRICS because of its very close working relationship with Russia, including the question– and I should say China as well– including the question of de-dollarization. The Saudis did not renew their obligations under written agreements with the United States over the petrodollar. The Saudi Arabians have been playing with selling to China and Iran. Therefore, in the general principle, Saudi Arabia is presenting itself as a major prospective contributor to de-dollarization.
17:48
At the same time, Saudi Arabia is in a defense alliance with the United States, and it cannot just hop from one side to the other without taking very great risks. We saw that when the Houthis forced Saudi Arabia to desist from its support to their opponents in Yemeni civil war by bombing Saudi, by missile attack, Saudi oil installations, it was clear that Saudi Arabia is vulnerable militarily and has to be very careful. And part of that caution is not to competely alienate the United States. So I don’t think that we have to be too concerned that Saudi has not signed up. They haven’t said no, they haven’t said yes. They’re standing and watching, for obvious reasons. I think that everyone is watching how the Ukraine war is evolving.
19:00
And as I’ve said on other occasions, the mood of heads of state, heads of government, is very much the same psychology that applies to ordinary mortals. They want to be on the side of winners and not on the side of losers. And for the last year, and particularly for the last several months, it has been perfectly clear to every objective observer that Russia is winning, not just against Ukraine, but against the whole of NATO, plus another dozen or more countries that have signed up to provide support to Ukraine at the behest of the United States. But Russia is clearly winning. And so you had the, despite all of the efforts by Washington to sabotage the BRICS gathering and to remind the world that Vladimir Putin has been condemned by the International Criminal Court and all the rest of this propaganda, nobody paid heed to it.
20:07
They came, they enjoyed being guests of Vladimir Putin. They took their selfies with him when they had an opportunity. And so it is a way of saying that the 30 or more countries that were there, representing 45 percent of the world’s population, do not believe anything coming out of Washington.
Alkhorshid: 20:33
And the situation with Venezuela, you know, that the country is important for Russia in South America. On the other hand, we’ve seen that it seems that Brazil, Lula, without the possibility of Venezuela being part of BRICS, how, what are they talking about in Russia about this? It was all about Brasil blocking Venezuela
Doctorow:
The Russians aren’t talking about this They know very well what you just said. But there are a lot of things they don’t talk about. They don’t want to endanger relations with Brazil. Brazil takes over next year, the presidency of BRICS. They would be very foolish to antagonize Lula over the issue of Venezuela.
21:32
At the same time, I’d like to point out just the human side of this. I don’t know what you saw. I was very impressed by Maduro. He must have lost 20 kilograms. He looks very gentlemanly and very much a world leader. I think it’s a question of time before he’s admitted over– this will pass. The position of Lula will change over time. He has to show that he has some power, and he had every right to do that. It is the governing rule of BRICS that all decisions are made by consensus. Therefore, it would be, Russians would be bad sports if they denied the Brazilians the right to their own voice and to veto something. I don’t think this should be blown out of proportion.
22:34
On the other hand, it is notable that Bolivia was added. Bolivia is one of the 13 designated partners which will come on board in 2025. And the Russians gave some attention to Bolivia and to the president in advance of Greece. And they pointed out to their audience that he is a real intellectual leader. He is a major actor on the world stage.
Mr. Maduro is embedded in Venezuela, okay. And he stands for certain politics which are liked or not liked by his neighbors. Bolivia is not in that situation, and Bolivia’s led by a man who enjoys very big international respect. Therefore, for the sake of Latin America, I think it probably was better that Bolivia is the new flag carrier for their region of BRICS rather than Venezuela.
23:37
Then of course you have compensation. In compensation to the left, you have Cuba designated as a prospective partner. So– and then a few days later, as we know, just a couple of days ago, you had 187 countries in the United Nations General Assembly voting against American sanctions. You had– on Cuba, trade sanctions, the embargo, And you’ve had only two countries, the United States and Israel, who voted for continuation of that embargo. So I wouldn’t worry about which way the world is going. The American foreign policy of, as they used to say, me-me-I, that is pure unadulterated egoism at the expense of the rest of the world, has been shown up.
24:30
And remarkably, all of America’s allies had enough of this. And you would think that, all right, the EU abstained. The great British poodle would abstain. No, they all voted against the United States on this. So the times are changing.
Alkhorshid: 24:55
It’s out of our discussion, but do you understand the behavior of United States toward Cuba? Because they have been under the sanctions for more than, if I’m not mistaken, 68 years. It’s unbelievable what they’re doing to Cuba.
Doctorow:
The United States is a very vengeful country. I’m not speaking about individuals. Individuals have very short memories. But the deep state has a long memory and is vindictive. You speak about the sanctions against, the embargo on Cuba, the vitriolic language used to describe the Cuban leadership. What about Iran?
The conflict with Iran didn’t start last week. It didn’t start ten years ago. It goes back to 1979, the hostage taking of the American embassy in Tehran, which is never forgotten by the American political class. So this vengefulness towards Cuba is not an isolated case.
Alkhorshid: 26:08
Yeah. And talking about what’s going on right now in Ukraine, do you think that Russia is shifting its focus from the Kursk region to other regions?
Doctorow:
Well, I can’t say that it’s shifted its focus, but it’s shifted, well, it’s focused in the sense of what are they talking about? What is the news telling the Russian public? They’re talking only about the front lines in Donetsk and Donbass, because they’re scoring enormous victories, and the mood has changed entirely in Russian news coverage of the war. And they admit that, they say that themselves, that they have not seen anything like the present advances, not of inches, meters, but of kilometers every day.
And we talk about the collapse of the Ukrainian army. No, it’s not collapsing. And a different word is used, both in Russia and in Ukraine. They speak about sipitsa. They say the front is crumbling.
27:26
Now, crumbling is not the same thing as running away. But it means that there are weak points that are being revealed and taken advantage of every day along the front by the Russian troops. And they are proceeding with greater confidence, with more daring, I would say, because they are less fearful of a counterattack. But that being said, the Ukrainians still have very effective drone operations. And even on today’s news, one of the Russian war correspondents was counting his blessings that he was not blown to bits in his car, because a Ukrainian drone did hit his car earlier in the day. So the notion that its a steamroller, the Russians are just mowing down everything, is not inaccurate.
28:34
There is resistance. The Ukrainians, by pure perversity and I’d say cruelty of their senior command, are standing the ground, fighting and dying like men. That is praiseworthy, maybe, if you write patriotic poetry. But for the sake of the Ukrainian nation, of course, it’s a disaster that their men are being killed because they’re ordered to stand and hold the ground, which is untenable, which cannot be defended, and they don’t have sufficient fortifications to withstand the onslaught of the glider bombs and heavy artillery and so forth, and also the jet fighters that the Russians are throwing at them. For this reason, we see the front moving, evening out.
29:38
And we hear words said that we haven’t heard in two years, that they are moving not just on Bakrovsk, which is an immediate objective, but they’re now planning their moves on Kramatorsk and Slavyansk. Now these are towns which had great iconic values, like speaking of the Alamo in Texas, because that’s where the Russian Spring of 2014, the rising in Donbas against the coup-d’etat government in Kiev, this is where their valiant local troops held out for 85 days against the vastly superior Ukrainian army. But those towns in the middle of Donetsk oblast are now in the sights of the Russian army. So a lot of attention is being given there, and it’s as though Kursk doesn’t exist. Of course there’s fighting going on in Kursk, the mopping-up operation.
30:51
Somehow– I mean, it is a 160-kilometer-long border, And there obviously are some porous parts of that border in which some additional troops from Ukraine are getting into Kursk and giving some relief to the remaining several thousand out of what must have been close to 30,000 troops overall that were introduced by Ukraine into the Kursk oblast. But these are still rather small units that are spread out over large territory and that is highly forested. And so it’s difficult to flush them all out very quickly and at least cost in lives to yourself. So the Russians are doing a methodical– and they’re doing this at their own leisure, one can say, while all of the dynamism in the Russian war effort is taking place in Donbas and primarily in Donetsk. What we have to remember is that going back to 2014, when the line of confrontation was frozen, these two main oblasts or regions of Donbas, Donetsk and Lugansk, they were held substantially by Ukraine, not by Russia.
32:23
This was true particularly of Donetsk. Lugansk, going back to the start of the special military operation, was mostly liberated by the Russian forces. Donetsk was not. And Donetsk, when you look at the map, the capital of the Donetsk oblast was just a dozen kilometers or so away from the line of confrontation. And therefore for more than a year, maybe 18 months, the capital of Donetsk was subject to daily artillery strikes and short-range rocket attacks coming from the Ukrainian forces just over the border, so to speak.
33:17
Well, they have been pushed back. The only strikes that hit Donetsk now are long-range missiles, not artillery, because they’re out of artillery range. And the pushback that has been slow, very slow, by the Russians in Donetsk, was made slow because of the eight, nine years of fortification building and digging in that the Ukrainians had done in the period between 2014 and the start of the special military operation in 2022. So it looks like nothing happened, nothing changed, but on the ground, around the Donetsk, a lot changed, particularly from a year ago. And now it’s dramatic changes that we see in the last few weeks.
Alkhorshid: 34:11
Do you think that– because we’ve learned recently that Ukraine is preparing to conscript 160,000 soldiers, new forces coming out, coming into the army of Ukraine– do you think that they’re preparing, they’re getting some sort of information from the United States that in the aftermath of the 2024 presidential election, they’re going to get some sort of aid to improve their army, maybe put Ukraine in a better position — if, at the end of the day, they decide to go after negotiations?
Doctorow: 34:48
Well, you can project big numbers of mobilization. Implementing that in the present situation of a very demoralized population, which is what’s happened to Ukraine, when they’re entering a winter period with 80 percent of their power generation knocked out, when they’re going to face, the home front will be facing freezing temperatures in their residences, lack of water, lack of everything that electricity provides, that will further demoralize not just the general population, but the fighting population. And I believe the presently observed deserters level and presently observed flight and hiding of potential draftees will be exacerbated. So it’s inconceivable that numbers like this will actually find themselves in military uniforms. That being said, you come to the question of the disposition of forces. A large part of what the Russians are doing now is preparing for spring offensive.
36:15
Their offensive, not a Ukrainian offensive. And they’re doing that by occupying the heights. Now, there are no mountains in Ukraine, and heights means 250 meters above sea level. But if you are 250 meters above sea level, and the enemy is at sea level, then you have a very big military advantage. And that is what the Russians are doing. They’re taking all of the desirable locations to support a crushing blow if this war continues into the spring.
Alkhorshid: 36:56
How do you find right now in the mainstream media in the West, all over you find they’re talking about North Korean soldiers being in Russia, helping them against Ukrainians. How is that– in your opinion, what is the main reason of this type of rhetoric on the part of the West?
Doctorow:
Well, there’s several reasons, not just one. One of them is to cry foul and say the Russians are escalating and therefore we are entitled to an escalatory path. So they’re setting the public opinion to be prepared for the West to do something still more irresponsible in this war. That’s one aspect of it. It’s a diversion. It’s being used to suggest that the Russians are weaker than they seem. It is to detract from the military success in Donetsk, that their own newspapers and television reporters are putting out to the public every day, that Russians are steamrolling Ukraine, or perhaps I say that’s an exaggerated statement, but that’s how it’s being described, even in Western media today.
38:19
And if you say, oh, the Russians need to have those North Koreans to clear out Kursk, then it makes it seem as though the Russians really aren’t so formidable as you thought a moment ago. So it’s a demeaning disparagement of Russians and preparing your way for some kind of utterly stupid escalation from the side of the West. As for example actually setting off South Korean pilots and F-16s from Romania to defend Ukrainian airspace. That harebrained scheme is possibly what the dying days of the Biden administration might be plotting to enact. I don’t think it will happen. I imagine the South Koreans are not quite that stupid.
Alkhorshid: 39:15
We are approaching the day that the United States would decide who’s going to be the next president of the United States. So far it seems both candidates have a good chance of winning 2024. But in the case of Donald Trump, if he wins, do you think that … is he able to accept what Russia would put on the table to negotiate on? Because that would be so important that if he has the support from those people behind the scene to negotiate with Russia.
Doctorow: 39:53
There will be a difficult situation for Trump. The Russians have already put their cards on the table. That they have absolutely no trust in him or in his judgment, and they do not accept the notion that he can knock heads together and bring them to the table, the Ukrainians and the Russians to the table and end the war. I think that Trump, he and his advisors look closely at the situation will back away from this proposal of being honest brokers to end the war, because it will only involve them in making, approving actions that will be criticized by the opposition in the United States, by howls of anger over the American betrayal of this ally and future NATO member. So I think prudence will dictate that Trump solve the question in a manner that is least painful for his reputation, that takes the least political coinage from his side.
41:20
And that’s very simple. Stop, stop sending money, stop sending arms. That in itself will have the consequence of the Ukrainian capitulation, for which the United States can just wash its hands. “Well, guys, you couldn’t do it. Too bad.” But if he gets involved in negotiations, I think it will cost him a lot of political capital for no political gain.
Alkhorshid: 41:49
How about the situation with China? Do you think that as we have these two conflicts in Ukraine and in the Middle East, do you think that recently, I don’t know if you saw the interview of JD Vance talking about Iran and Israel, he said, “We are not interested in going to war with Iran because it doesn’t matter how much Israelis are pushing for a war with Iran. It’s not in our interest right now. We are not prepared for that.”
It seems that he wants to focus on China and what’s going on with China. And at the end of the day, we see that the case of Ukraine and even in the Middle East, somehow fading away. And the case of China is getting much more important in the eyes of the United States. Do you think … is that possible if Trump wins? We’re going to have at the same time, I don’t because I’m not, I don’t see that Trump would be able to put an end to any of these two conflict in Ukraine, in the Middle East. But do you think, are we going to have a new conflict? It doesn’t matter who wins, Kamala Harris or Donald Trump. And are we going to have a new front on Taiwan, a new conflict, which would, these two countries, Iran and Russia, would be part of this conflict again, against the United States.
Doctorow: 43:24
Look, Donald Trump is not a towering intellect, nor is he a man to make long-term commitments to anybody. He is a showman. He is a rather skilled political actor. And he knows the value of pre-election promises, which is nil. He is saying a lot of irresponsible things, which I think, should power come into his hands, he will not hesitate for a moment to discard.
Then is the timing issue. The Ukraine war is with us right now. The Iran-Israeli conflict is with us right now. It is very good politics to say, “Oh, we have to go slow on these things because the bigger issue is the coming fight with China”, which is not right now, which is by American military estimates three, five years away. In five years, Donald Trump will be out of power. Donald Trump today is not the Donald Trump of 2016, when he had virtually no control of who would be serving him.
44:49
He was stymied by inability to get anyone through the Senate for approval, except those who were actually going to implement the opposite of what he wanted. And so he had people from Tillerson to Pompeo, not to mention his national security advisor, who were undermining entirely his intentions for foreign policy. That was the Donald Trump then. Donald Trump today has at his side formidable thinkers and actors. He has the world’s richest man at his side, Elon Musk.
Musk, I don’t think for a second, could entertain the idea of a real conflict with China. Much of his fortune is invested in China. It’s unthinkable that he would encourage Trump to head into a war with China. The other members around, other people around Trump, RFK Jr. is one, and there are others, people of a lot of maturity and not an infantile wish to show who’s boss to China.
46:10
So I don’t take, I take it with a grain of salt, all of the pre-election discussion in the Trump camp about a coming showdown with China. Showdown in the future is one thing, showdown in the present is something very different. And for that reason, I’m not at all worried about relations with China leading us to a world war.
Alkhorshid: 46:35
You have to consider that Donald Trump is amazing when it comes to firing people as well.
Doctorow:
Look, I have one enormous debt to Donald Trump and so do all of my peers, only I admit it and they don’t. If it weren’t for Donald Trump, this show would not exist and none of the other shows would exist, and we all would be silenced. He by his impudent, irresponsible language, as viewed by the deep state, he has given us all a voice. Whatever else you can say about Trump and many things negatives, for me that’s a saving grace. I hope it’s also understood by all of your viewers. They wouldn’t be listening to you.
Alkhorshid:
Yeah. Thank you so much, Gilbert, for being with us today. Great pleasure as always. And have a good trip.
Doctorow: 47:35
Thanks so much.
Published by gilbertdoctorow
Gilbert Doctorow is an independent political analyst based in Brussels. He chose this third career of 'public intellectual' after finishing up a 25 year career as corporate executive and outside consultant to multinational corporations doing business in Russia and Eastern Europe which culminated in the position of Managing Director, Russia during the years 1995-2000. He has publishied his memoirs of his 25 years of doing business in and around the Soviet Union/Russia, 1975 - 2000. Memoirs of a Russianist, Volume I: From the Ground Up was published on 10 November 2020. Volume II: Russia in the Roaring 1990s was released in February 2021. A Russian language edition in a single 780 page volume was published by Liki Rossii in St Petersburg in November 2021: Россия в бурные 1990е: Дневники, воспоминания, документы. View all posts by gilbertdoctorow
Published November 2, 2024
Introduction
The following is an overview of the recent events and present state of the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War. We observe movement towards the end of the conflict in its present configuration and in two new directions simultaneously—a race to the final resolution of the NATO-Russia question. One direction consists of movement towards peace negotiations. The other is toward escalation into a open, direct NATO-Russia war likely to expand beyond the borders of Ukraine and far western regions of Russia. The race to resolution is on and it remains anyone’s guess whether peace or greater war will win the day.
Russia Proposes Diplomacy…Again
On June 14 Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a roadmap for ending the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War during a speech at Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He called the “Ukrainian crisis” “a tragedy for us all” and the result not of a Russo-Ukrainian conflict per se but “of the aggressive, cavalier, and absolutely adventurous policy that the West has pursued and is pursuing.” He proposed what he called “a real peace proposal” for establishing a permanent end to the Ukrainian conflict and war rather than a ceasefire. Putin based his proposal on principles he has reiterated numerous times, most of which were agreed upon by Kiev and Moscow in Istanbul in March-April 2022; a process scuttled by Washington, London, and Brussels (https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1746596120971673766.html; see also https://x.com/i_katchanovski/status/1750362694949966291?s=51&t=n5DkcqsvQXNd3DfCRCwexQ). In particular, he has now offered “simple” conditions for the “beginning of discussions.” They include: the full withdrawal of all Ukrainian troops from Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporozhia oblasts as they existed as of 1991—that is, Russia would receive all the oblasts’ territories not just those now controlled by Russian troops. Immediately upon agreeing to this condition and a second requiring Kiev’s rejection of any NATO membership (Ukraine’s “neutral, non-bloc, non-nuclear status”), from the Russian side “immediately, literally the same minute there will follow an order to cease fire and begin negotiations” and Moscow “will guarantee the unhindered and safe withdrawal” of Ukrainian units. However, he expressed “huge doubts” that the West would allow Kiev to agree to this. If his offer is rejected, Putin emphasized that all future blood-letting in Ukraine would be the West’s and Kiev’s “political and moral responsibility” and that Kiev’s negotiating position would only deteriorate as its troops’ position at the front (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/74285).
To be sure, Putin’s offer was not made under the illusion that it would be taken up within the next few months and was certainly another effort to lay blame for the conflict at Washington’s, Brussels and, less so perhaps, Kiev’s doors. Nevertheless, Putin’s public offering before Russia’s Foreign Ministry personnel is a most authoritative and official statement of a specific proposal from Russia; one that included paths to both a ceasefire and permanent peace, if Washington and/or Kiev choose to take them as Ukraine continues to crumble at the front, in the political sphere, and economically throughout this year. The pressure from the Western and Ukrainian publics to negotiate with Moscow will continue to mount through the U.S. presidential elections, as Ukraine deteriorates and the risk of direct, open, full-scale NATO-Russia war grows. It is possible that if US intelligence concludes and reports to the White House that the Ukrainian front and/or army and/or regime will collapse before the November elections, then the Biden administration may be moved to open talks or force the Ukrainians to do so.
Putin’s territorial demands are not likely to be static, as the territorial configuration changes rapidly on the ground. Russia seizes more territories beyond the four oblasts and Crimea, and the negotiating algorithm changes. Thus, the seizure of areas in Sumy and Kharkiv may not just be an attempt to begin establishing a broad ‘buffer zone’ to move more Ukrainian artillery and drones out of range. The Sumy, Kharkiv, and areas near, say, areas of Nikolaev and Odessa in the south can serve as trading cards to entice acquiescence to talks, as long as Russia makes no claims on those territories. In other words, the Ukrainians could have inferred and were perhaps supposed to infer that they could demand a request for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Sumy and Kharkiv simultaneously with Kiev’s withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the four Novorossiyan regions. The incursions into Sumy and Kharkiv in May might reflect preparation then already for Putin’s official reiteration of the peace proposal in June. Putin’s call for Ukrainian withdrawal from the four noted ‘Novorossiya’ regions implies the ‘return’ of any and all other areas occupied by Russian troops. Continued refusal to talk with Moscow and any further Russian gains give Putin flexibility in enticing or threatening Washington, Brussels, and/or Kiev to the negotiating table. Refuse talks and lose non-Novorossiyan lands; accept talks and Kiev gets them back.
Also, both subjectively (with Putin’s intent) and objectively (without Putyin’s intent) the proposal undermined Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskiy’s ‘disnamed’ ‘peace summit’ in Switzerland which was nothing other than an exercise in rallying support among supporters for the beleaguered Maidan regime. Tied to this issue is the Russian president’s assertions in the speech both Zelenskiy and the Maidan regime are illegitimate. Putin got mired down in some self-contradictions here. His assertion that the Maidan regime is illegitimate, since it came to power by an illegal “armed putch” – an absolutely correct one – contradicts his other claim that only Ukraine’s parliament or Supreme Rada is now a legitimate authority and representative of the Ukrainian people. According to Putin, Zelenskiy is not Ukraine’s legitimate authority according to the Ukrainian constitution and thus the Rada is, because Zelenskiy’s first five-year term expired without his being re-elected, but this is a plausible but debatable conclusion regarding a now extremely complicated legal issue. The key point here is that if the Maidan regime that arrived in power in February 2014 by way of an illegal coup is illegitimate, then the organs of power elected under it are equally as illegitimate, putting aside the issue of creeping legitimization by time (still too early) and international recognition. Indeed, it was a decision of the Rada on 21 February 2014 ostensibly impeaching the already overthrown (for all intents and purposes) President Viktor Yanukovych, without a quorum moreover, that gave a quasi-legal veneer of legitimacy to the Maidan coup, as Putin himself notes in his June speech (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/74285).
However, it should be noted that Putin’s raising of this issue is probably less driven by legalities than politics. Putin may be trying to drive a wedge between parliament and the Office of the President in order to strengthen any coup d’etat being planned in the wings by those such as former president Petro Poroshenko and former Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Zaluzhniy. In Putin’s interpretation of Ukraine’s “unique juridicial situation” as well as that of some Ukrainians, Poroshenko’s or Zaluzhniy’s legitimacy to rule is no less and indeed greater than that of Zelenskiy’s own.
It appears that Zelenskiy’s increasingly weak position at home, which I have discussed numerous times elsewhere, declining support for Ukraine abroad and most importantly in the U.S., Ukrainian forces’ dire situation all along the front and in the rear (lack of men and weapons to fight), the threat of a Russian summer offensive (see below), and Putin’s June proposals had their effect. As Zelenskiy arrived in Brussels on the eve of the NATO summit in Washington DC, a series of events confirmed the likelihood that Putin’s speech reflected developments in secret US-Russian talks, and Zelenskiy suddenly moved to suggest Kiev prepare (https://ctrana.news/news/467522-zelenskij-nameren-ustroit-perehovory-ob-okonchanii-vojny-chto-eto-znachit.html). In the days prior, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin telephoned Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and supposedly discussed measures to prevent a US-Russian clash that could lead to war likely motivated by the ATACMs attack on Crimea that killed some ten beach-goers, including children, and wounded some 40. It seems almost certain that there was some discussion of negotiations on war and peace. This was followed by rumors that a Russian plane had departed to Washington DC on June 25th. Now, just days later, Zelenskiy said in Brussels that Kiev “must put a settlement plan on the table within a few months.” This followed a statement weeks earlier by Ukraine Foreign Minister Dmitro Kuleba and Office of the President Andriy Yermak that the next Ukrainian peace summit following the failure of early June’s session should lead to a peace agreement and include Russia directly or indirectly for the first time and lead to a peace agreement (https://ctrana.news/news/466816-kuleba-dopustil-prekrashchenie-vojny-v-ukraine-posle-sammita-s-uchastiem-rossii.html; see also https://ctrana.news/news/467121-v-kakom-formate-mohut-sostojatsja-perehovory-s-rossiej-na-novom-sammite-mira.html). This confirms my sense that the Ukrainian war will end one way or the other this year unless NATO intervenes directly with troops on the ground.
Moscow’s Military Plans: Reject Talks and War You Shall Have
Moscow’s military plans for the remainder of the year can be summed up as continuity in Ukraine and preparations for war beyond Ukraine against the West. Thus, in Ukraine Russia will continue its more offensive strategy of ‘attrit and advance’ upgraded from, an intensification of what Alexander Mercouris calls ‘aggressive attrition’ (https://gordonhahn.com/2024/02/02/russian-strategic-transformation-in-ukraine-from-aggressive-attrition-to-attrit-and-advance/). Under attrit and advance, Russian forces still emphasize destruction of Ukraine’s armed forces over the taking and holding of new territory. The attrition of massive, combined air, artillery, missile, and drone war supersedes the advances on the ground by armor and infantry in this strategy. Thus, territorial advance is slow, but personnel losses are fewer. The Russians do not have their eyes on Kharkiv and may not even be attempting to create a border buffer zone. The main military strategic goal of the Kharkiv, now Kharkiv-Sumy offensive likely is to stretch the frontlines and thus resources of the Ukrainian armed forces. Building a buffer zone is secondary and concomitant with the military-political strategy of attrit, advance, and induce Kiev to talk. Look south in summer or autumn for offensives or very heightened activity in Kherson and/or, perhaps, Zaporozhia. The goal of this will be to stretch out the length of the entire war front beyond that which is being accomplished by the attacks on Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. The Russian strategy at this higher level is to stretch and thin out the Ukrainian forces’ already exhausted personnel, weapons, and equipment resources in the hope that a whole can be punched deep into Ukrtainian lines and the rear at some overstretched point, allowing a major, perhaps even ‘big arrow’ breakthrough aimed at some key Ukrainian stronghold or an encirclement of a large number of Ukrainian troops.
Despite the calls of some Russian hawks, Putin will never acquiesce to bomb Ukraine, no less Kiev ‘into a parking lot’ or ‘the stone age.’ For Russians, Ukrainians are a fraternal eastern Slavic people, with long-standing ties to Russia. Most Russian families have relatives or friends from or in Ukraine. Kiev is ‘the mother of all Russian cities’, and despite Russia’s possession of precise smart weapons, the risk of destroying Orthodox holy sites and other historical monuments in Kiev is too high. Russia’s overwhelming strength in weapons and manpower, despite Western inputs into Ukraine’s armed forces, could allow Russian attrit and advance to persist for many years—more than will be necessary to force negotiations or seize much of Ukraine.
Boiling the Russian Frog – Escalation by Any Other Name
There has been much talk about the US repeartedly stepping over Russian red lines. The most recent is Washington’s and Brussels’ (NATO’s) grant of permission to Kiev to target the territory of Russia proper (1991 territory) with Western-made weapons. The West itself has drawn many red lines that it said could spark direct war with Russia and, therefore, should not be crossed: offensive weapons, artillery, tanks, aircraft, various types of missiles, cluster munitions, etc., etc. Most recently, Washington crossed two red lines in rapid succession by approving Kiev use of U.S missiles, such as ATACMs to target Russian territory across the border in Kharkov and, presumably Sumy, where Russian forces have made a new incursion in order to develop a buffer zone so that Ukraine cannot target civilians as it has been doing in cities in Belgorod, send Ukrainian and Russian-manned pro-Ukrainian units across the border into Russia, and otherwise target Russian territory from northeastern Ukraine. It then expanded approval of the use of such missiles against any Russian territories from which attacks in Ukraine are being supported (www.politico.com/news/2024/06/20/us-says-ukraine-can-hit-inside-russia-anywhere-00164261). Days later Ukraine fired 5 ATACMs (4 were intercepted) at Sevastopol which hit beach-goers far from any military target, wounding 46 and killing 3, including 2 children. The potential escalation of the overall war resulting from this Ukrainian target was compounded when on the same day jihadi terrorists attacked the ancient Muslim city of Derbent in Dagestan, long a hotbed of global jihadi terrorism in Russia. The terrorists, likely from Central Asia or Afghanistan’s ISIS-affiliated Islamic State of Khorosan, attacked an Orthodox church and a Jewish synagogue, killed several civiulians, 15 policeman, and cut the throat of an Orthodox priest. This attack will likely be conflated with the Sevastopol attack. Recall the jihadin attack on Moscow’s concert venue, Crocus City Hall, which Russian authorities immediately suspected to be one involvomng Ukrainians.
Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has drawn few if any clear red lines, but several have been implied. Cautious and cagey Putin has never explicitly promised a particular response to any particlar crossing of a red line. Instead, he has invoked Russia’s great military potential, including nuclear, as sufficient reason for rational leaders to cease and desist. The assumption – both Putin’s and observers’ – is that this is a spontaneous, gradual escalation, driven by panic over Kiev’s deteriorating military, political, and economic situation as Russia marches forward, expanding the war front. The likelihood is that this is not a spontaneous response to conditions at the battlefront but rather a calculated policy of ‘boiling the frog’, and the ‘frog’ is as much Western publics as it is Russian political and military planners. After all, it matters less to Russian military planners at least why NATO is escalating the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War than the fact that NATO is escalating, crossing red lines. For Western publics, however, the approach of war needs to go unnoticed until it is too late. Whether by hook or crook, a false flag operation or a provoked Russian overreaction, Western NATO leaders seem intent on expanding the war beyond Ukraine’s borders and that will require Western public support and thus a vaccum of public discussion of NATO actions and national interests. Even if the constant escalation is ‘simply’ a game of chicken, upping the ante to see if Putin blinks or if the war can be dragged out past the November U.S. elections, there are many in U.S. intelligence and other departments, who are itching for a war against Russia who may escalate or enable Kiev to do so, intentionally or not, such that one is provoked. Unintentionality comes in, as Kiev has been anxious to force NATO or at least NATO member-states into direct involvement in the war. Ukraine has achieved some success in this, but so far such Western involvement has been limited, intially, to secret injections of Western troops and mercenaries, and then to open advisory roles. The summer and fall of 2024 will be a dangerous window in which a spark can detonate the larger war that such mad men and women are playing with.
To the extent that the West remains intent on continuing the escalation of the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War, Moscow will engage in asymmetrical escalation targeting Western forces outside of Europe and prepare for possible full-scale war with NATO or NATO members in and beyond Ukraine. Putin recently noted that asymmetrical escalation would be Moscow’s choice should the Werst continue escalating against Russian in Ukraine. Many commentators have noted what such options might be: arming the Houthis with missiles or air defense, supporting Hezbollah and/or Hamas against Israel, arming terrorist groups in the Middle East to attack U.S. bases, say, in Syria, Iraq, or elsewhere. Given the thousands of U.S bases around the world, American and other Western forces are eminently vulnerable. Moscow only needs the will and networks for deploying its ample means in the necessary directions. Moscow has the will. It is building networks.
Towards a Eurasian Security Pact: Getting Ready for Direct War with NATO
With war with NATO now firmly in the cards, a distinct possibility, the Kremlin is intensely set on military and military-political preparations. The rejection of Putin’s next peace proposal was likely the last straw that will set in motion the next phase in Russia’s diplomatic offensive in tendem with China aimed it rallying the Rest against the West. This new phase will focus on developing military partnerships and alliances. This was signalled most notably in the same June 14th speech in which Putin made his peace offering, evidencing the connection between it, the West-Ukraine rejection, and Russia’s first diplomatic move in this security direction.
For years, particularly after the Maidan coup, Putin has been conducting Russian diplomacy with the goal of creating a Great Eurasian and global alternative to the West’s ‘rules-based world order’, seeking to base a new, alternative international system of political, economic, financial, and monetary institutions on different rules written by all the great powers – the ‘Rest’ – rather than just the West. This ‘democratization’ or a certain ‘de-hierarchization’ or ‘levelling’ of the international system is to be organized on the principle of multipolarity and diversity for the world’s major civilizations. Putin’s model has come to mirror the ideas of the late Russian neo-Eurasianist Aleksandr Panarin in many ways. It has taken years for Putin to arrive firmly at the idea of an interconnected Greater Eurasia as the core of a global community of civilizations, preferably ‘traditional’ (i.e. non-postmodernist Western ones) as a kind of ‘Russian idea.’
However, in his February 29th annual address to both houses of the Russian Federal Assembly, Putin introduced the idea of creating a Eurasian security system. He reiterated his idea of “democratizing the entire system of international relations,” by which he means dismantling Western hegemony or ‘rules-based world order.’ However, he also proposed replacing it with a “system of unidivided security,” under which “the security of some cannot be secured at the expense of the security of others,” and gave marching orders to Russia’s diplomatic corps and other departments to what in effect would culminate in a Greater Eurasian security ‘architecture’ or pact (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73585).
On June 14th, Putin declared the death, the “collapse of the system of Euro-Atlantic security,” and repeated his call for the international security architecture to be “created anew.” He instructed the government and foreign ministry to work out “jointly with partners, with all interested countries…their version of guaaranteeing security in Eurasia, proposing them then for a wide international discussion.” He revealed that during his May visit to China he discussed this with PRC Chairman Xi Jinping, and they “noted that the Russian proposal does not contradict, but, to the contrary, compliments and is fully in agreement with the basic principles of the Chinese initiative in the sphere of global security.” Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskiy responded to the summit by criticizing China for being Putin’s tool, contributing further to the anti-diplomatic dynamic and isolation of the West from the Rest (https://breakingdefense.com/2024/06/in-surprise-singapore-visit-zelenksyy-asks-for-asian-support-in-peace-talks-accuses-china-of-disruption/). China responded by declaring its geopolitical military solidarity with Russia. Nevertheless, in his June speech Putin stated that Russia “future architecture of security is open to all Eurasian countries,” including “European and NATO countries.” This Greater Eurasia security pact is thus also a mechanism for splitting NATO, particularly Europe from the U.S. This is to be achieved by networking and lobbying all the international organizations in Eurasia that Russia has been building for decades now: the Russia-Belarus Union, BRICS+, SCO, EES, CSTO, and the CIS—all specifically mentioned by Putin in his speech behind such a project—as well as “influential international organizations of Southeast Asia and the Middle East.” According to Putin, the “states and regional structures of Eurtasia should determine concrete sphers of cooperation in the area of joint security. Proceeding from this: that they themselves should build a system of working institutions, mechanisms, and agreements that would really serve the attainment of the common goals of stability and development.” In this regard, he supported the Belarus’s proposal “to work out a programmatic document: a charter of multipolarity and diversity in the 21st century” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/74285). The Belarusian proposal was made by Minsk’s Foreign Minister in 23 October 2023 speech and envisaged what Putin discussed on June 14 but included the OSCE as a potential participant (https://ont.by/news/belarus-predlagaet-miru-razrabotat-hartiyu-mnogoobraziya-dlya-xxi-veka).
It is likely no coincidence that Putin openly supported Belarus’s idea of such a charter ten days before Belarus, with Russian sponsorship, was set to become a member of SCO on June 25th. Belarus’s membership in the largely Asian based organization founded by Moscow and Beijing places SCO’s flag farter west than ever before. This comes days after Putin’s visit to North Korea and the agreement to establish a de facto Russo-North Korean alliance. Thus, the gorwing network of theb Sino-Russian-organized networks of international networks based in Eurasia but extending globally through BRICS+5 to every continent is growing apace and now includes a robust security component.
Putin suggested in his June 14th speech that building an “undivided system of Eurasian security” and in fact global security architecture would be a post-Ukrainian war focus, again implying possible inclusion of the West or elements thereof, in any such architecture. But the train of the Rest’s rejection of the Western worldview has left the station, and, with the danger of escalation in Ukraine, Israel, and elsewhere afoot, it seems more likely that the new Eurasian-South bloc will be an alternative to, possibly a foe of the West’s ‘rules-based world order’ rather than a partner (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/74285).
Conclusion
Again, the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War – the current war with militay combat confined largely to Ukrainian and far western Russian territory — will end this year or very early next year. However, a new broader war can take its place, if the peace fails or is never agreed upon. Such a broader war could be confined to the present war’s territorial parameters in Ukraine, while expanding to a worldwide proxy war led by Russia and its direct or indirect allies against Western foreigbn bases and/or spreading to western Ukraine as a result of a NATO military intervention across the Dniepr’s Right Bank. A NATO fighter jets, such as F-16s, based outside Ukraine, could make Romanian or Polish air bases or other facilities targets for Russian missiles and drones. A NATO or Russian no fly zone of one kind or another could lead to NATO-Russian air combat. A Russian shootdown of the U.S. intelligence drone Global Hawk could be the spark for such tensions in the air.
The hope is that cooler heads will prevail, but the U.S. is in the midst of a deep and potentially explosive political crisis in which bureaucratic politics can become highly cryptic, conspiratorial, chaotic, and irrational, provoking new more dangerous conflict. Similarly, in Kiev a meltdown of the Maidan regime could be imminent and will likely come as a shot in the dark, unexpected by all. That could lead to the same kind of breakdown of bureaucratic, state discipline, and the rule of law – something far weaker in Ukraine than in the `U.S. – and lead to clandestine adventures of desparation, such as a false flag on a nuclear plat in Ukraine’s Energodar or elsewhere or ‘Hail Mary’ operation targeting a Russian nuclear or other strategic object, sparking a Russian overreaction and a full-scale NATO-Russian war. Worse still, state organizational (as opposed to territorial) breakdown in Ukraine could bring a complete political, economic, social, and state breakdown, with opposing Ukrainian partisan armies, warlords, and ultranationalist/neofascist formations fighting between themselves and carrying out guerilla and terrorist warfare against Russian and even Western occupiers. That Zelenskiy is now broaching peace talks with Putin is a reflection of the opportunity and dangers that are in the offing.
NEW BOOK
EUROPE BOOKS, 2022
RECENT BOOKS
MCFARLAND BOOKS, 2021
===
MCFARLAND BOOKS, 2018
About the Author –
Gordon M. Hahn, Ph.D., is an Expert Analyst at Corr Analytics, www.canalyt.com. Websites: Russian and Eurasian Politics, gordonhahn.com and gordonhahn.academia.edu
Dr. Hahn is the author of the new book: Russian Tselostnost’: Wholeness in Russian Thought, Culture, History, and Politics (Europe Books, 2022). He has authored five previous, well-received books: The Russian Dilemma: Security, Vigilance, and Relations with the West from Ivan III to Putin (McFarland, 2021); Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West, and the “New Cold War” (McFarland, 2018); The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia’s North Caucasus and Beyond (McFarland, 2014), Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007), and Russia’s Revolution From Above: Reform, Transition and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime, 1985-2000 (Transaction, 2002). He also has published numerous think tank reports, academic articles, analyses, and commentaries in both English and Russian language media.
Dr. Hahn taught at Boston, American, Stanford, San Jose State, and San Francisco State Universities and as a Fulbright Scholar at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia and was a senior associate and visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Kennan Institute in Washington DC, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group.
Why does the war in Ukraine continue? How will the war be stopped? To understand this, we must look to how political leaders think in Kyiv, Moscow, Washington and London. We need to understand the significance of the Ukraine War for these leaders. We have to start with the obvious, what everyone should know: The ABC of the Ukraine War.
A) From day one, Vladimir Putin said: Russia had been faced with a threat “to the very existence of the state”. He saw the war as “existential”. And Putin’s perception is no different from others in the Russian elite, then-US Ambassador to Moscow, William Burns, wrote to his secretary of state Condoleezza Rice back in 2008. Ukraine is only 500 km from Moscow. Western forces entering Ukraine would make any defense of Russia impossible. And U.S. leaders like former Secretary of Defense and Vice President Richard Cheney have said that they wanted to break Russia into pieces. To Moscow, it became necessary to deny the West military access to Ukraine in order to survive. If the U.S. would enter Ukraine, the West would pass the “brightest of all red lines”, to quote Ambassador Burns, current CIA Director William Burns from 2008. This would be “a declaration of war”, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel said. The most obvious provocation ever. Despite this, the U.S. continued its military buildup in Ukraine. The U.S. actually wanted to provoke a war with Russia in Ukraine – a war that Ukraine would never be able to win. Russia has a much larger industrial base than Ukraine. It produces several times more artillery shells than the Western countries combined, which is crucial in a protracted war. Russia has more than 140 million inhabitants, while Ukraine had only 40 and many of them have fled the country. Men from eastern Ukraine, in particular, are in hiding (4.5 million) and do not want to be part of the war (see Arestovich below). Ukraine will soon have a lack of troops. Rajmund Andrzejczak, former chief of the Polish General Staff, said “Ukraine is losing this war”. It was actually clear from the first day of the war. A country like Ukraine cannot win over the much larger Russia if Russia perceives the war to be “existential”. For those who knew anything about Russian military thinking, it was clear from day one: Ukraine would lose this war, and the more weapons the West gives Ukraine, the more soldiers will die. The question is just how many hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers will be killed before one is willing to enter peace negotiations.
B) From the 90s, Russia had one key demand: “a neutral Ukraine”. Since 2008, Russia has said that Ukrainian NATO membership would lead to war, but the United States with the support from the nationalist elite in western Ukraine still pushed for Ukrainian NATO membership. The 2014-15 Minsk Agreement gave Russia a “guarantee of a neutral Ukraine” and Russia was satisfied with that, but from 2019 Ukraine included its ambition to join NATO in the constitution in direct conflict with the Minsk Agreement, while Americans and Britons had been building up militarily in Ukraine. According to Russia, this was a violation of several agreements. Russia entered with a military force on 24 February 2022. At this very moment, President Putin said: “We have been treating all new post-Soviet states with respect […]. Russia respects the sovereignty of all post-Soviet states, and we respect and will respect their sovereignty. […] It is not our plan to occupy the Ukrainian territory”, he said. But Russia cannot accept a “[Western] threat from the territory of today’s Ukraine”. Russia demanded a neutral Ukraine. Ukraine’s chief negotiator from the talks with Russia in March-April 2022, David Arakhamia, said: Russia wanted a neutral Ukraine. “In fact, this was the key point. Everything else [was] cosmetic”, he said. President Zelensky's military adviser, Oleksiy Arestovych, who also attended Istanbul, said the negotiations were “successful. We opened the champagne bottle. It was completely successful negotiations”. Russia had no territorial claims, but British Prime Minister Boris Johnson travelled to Kyiv and said, according to Arakhamia, “We should not sign anything with them at all, and let's just fight”. After this, Russia lost all trust in a negotiated solution. When the West did not accept a neutral Ukraine as a buffer against Western military forces, Russia had only one option: to include the Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine in Russia to secure such a buffer. However, Russia still demands a neutral “rest-Ukraine” and the longer the war continues, the more territory Russia will take.
C) In the U.S. leadership everyone knew that Ukraine would never be able to win the war and would never be able to retake lost land. For the United States, the war is not primarily about Ukraine. U.S. policy is to “fight to the last Ukrainian”, said President Bill Clinton’s Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ambassador Chas Freeman. Most important for the United States is to “weaken Russia”, President Biden’s Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said. General Harald Kujat, former German Chief of Defense and Chairman of NATO Military Committee (2002-05) said that the U.S. is using the war in Ukraine to “weaken Russia” before the U.S. begins its war against China. For the United States, the war today is not about Ukraine, but Russia. One wants Russia to crumble. But how would the U.S. get the Ukrainian leadership accept a destructive war on its soil? To understand this, we must listen to Oleksiy Arestovych. He said back in 2019 that the best thing for Ukraine is “of course a major war with Russia and NATO membership as a result of a victory over Russia”. And he continued: “With a probability of 99.9 percent our price for joining NATO is a full-scale war with Russia”. The Americans and British had apparently told Kyiv to step up its war against the Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine to trigger a major war with Russia in order to make NATO defeat Russia to open up for Ukraine to join NATO. It was all about provoking Russia into a war, but from the first day of the war, Western media claimed that “Putin wanted to conquer Ukraine”. Despite entering Ukraine with far too small a military force to occupy the country and despite that those Ukrainian leaders said that Putin wanted “neutrality”, not to conquer Ukraine, all Western media spoke about a “full-scale invasion”, “an unprovoked attack” and that Putin wanted to conquer Ukraine. The problem is that the longer the war lasts, the more territory Russia will take and the more Ukrainian soldiers will be killed. Ukraine could have had a neutral sovereign state if one had accepted the 2015 Minsk Agreement or if one had accepted its negotiated agreement with Russia from March-April 2022. But instead, they followed British advice not to negotiate with Putin, “the crocodile”, to quote Johnson. This is tragic.
When Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg argues that one should support the Ukrainians with more advanced weapons systems to make their hand stronger “at the negotiating table”, he hasn’t understood that Russia is not the United States. The U.S. can back out and walk away from a war when it becomes too costly. The U.S. walked away from the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, when the costs of these wars overwhelmed any prospect of success. But Russia would not enter such “a war of choice”. To Russia, the Ukraine War is considered to be “existential”. One will use every means necessary to win the war. Ukraine and not even the European states can win a war over a major nuclear power like Russia, and the U.S. is unlikely to attack Russia, for example attack the Russian Naval Base at Murmansk, because in that case Russia will attack the U.S. Naval Base at Norfolk (Washington), and with the present Russian development of hypersonic missiles, Russia is in no way weaker than the United States in this respect. On the other hand, Russia is not interested in conquering others. One just wanted a neutral Ukraine and to abolish threatening weapons systems at its borders in accordance with the UN Charter (Art. 2:4).
INTRODUCTION
Reading perhaps Russia’s greatest thinker, Nikolai Berdyaev, during the horrors of the NATO-Russia Ukrainian war, I thought it might be of some interest to examine Berdyaev’s views on war, Russia, and Ukraine. Berdyaev was born near Kiev, in Obukhov, Kiev Oblast’, lived in Kiev and its environs, and attended a series of educational institutions in Kiev, including Kiev University. However, like many born in Ukraine over the centuries, he identified exclusively as a Russian, having no Ukrainian but rather noble Russian, noble French, as well as Polish and Tatar ancestry.
Living in the Russian Empire, he was caught up in many of its intellectual trends and political events. Drawn to Marxism in his university days and exiled to Vologda in 1897 for anti-Tsarist activity, Berdyaev soon abandoned such thought in favor of a moderate conservatism and revival of his Orthodox faith. He was very much opposed to the atheistic communist Bolshevik regime, and was arrested and interrogated by Cheka chief Felix Dzerzhinskii and deported from Soviet Russia along with hundreds of other philosophers and conservative intelligents in 1922. Berdyaev remained loyal but critical both of the Tsarist regime and Orthodox Church. As a thinker, he produced a free religious, historical, and political philosophy, with his greatest contributions being made to philosophy of history, so popular among the Russian intelligentsia both in his and our time. His thought reflected many of the elements extant in Russian culture and thought during the late 19th century, as I have analysed in my Russian Tselostnost’: Wholeness in Russian Culture, Thought, History and Politics (Europe Books, 2022) and my working paper “Russian Historical Tselostnost’” (https://gordonhahn.com/2023/04/13/working-paper-russian-historical-tselostnost-parts-1-3-conclusion/, 13 April 2023), including: monism, universalism, communalism, solidarism, messianism, historicism, transcendentalism and anti-bourgeoisism.
Berdyaev’s monism, like that of most of Russian religious and philosophical thought, held that God was present in the world and the Heavenly Kingdom and Divine were interconnected with the material world, humankind, and individual persons’ lives. Humankind’s purpose should be to prepare for the full unity of the universe and the Heavenly Kingdom, between spirit and matter, God and humankind. Berdyaev’s very Russian belief in or aspiration to unity or wholeness or tselostnost’ enveloped other types of tselostnost’: universalism, communalism, solidarism, and historical unity (Hahn, Russian Tselostnost’, pp. 138-42, 380-2, 567-8, 725-6, and “Russian Historical Tselostnost’”). As an Orthodox Christian, Berdyaev believed in the ultimate unity of all humankind in Christ—putting his Russian univeralist and monist tselostnost’ in brief (Hahn, Russian Tselostnost’, pp. 138-42, 380-2).
Similarly, Berdyaev shared the Russian aspiration to and belief in the propriety of communalism—the priority of the group’s interest over individual interests and the benefits of this to individuals and humankind (Hahn, Russian Tselostnost’, pp. 567-8). Although he was critical of Slavophiles, he saw their belief and that the Russian agrarian socialists in the advantages and moral superiority of the village commune as a reflection fo Russians’ preference for a communalist rather than individualist culture. He also endorsed Slavophile Aleksei Khomyakov’s views of spiritual communalism or sobornost’ – ‘communitarianism’ or ‘conciliarism’ – under the protective divine wing of Christian love in the community of Orthodox believers and the Church (Nikolai Berdyaev, “Slavyanskaya ideya,” in Nikolai Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii (St. Petersburg: Azbuka, 2016, pp. pp. 161-70, at p 162. )].
The Russian preference for political, social, cultural, and ontological (identitarian) unity or solidarism is also present in Berdyaev’s work as an aspiration, since he was well aware of the great schisms that plagued Russia historically and in his own time. As I discuss below, these foundational elements of Russian tselostnost’ in Berdyaev’s thinking accompany his equally Russian messianism, historical tselostnost’, his vision of Ukraine, and his views on war.
Berdyaev, Russia, and its Fate
Berdyaev was neither a revolutionary nor a reactionary. He was, rather, a Russian patriot, Orthodox believer, a moderately conservative for his time and place, but he was critical of the Russian elite, intelligentsia, people, and orthodox Church. Presaging Soviet culturologist Yurii Lotman’s work on Russian duality, he was particularly struck by and quite penetrating and eloquent in describing the stark contradictions in the Russian character—its abundant antinomies: “In other countries one can find all these contradictions, but only in Russia does the thesis turn into its antithesis, the bureaucratic state is born from anarchism, slavery is born from freedom, and extreme nationalism from supra-nationalism” (universalism) [Nikolai Berdyaev, “Sud”ba Rossii,” republished in Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii), pp. 11-44, at p. 29]. He points to other antinomies. Russian nationalism also coexists, it not produces Russian universalism: “Supra-nationalism, universalism” is “an essential trait of the Russian national spirit… The national in Russia is precisely supra-nationalism and its freedom from nationalism; in this Russia distinctive and unlike any other country in the world. Russia is called upon to be the liberator of nations” (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 20). In this last phase we see one way in which one particular trait generates Russian messianism, a belief in a special global mission for Russia in shaping world history. In another antinomy, “(t)he other side of Russian humility is an unusual Russian self-opinion. The humblest Russian is the greatest, most powerful, and uniquely called” (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 21). Here again, another essential trait leads, in Berdyaev’s thinking, to Russian messianism. In order to attain its proper status in the world and have its say in History’s course and outcome, it needed to overcome the negative sides of these antinomies.
Being a Russian patriot and imbued by Russian monist Christian, teleological historicism, Berdyaev, much like Fyodor Dostoevskii, developed a faith that Orthodox Russia would overcome its shortcomings and play an important role in leading humankind to Christian unification at the end of History. He certainly saw Russia as properly a “great Empire” (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 276) and was supportive of Russia’s colonial advancement of less developed peoples and of Russia’s “heroic” army in World War I (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 100). At times, he wrote as if Russia was destined to overcome its insufficiencies and play a pivotal or leading role in history, but at other times he was urging changes to achieve this, thus implying an element of uncertainty in his own mind. For example, in his article “Spirit and Machine,” Berdyaev wrote: “If Russia wants to be a great Empire and play a role in history, then this lays on it the obligation to start on the path of material-techonological development. Without this decision, Russia will fall into a situation without exit. The soul of Russia will be freed and its depths disclosed only on this path (of material development)” (Nikolai Berdyaev, “Dukh and mashina,” in Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 266-76, at p. 276).
Berdyaev’s own nationalism and messianism were reflected in his belief in a special historical role of the Slavs—his “Slavic idea.” He was no enemy of the West but was highly critical of its bourgeois materialism, which he blamed for the outbreak of World War (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 207, 217-18). “Russia is the most non-bourgeois country in the world,” lacking the “despotism” of the bourgeois family life and concerns Berdyaev averred. He conterposed to this Western ‘bourgeoisism’ the transcendence of the world exemplified by Russians: “The Russian person with ease of the sul overcomes any bourgeoisness and departs from any custom and from any normed life. The wanderer (strannik) type is so characteristic of Russia and so wonderful. The wanderer is the freest person on earth. …The greatness of the Russian people and the calling of it to a higher life are concentrated in the strannik type. … Russia is a fantastic country of spiritual drunkenness. … The Russian spirit cannot sit in place, it is not )of) the shopkeepers’ soul, not a local soul. In Russia, in the soul of (its) people there is a kind of endless searching, a searching for the invisible city of Kitezh, and unseen home. … Before the Russian soul open great exapanses, and there is no marked horizon before its spiritual eyes. The Russian spirit borns in a fiery pursuit of the truth, absolute, divine truth and salvation for the whole world and the universal resurrection to a new life” (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 24-6). Here, in Berdyaev’s perspective, is a classic Russian vision of the Russian soul, replete with its monist, universalist, transcendental, and messianic expanse. Berdyaev was himself typically Russian in his tendency towards transcendentalism and wholeness, preferred over the everyday mundanity of Western bourgeois life and understanding. Berdyaev’s very Russian transcendentalism, symbolized by and reflected in the strannik, is evidenced by his own belief in and aspiration to wholeness in its various forms as well as by his messianic hopes for Russia (see Hahn, Russian Tselostnost’: Wholeness in Russian Culture, Thought, History and Politics).
Oddly enough Berdyaev did not view Russia’s main opponent in World War I, Germany, as having been soiled by its very bourgeois life and even denied it had a fundamentally materialist culture. German culture and messianism derived from a far deeper cause, its own peculiar idealism. German bourgeoisism, industrial-techological advancement were the consequence of the German spirit. “The German is a metaphysician” (Nikolai Berdyaev, “Religiya Germanizma,” in Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 195-204, especially p. 197). In contrast to Russian idealism’s humility, however, German culture, in Berdyaev’s view, is imbued with an egocentric nationalism and aspiration to instill rationality, organization, and order in the world. While Russian messianism and universalism accepted chaos as the nature of human history before salvation, German messianism and universalism pursued humankind’s salvation through the willful elimination of chaos, and only Germany, Germans thought, can accomplish this task (Berdyaev, “Religiya Germanizma,” pp. 195-204, especially p. 200). In this way, like Russian nationalism, German nationalism contained and indeed nurtured the germ of universalism, however different a species of universalism it might be, not to mention imperialism.
Despite its own sprituality, Germany had chosen the path of “prideful” nationalism and the machine in excess and thus was in conflict with Russia and potentially could be better opposed by the Slavic idea, Slavic unity, and Slavic messianism. In his earlier writings, which have been the focus herein so far, Berdyaev adhered to some pan-Slavist tendencies and even proposed Slavic unity and messianism as an antidote and counterforce against German militaristic messianism. For example, in his article, “The Slavic Idea” (“Slavyanskaya ideya”), he emphasized that two of the 19th century Slavophiles’ and pan-Slavists’ shortcomings was to ignore or underestimate as well as a failure to address divisions between the various Slavic peoples and to harbor an inappropriate disdain for Poland because of its Catholicism, leaving the “Slavic idea” in a “sad condition” (Nikolai Berdyaev, “Slavyanskaya ideya,” in Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 161-70, at pp. 162 and 163-5). Instead, Russia ought endeavor to unify the Slavs under the “Slavic idea” against the threatening danger of Germanism”, should emphasize ethnicity over religion in order to unify Slavdom, particularly its two greatest states, against Berlin (Berdyaev, “Slavyanskaya ideya,” in Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 161 and 168). Indeed, Russia must, according to Berdyaev, “redeem its historical guilt” before the Polish people (Berdyaev, “Slavyanskaya ideya,” in Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 165). “The idea of Slavic unification, first of all Russian-Polish unification, should not be external-political, utilitarian-statist” but rather “spiritual and focuses on internal life” in the Slavic world, which presumably means a concentration on overcoming religious schism, cultural differences, and historical grievances (Berdyaev, “Slavyanskaya ideya,” in Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 170).
One cannot help but be struck by the analogous configuration of the contradiction and conflict between Berdyaev’s view of world affairs, World War I, the idealistic orgins of German militarism in the aspiration to organize and order humankind, and the Slavic idea he counterposed to German imperialism, on the one hand, and Russia’s perception of American hegemony, Washington’s rules-based new world order, and Russian neo-Eurasiainism and Sino-Russian-led, Greater Eurasian-centered alternative multi-civilizational model for the international system, on the other hand, reflected by BRICS+, the One Belt One Road Initiative, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Indeed, Berdyaev perhaps presaged Eurasianism in writing that “Russia should be demonstrate types of eastern-western cultures and overcome the one-sidedness of Western European culture with its positivism and materialism and the self-satisfaction of limited horizons. … We should move out into the worldly expanse. And in this expanse the ancient wellsprings of culture should be visible. The East should become of equal value to the West again” (Berdyaev, “Slavyanskaya ideya,” in Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 159).
Berdyaev’s endearment to the “Slavic idea” centered on a Russo-Polish rapprochement and alliance and his disdain for Germany’s imperialism and war machine suggest that similarly he would have rejected American positivism, materialism, and hegemony, NATO expansion, and its splintering of Slavic peoples away from Russia and if alive today would accept Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to block NATO expansion even at the cost of war in Ukraine. It is reasonable to conclude, in fact, that Berdyaev’s views of Ukraine, if held in comparably relative form today, might have facilitated not just his acceptance, nut perhaps even support for Russia’s ‘special military operation’ against Kiev.
Berdyaev, Ukraine, and Russia
As noted above, Berdyaev was born and lived his youth and young adult years in Ukraine, indeed even attending university in Kiev. So he could have succumbed to ideas of Ukrainian nationalism which intensified at the time or rejected them based on his essentially Russian ethnicity and identity as well as his later adult life’s deep imbeddedness in the life and culture of Russia in its imperial centers, St. Petersburg and Moscow. Initially, he dabbled in Marxism as much of his generation did but then turned to a religious idealism rooted in Russian Orthodoxy. The issue of Ukrainian nationalism and separatism was already a burning issue in the Russian Empire by World War I and was intentionally aggravated before and during by Vienna, and Berdyaev did not shy away from blaming St. Petersburg’s policy for damaging Russia’s prestige and strengthening separatism in Galicia (Nikolai Berdyaev, “Natsionalizm i Imperializm,” in Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 132-40, at p. 139).
Berdyaev’s preference for and perhaps belief in Slavic unity would naturally have been predisposed him to oppose Ukrainian separatism. At the same time, in discussing the divisions in the Slavic world, he noted the tendency of ethnically close or related peoples to be less able to understand each other and so to more easily reject each other than peoples culturally and linguistically more distant from each other. (Nikolai Berdyaev, “Rossiya i polskaya dusha,” in Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 187-95, at p. 188). This dynamic can be seen in stark relief nowhere better than in Russo-Ukrainian relations, though, to be sure, much of the antagonism has been seeded by Russia’s foes, seeking to sow separatism for centuries there—not to mention Poland’s and Austro-Hungaria’s own colonial relations with Ukraine. Therefore, Berdyaev was and would be today keenly attuned to the complexities of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship – compounded after his writing on the subject by the Soviet experience in a myriad of ways – and its role in fomenting the crisis that led to the NATO-Russia Ukrainian war.
Consistent with his pan-Slavist idea, Berdyaev fully rejected in his time the idea of a separation of Russia and ‘Malorossiya’ (Little Russia) or Ukraine. In his 1918 article “Russia and Great Russia” Berdyaev denied both the Great Russians and “Little Russians” any status as separate nations or peoples. Just as there is no separate Ukrainian nationality, he aasserted, so too there is no separate Great Russian nationality; there is only a single, united Russian nation, with “tribal differences” between Russians and Ukrainians (N. A. Berdyaev, “Rossiya i Velikorossiya,” Nakanune, No. 3, April 1918 republished in A. Yu. Minakov, ed., Ukrainskii Vopros: V russkoi patritiocheskoi mysli (Moscow: Knizhnyi mir, 2016), pp. 413-19, at pp. 413-14.). In other words, he perceived solidarist tselostnost’ and supported solidarism of the Russian nation as a united ethno-cultural entity, noting its centuries’ long continuity until 1917. He did so in the unique way of denying the Great Russians any national status separate from its union with Ukraine and other traditional territories and even Russia’s colonized peoples. Berdyaev was prepared to sacrifice even the well-being of each of the eastern Slavic nations for the sake of a unified Russia. “A suffering, sick, misfit Russia would be better than well-off and self-satisfied states of Great Russia, Little Russia, Belorussia, and other regions, thinking themselves independent wholes” ( Berdyaev, “Rossiya i Velikorossiya,” p. 418). For him, “(i)t is not possible to think of Great Russia without the south and without its riches. And it is impossible not to see a terrible betrayal and terrible crime in the destruction of the entire cause of Russian history which carried out the idea of Russia” (Berdyaev, “Rossiya i Velikorossiya,” p. 419). Assuming Berdyaev would not have acquiesced to constructivist arguments regarding nations, his pan-Slavism would have inclined him to refuse to recognize the formation of a separate Ukrainian identity and the idea of a separate Ukrainian nation and state. Moreover, Berdyaev asserted that annexations can be historically useful and condemned Europe for failing to help the Christians of the Ottoman Empire and wrote of Russia’s historical “calling” in his discussion (Nikolai Berdyaev, “Dvizhenie i nepodvizhnost’ v zhizni narodov,” in Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 227-33, at pp. 229-32). Given his pan-Slavism, one can suspect that he had in mind any future Russian attempt during the war to help Turkey’s Slavic Christian peoples breakaway from Constantinople. Although whether Berdyaev, if he was alive today, would have or would not have backed Russia’s ‘special military operation’ into Ukraine is a considerably different matter, by all appearances he could very well have accepted it and the annexations of Ukrainian territory both in 2014 and 2022.
Berdyaev on War
In numerous articles written during World War I and before the fall of the Romanov dynasty and Imperial regime, Berdyaev discussed nationalism, imperialism, universalism, messianism, the role of words in politics and society, war, and Russia’s relations to all these elements (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii). The theme of war was directly related to the time in which he was writing, during World War I, when Russia was in the midst of a mammoth struggle of competing imperialisms of which Russia’s was but one and hardly focused on Europe proper. Berdyaev’s monist tselostnost’ was reflected in his belief that war was a reflection not just of humankind’s inner, spiritual world but of the divine world (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 205-18). War is material reflection of spiritual world, a symptom of internal disease in humankind, a reflection not cause of evil. In this way, all were to blame and responsible for and participates one way or another in the ‘Great War’ (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 205-7, 210-11). But most of all, it seems, materialism in its most concentrated social form – bourgeois life and values – was responsible for the outbreak of WW I. Here, Berdyaev’s very typical Russian transcendentalism emerges to indict non-spiritual, bourgeoisie life, which, he argued, kills human spirituality (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 207).
But on the grander scale of things, war is inevitable, an integral part of tragic nature of human history, which Berdyaev emphasized in his monist philosophy of history and historicism (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 217). His religiosity availed him to parse differing attitudes towards war he perceived in Russians and perhaps others between materialists and positivists. Berdyaev asserted that materialists’ greater fear of death more contributed to their greater fear of war and therefore their pacifism. Consistent with his monism, Christians (such as he himself), he argued, see war more deeply as a symptomatic expression of “spiritual violence”, which all inflict on others (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 208). There is a “dark irrational source” in the depths of humankind from which comes “the deepest tragic contradictions.” Evil in humankind was gaining full reign in the absence or insufficient ubiquity of the Divine. Yet war is a mix of good and evil. In terms of the latter, it involved violence and death inflicted by man against man. A truly Christian war (and state) were impossible for Berdyaev. In terms of the good, war moved the tragedy of history forward towards its apocalyptic apotheosis of all humankind and the advent of the ultimate triumph of “Christ’s sword”, the Second Coming, and Heavenly Kingdom (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 209). Thus, Berdyaev’s views on war are based on his Christian philosophy of history and historicism intermixed with his Orthodox monism and universalism.
Later, Berdyaev would develop a sophisticated religious philosophy of history in which he elaborated on the connection between the worldly and spiritual worlds’ struggle between good and evil and its relationship to world history and its ultimate apocalyptic, yet Christian outcome with the second coming of Christ and the advent of the Heavenly Kingdom to the material world. Here was a mix of beliefs in monism and historical unity. A hint of his subsequently more deeply developed Christian eschatology and teleology of History’s ultimate outcome and the following salvation can be seen in a religiously and metaphysically philosophical passage on war:
The responsibilityof man (for the war) should be broadened and deepened. Truly, man is violent and a murderer more often than he suspects and than (others) suspect about him. It is impossible to see violence and murder only in war. All our earthly life rests on violence and murder. Even before the beginning of today’s world war we were violent and murdered in the very depths of life more than during the war. The war manifested on the material plane our old violence and murder, our hatred and antagonism. In the depths of life there is a dark, irrational wellspring. The most profound tragic contradictions are born from it. And humankind, not enlightened within itself divine light because of this dark ancient element, inevitably is passing through the baptismal horror and death of war. There is an inherent redemption of ancient guilt in war. There is something foolish in the abstract wishes of pacifism to avoid war, leaving humankind in its previous condition. This is the wish to remove responsibility from oneself. War is intrinsic punishment and intrinsic redemption. In war, hatred is remolded into love, and love into hatred. In war the furthest extremes touch, and the devilish dark intersects with divine light. War is the material manifestation of the ancient contradictions of being and the revelation of the life’s irrationality. Pacifism is the rationalistic negation of the irrational dark in life. And it is impossible to believe in an eternally rational world. It is not for nothing that Apocalypse prophecies about wars. And Christianity does not foresee a peaceful and painless end of world history. Below is reflected that which is above, and on earth it is at it is in Heaven. And above, in Heaven, God’s angels fight with Satan’s angels. In all spheres of the cosmos there is fiery and furious elements, and war is conducted. And on earth Christ brings not peace but the sword. The deep antinomy of Christianity is in this: Christianity cannot answer evil with evil, resist evil with violence, and Christianity is war, the division of the world and its outgrowth until the end of the redemption of the cross in dark and evil (Nikolai Berdyaev, “Mysli o prirode voiny,” in Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 205-13, at pp. 208-9).
The above exegesis is not only Berdyaev’s metaphysical analysis of the meaning of World War I and war in general. It is Berdyaev’s recommendation to Russians on how they should interpret the apocryphal events they were witnessing.
Indeed, Berdyaev argued that Russians’ failure to adopt such a religious-metaphysical attitude towards the war that recognizes the “(c)reative historical tasks” related to the war led to a need for self-justification for Russia’s involvement. Self-justification was achieved by placing themselves above the Germans, who were portrayed as morally inferior. Russia’s “hasty justifications for the war or, more precisely, our self-justifications came to one conclusion: we are better than the Germans, moral right is on our side, we are defending ourselves and others” (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 220). He continued: “For some (Russians) the German people were acknowledged as the bearer of militarism and reaction, and that is why it is necessary to fight with them—it is a progressive cause. Even anarchists such as Kropotkin stood for this point of view. For many the German people seemed the bearer of the anti-Christian principles and a false spiritual culture, and that is why war with them is a holy war” (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 221). Berdyaev would likely see this less the less than humble and sufficiently arrogant and self-righteous today in both the Western and much of Russia’s perceptions, proclamations, and propaganda surrounding the NATO-Russia Ukrainian war.
There was no shying away from criticism of Russians’ behavior at the outbreak of the war, on Berdyaev’s part. He castigated the bloodthirsty nationalism that swept through Russia at the time as it did throughout Europe: “The orgy of chemical instincts and the ugly profiting and speculation in the days of the great war and the great trials for Russia are ourgreat shame and a black stain on national life” (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 99). He saw this as a consequence of Russia’s weak moral education, lack of a civil society and civic honesty and honor, and one alternative side of Russian smirenie: susceptibility to the “temptation of easy gains,” which he saw elevated by in Russia’s bourgeois-philistine layer” (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, pp. 99-100). Thus, he today would be dismayed by similar war mongering and the like coming from the ultra-patriotic wing of Russia’s political spectrum as well as from more ‘bourgeios-philistine’ elements such as Russian Security Council Secretary, Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission, and former Russian president Dmitrii Medvedev.
Finally, Berdyaev placed the war in another larger context of the struggle between peoples for a “dignified national existence” that was part of the development of the world’s historical tragedy in which no nation had a monopoly on morality in war. “Тhe historical struggle is a struggle for being and not for forthright justice, and it is implemented by the comprehensive spiritual forces of nations. (The historical struggle) is a struggle for national being and not a utilitarian struggle, and it is always a struggle for values, for creative strength and not for the elementary fact of life and not for simple interests. One can say that the struggle among nations for historical being has deep moral and religious meaing, and it is necessary for the higher goals of world process. But it is impossible to say that in this struggle one people wholly represents the good, and another people wholly represents evil. One people only can be more right than another relatively speaking. The struggle for historical existence of each people has an internal justification” (Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii, p. 223).
CONCLUSION
Berdyaev’s thought on Russia, Ukraine, and war are a clear function of his Russianness and Orthodoxy filtered through his own personal struggle to understand the visible and invisible world and cosmos around him. In Berdyaev’s Christian eschatology, teleology, and soteriology dictated an even-handed treatment of the relative good and evil of the world’s peoples in the making of humankind’s tragic history, which was to end in apocalypse ushering in Christ’s second coming and the Heavenly Kingdom. This even-handedness is reflected in Berdyaev’s harsh criticisms of Russia alongside his attribution of a special mission. It is also evident in Berdyaev’s refusal to support Russian chauvinist positions in relation to Ukraine as well as Poland and even Germany. Great and Little Russians are co-equals in the Russian nation, in Berdyaev’s view. Finally, all are responsible and participate in the human evils of hate, violence, and war through which humankind must suffer to attain a divinely determined, not any man-made worldly and metaphysically historical outcome on earth as in Heaven.
According to the Book of Judges, Samson is a Jew consecrated to God. He has vowed never to cut his hair and has fabulous strength. However, his mistress, Delilah, cuts off his braids while he sleeps, depriving him of God’s help and strength. He was taken prisoner by the Philistines, who gouged out his eyes and threw him into prison in Gaza. During a sacrifice to their god, when his hair had begun to grow back, he was placed between two columns in the palace. With his bare hands, he pushed them apart, causing the palace to collapse. He committed suicide, killing several thousand Philistines in the process.
The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have led several leading politicians to compare the current period with the 1930s, and to raise the possibility of a World War. Are these fears justified, or are they just fear-mongering?
To answer this question, we’re going to summarize events that are unknown to everyone, though well known to specialists. We shall do so dispassionately, at the risk of appearing indifferent to these horrors.
First, let’s distinguish between the conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. They have only two things in common:
- They represent no significant stakes in themselves, but a defeat for the West, which, after its defeat in Syria, would mark the end of its hegemony over the world.
- They are fueled by a fascist ideology, that of Dmytro Dontsov’s Ukrainian "integral nationalists" [1] and that of Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s Israeli "revisionist Zionists" [2]; two groups that have been allies since 1917, but went underground during the Cold War and are unknown to the general public today.
There is, however, one notable difference between them:
The same fury is visible on both battlefields, but the "integral nationalists" sacrifice their own fellow citizens (there are hardly any able-bodied men under thirty left in the Ukraine), while the "revisionist Zionists" sacrifice people who are foreign to them, Arab civilians.
Is there a risk that these wars will become more widespread?
This is the will of both groups. The "integral nationalists" are constantly attacking Russia inside its territory and in Sudan, while the "revisionist Zionists" are bombing Lebanon, Syria and Iran (more precisely, Iranian territory in Syria, since the Damascus consulate is extra-territorialized). But no one responds: not Russia, Egypt or the Emirates in the first case, nor Hezbollah, the Syrian Arab Army or the Revolutionary Guards in the second.
All of them, including Russia, anxious to avoid a brutal retaliation from the "collective West" that would lead to a World War, prefer to take the blows and accept their deaths.
If war were to become widespread, it would no longer be simply conventional, but above all nuclear.
While we all know each other’s conventional capabilities, we are largely unaware of each other’s nuclear capabilities. The most we know is that only the USA used strategic nuclear bombs during the Second World War, and that Russia claims to have hypersonic nuclear launchers with which no other power can compete. However, some Western experts question the reality of these prodigious technical advances. Behind the scenes, what is the strategy of the nuclear powers?
In addition to the five permanent members of the Security Council, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel have strategic atomic bombs. All except Israel see them as a means of deterrence.
The Western media also present Iran as a nuclear power, which Russia and China officially deny.
During the Yemen war, Saudi Arabia bought tactical nuclear bombs from Israel and used them, but it does not seem to have them permanently at its disposal, nor to have mastered the technique.
Only Russia regularly conducts Nuclear War exercises. During last October’s exercises, Russia admitted to losing a third of its population in the space of a few hours, then simulated combat and emerged victorious.
Ultimately, all the nuclear powers have no intention of firing first, as this would undoubtedly lead to their destruction. The exception is Israel, which seems to have adopted the "Sanson doctrine" ("Let me die with the Philistines"). It would thus be the only power to imagine the ultimate sacrifice, the "Twilight of the Gods", dear to the Nazis.
Two critical works have been devoted to the Israeli military atom: The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy by Seymour M. Hersh (Random House, 1991) and Israel and the Bomb by Avner Cohen (Columbia University Press, 1998).
The military atom was never envisaged as a classic form of deterrence, but as an assurance that Israel would not hesitate to commit suicide to kill its enemies rather than be defeated. This is the Masada complex [3]. This way of thinking is in line with the "Hannibal Directive", according to which the IDF must kill its own soldiers rather than let them become prisoners of the enemy [4].
During the Six-Day War, the Israeli Prime Minister, the Ukrainian Levi Eshkol, ordered one of the two bombs Israel had at its disposal at the time to be prepared and detonated near an Egyptian military base on Mount Sinai. This plan was not carried out, as the IDF quickly won the conventional war. Had it gone ahead, the fallout would have killed not only Egyptians, but Israelis too [5].
During the October 1973 war (known in the West as the "Yom Kippur War"), the Defense Minister, the Ukrainian-born Israeli Moshe Dayan, and the Prime Minister, the Ukrainian Golda Meir, again considered the use of 13 atomic bombs [6].
Mordechai Vanunu’s revelations on the front page of the Sunday Times.
In 1986, a nuclear technician from the Dimona power plant, the Moroccan Mordechai Vanunu, revealed Israel’s secret military nuclear program to the Sunday Times [7]. He was kidnapped by Mossad in Rome, on the orders of the Israeli Prime Minister and father of the atomic bomb, Shimon Peres of Belarus. He was tried in camera and sentenced to 18 years in prison, 11 of which were spent in total isolation. He was again sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment for daring to speak to the Voltaire Network.
In 2009, Martin van Creveld, Israel’s chief strategist, declared: "We have several hundred atomic warheads and rockets and can reach our targets in all directions, even Rome. Most European capitals are potential targets for our air force (...) The Palestinians must all be expelled. The people fighting for this goal are simply waiting for "the right person at the right time" to come along. Only two years ago, 7 or 8% of Israelis thought this would be the best solution, two months ago it was 33%, and now, according to a Gallup Poll, the figure is 44% in favor.
So it’s reasonable to assume that no nuclear power, except Israel, will dare commit the irreparable.
This is precisely what Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu (Otzma Yehudit/Jewish Force) envisaged on Radio Kol Berama on November 5. Referring to atomic weapons against Gaza, he declared: "It’s a solution... it’s an option". He then compared the residents of the Gaza Strip to "Nazis", assuring that "there are no non-combatants in Gaza" and that this territory does not deserve humanitarian aid. "There are no uninvolved people in Gaza".
These remarks provoked indignation in the West. Only Moscow was surprised that the International Atomic Energy Agency did not take up the matter [8].
It is very likely that this is the reason why Washington continues to arm Israel, even though it is calling for an immediate ceasefire: if the United States no longer supplies Tel Aviv with weapons to massacre the Gazans, the latter could use nuclear weapons against all the peoples of the region, including the Israelis.
In Ukraine, the "integral nationalists" planned to blackmail the United States with the same argument: the threat of nuclear or, failing that, biological weapons [9]. In 1994, Ukraine, which had a vast stockpile of Soviet atomic bombs, signed the Budapest Memorandum. The United States, the United Kingdom and Russia guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity in exchange for the transfer of all its nuclear weapons to Russia and signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, after the overthrow of elected president Viktor Yanukovych in 2014 (EuroMaidan), the "integral nationalists" worked to re-nuclearize the country, which they saw as essential to eradicating Russia from the face of the earth.
On February 19, 2022, Ukrainian President Voloymyr Zelensky announced at the annual Munich Security Conference that he would challenge the Budapest Memorandum in order to rearm his country with nuclear weapons. Five days later, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched its special operation against the Kiev government to implement Resolution 2202. Its top priority was to seize Ukraine’s secret and illegal reserves of enriched uranium. After eight days of fighting, the civilian nuclear power plant at Zaporijjia was occupied by the Russian army.
Laurence Norman, the Wall Street Journal’s special envoy to the Davos forum on the Iranian nuclear issue, reported Rafael Grossi’s statement on the Ukrainian nuclear issue on Twitter, but did not publish an article on the subject. The information was confirmed by another journalist, this time from the New York Times, also on Twitter.
According to Argentina’s Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who spoke three months later on May 25 at the Davos Forum, Ukraine had secretly stored 30 tons of plutonium and 40 tons of uranium at Zaporijjia. At market prices, this stockpile was worth at least $150 billion. Russian President Vladimir Putin declared: "The only thing [Ukraine] lacks is a uranium enrichment system. But that’s a technical question, and for Ukraine it’s not an insoluble problem". However, his army had already removed a large part of this stock from the plant. Fighting continued for months. If the integral nationalists had still had them, they would have done what the "revisionist Zionists" are doing today: they would have demanded more and more weapons and, if refused, threatened to use them, i.e. to launch Armageddon.
Back to today’s battlefields. What are we seeing? In Ukraine and Palestine, the West continues to provide the "integral nationalists" and, to a lesser extent, the "revisionist Zionists" with an impressive arsenal. However, they have no reasonable hope of getting the Russians to back down, or of massacring all the Gazans. At worst, they can lead their allies to empty their arsenals, sacrifice all Ukrainians of fighting age and diplomatically isolate the puppet-state of Israel. As Moshe Dayan once said, "Israel must be like a mad dog, too dangerous to control".
Let’s imagine that these apparently catastrophic consequences are in fact their goal.
The world would then be divided in two, as it was during the Cold War, except that Israel would have become uninviting. In the West, the Anglo-Saxons would still be the masters, especially as they would be the only ones with weapons, their allies having exhausted theirs in Ukraine. Israel, isolated as it was in the late 70s and early 80s when it was only really recognized by the apartheid regime of South Africa, would still be fulfilling the mission it was originally entrusted with: to mobilize the Jewish diaspora in the service of the Empire, fearing a new wave of anti-Semitism.
This bleak vision is the only one that can keep the Anglo-Saxons from collapsing, and ensure that they will always have vassals, even if this will bear little relation to their power in the days of the "global world". This is why they have placed themselves in the current inextricable situation. The "integral nationalists" and "revisionist Zionists" are blackmailing them, but they intend to manipulate them to divide the world in two and preserve what they can of their supremacy.
In just thirteen minutes, four Kalashnikov rifles, knives, and plastic bottles of gasoline, discharged by four men, were not enough to kill and injure so many people as have been accounted for to date in the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow.
More than half those examined so far in post-mortems “died as a result of the fire from exposure to high temperature and combustion products”, according to Alexander Bastrykin, the chief investigator in his public report to President Vladimir Putin on Monday night. Post-mortems have yet to be reported for one-third of the 139 dead counted by Bastrykin; no analysis of the cause of injuries to 182 of the surviving casualties has been reported yet; 93 of them remain in hospital.
Bastrykin also reported “two AK-74 assault rifles, over 500 rounds of ammunition, 28 magazines with ammunition, and bottles with remaining gasoline were found and seized at the scene.” A NATO military expert explains: “They didn’t strike me as well-trained, so they lost time changing magazines and their fire wasn’t all that accurate. These data tell me the majority of victims died from some other cause than gunshot.”
Yevgeny Krutikov, a writer with military intelligence sources, reported in Vzglyad: “It can be assumed that the weapons were stored in the terrorists’ cache for a long time and not too carefully – the machine guns sparkled during the shooting. This indicates damage to the barrel or breech (dirt got inside the barrel).”
Recruitment of the shooters; pre-placement of weapons and ammunition; accommodation and advance payment to the gunmen; purchase of the car they used; communications and coordination; exit undetected in the crowds escaping the building; and the escape route to the Ukraine border through Bryansk region – the evidence of these details prepared over weeks and months indicate a much larger organization than the four shooters formed with seven others already arrested and under interrogation.
What they know and will tell is likely to reveal a sophisticated command-and-control system which knew how vulnerable the target was, how to maximize the killing in the shortest possible duration, and at the same time allow escape for the attackers – which is almost unprecedented in the recent history of mass terrorist attacks in Russia. .
That’s to say, the command knew — the shooters and their accomplices didn’t. There was advance reconnoiter of the Crocus City Hall so that the shooters knew the route they followed inside the building and then out under cover of fire and smoke, which erupted faster than they were able to shoot almost half of their ammunition which they left behind.
Did the command also know that Crocus City Hall and the surrounding mall were operating without adequate fire alarms, smoke and carbon monoxide detectors, sprinklers, and emergency ventilation, none of which has been reported by eyewitnesses? Was the building targeted because the command knew it was constructed without fire-resistant structural supports, allowing ceilings and roof to cave in, choking or crushing those beneath to death?
“Most of the victims in Crocus died not at the hands of terrorists, but from the criminal negligence of the owners and regulatory authorities,” reported Mikhail Delyagin, chairman of the State Duma Committee on Economic Policy, on Sunday evening. “It is known that many people suffocated with carbon monoxide inside the building. There are already more victims of this kind than those killed by terrorist shooting. Nothing like this could happen in a certified building built according to modern standards for such objects. Why? Because all such buildings are equipped with an automatic ventilation system. These are windows or hatches that fire off automatically if the detector detects an increased level of carbon monoxide inside. Holes open in the roof – and the life-threatening gas goes into the sky. This system works, by the way, without electricity, on compressed air.”
“The way the Crocus burned down shows that cheap Chinese materials (glass wool, plastics, cable braid, etc.) were used in its decoration, which are prohibited for use in public buildings. The reason for the ban? Combustibility. In Europe, non-burning glass wool, plastics, etc. have been used for a long time. They are, of course, twice or three times more expensive than the Chinese equivalent. But they have one advantage: they do not burn in case of fire. And they don’t kill those who are inside.”
Delyagin has publicly accused Aras Agalarov, the wealthy founder of the Crocus shopping and development group, and his son Emin of failing “to formally commission this particular concert hall. As it became known, it is not listed as a properly designed capital construction object on the cadastral map of the Federal Register. Apparently, the amount of bribes needed to receive such a dangerous object exceeded all reasonable limits, and for Agalarov, taking into account the above-mentioned monstrous violations of standards, it was cheaper to extend the status of a building under construction than to put it into operation.”
Bastrykin has announced “the investigation is checking the possibility of violation of safety requirements and the fire extinguishing system in the Crocus City Hall concert hall. For this purpose, remote controls, electronic components and control devices for the fire protection system of the concert hall were seized. They are aimed at researching and extracting information about the operating mode of fire safety systems at the time of the terrorist attack. The contents of the fire protection system server are being studied with the participation of experts. To establish the operability and timely operation of all fire safety systems, a fire technical examination has been appointed.”
Emin Agalarov has issued a press statement claiming he arrived shortly after the gunmen had left. He said he “entered the building 40 minutes after the first shots were fired. He noted that the fire safety system was working and the doors were unlocked…The sprinkler fire extinguishing system was also operating normally. The building collapsed only six hours after the start of the terrible fire. Some rooms remained intact and did not burn down.”
“If we focus too hard on the minute details which are being patched together, this might clear up some details of assault,” comments a retired senior intelligence source in a position to know, “we might learn something more but not the fundamentals. These [the four shooters] are no ISIS-K. . The harder New York Times, BBC and The Guardian try to prove they are, the less we have to believe it. They are no jihadists. Just murderers. Mercenaries brought in a month ago.
They are not suicide killers. There are no reports of this ISIS outfit operating away from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Certainly not in Tajikistan. However there are mercenaries at a dime a dozen there who have fought all over. Including in ISIS.”
“At Ukraine entry, they would certainly have been killed, removing all the evidence. The investigation will show they were hired, paid for. A Tajikistan blogger news service reported raids in [Tajik] villages, but then removed it. I am sure their families and friends will be picked up and all connections to jihadists or contractors will be established. They are not migrants, do not speak Russian, and thus cannot claim any ethnic discrimination vendetta [against Russians].”
President Putin claimed in his meeting with the security services on Monday: “We know that the crime was perpetrated by radical Islamists. The Islamic world itself has been fighting this ideology for centuries. But we are also seeing how the United States is using different channels to try and convince its satellites and other countries of the world that, according to its intelligence, there is supposedly no sign of Kiev’s involvement in the Moscow terrorist attack, that the deadly terrorist attack was perpetrated by followers of Islam, members of ISIS, an organisation banned in Russia. We know whose hands were used to commit this atrocity against Russia and its people. We want to know who ordered it.”
What Putin meant by “radical Islamists” is unclear; the public evidence of the four individuals who have been charged has yet to confirm a record of their religiosity or any ideological conviction.
The officials at the Kremlin meeting on Monday: Prosecutor-General Igor Krasnov, Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Anton Vaino, First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei Kiriyenko, Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova, Presidential aide Maxim Oreshkin, Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Emergencies Minister Alexander Kurenkov, Minister of Labour and Social Protection Anton Kotyakov, Healthcare Minister Mikhail Murashko, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov, Commander of the National Guard Troops Viktor Zolotov, Chairman of the Investigative Committee Alexander Bastrykin, Moscow Region Governor Andrei Vorobiev, and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin. Source: [http://en.kremlin.ru/](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73732)
For the time being, the only evidence connecting the four shooters to the Ukraine is the direction they were taking when their vehicle was stopped by the security forces. In a shootout the car overturned, and three of the gunmen fled into the forest beside the road, leaving one man injured in the car.
The head of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy, Alexander Khinshtein, is the source for press reporting on the site of the interception. That was on Highway E101 about seven kilometres south of the P-120 intersection east of Bryansk city. From Bastrykin’s report, and from an award ceremony in Bryansk on Monday for the forces who made the capture – Federal Security Service (FSB), Interior Ministry, National Guard, and border forces of the Defense Ministry — the getaway was being tracked for some time before it reached the P-120 intersection. At that point, if the four men planned to head for Belarus, they would have turned right, followed the south circular road around Bryansk, and then turned left on to the A-240 towards the Belarus border, about 100 kms to the southwest.
Instead, the men drove due south and on the highway near Khatsun, they were about 100 kms from the Ukraine border. There have been reports they were expecting to make a rendezvous with accomplices they believed would guide them to safety over the Ukraine border, and to payday. Or, as Moscow sources speculate, to their execution by the Ukrainians.
Above: [Google map of the roads and villages](https://t.me/voenacher/63117), including Khatsun, east of Bryansk city. Below: the view in daylight of the point on Highway E-101 where the gunmen were intercepted about five minutes after they passed the Belarus turnoff, confirming to the security forces tracking the car that they were heading to the Ukraine.
Speculation, however, including analysis of the cui bono, who gains type, the sequence of statements from Washington, and the history of association between the US, British and Ukrainian secret services and Tajik mercenaries, creates a balance of probabilities, but not an explanation beyond reasonable doubt.
“Of course, we must also answer the question of why the terrorists, after committing their crime, attempted to flee specifically to Ukraine,” the president said at his meeting with security officials on Monday. “Who was waiting for them there? It is clear that those supporting the Kiev regime do not wish to be implicated in acts of terrorism and be seen as sponsors of terrorism. But there are indeed numerous questions.”
Public comments to reporters on Tuesday by the FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov and Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev have answered with emphasis on the Ukrainians, backed by the US and UK.
Source: [https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin](https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin) March 26 – 15:34.
Boris Rozhin (Colonel Cassad) has followed their remarks with a detailed statement of the history of the intelligence service operations before the Crocus attack, and a circumstantial detail of Ukrainian border drone operations in the area and on the night the getaway car was headed through Bryansk region. Click to read – March 26, Min 22: 23.
What is evident so far, including from the line of Tajik accomplices now making formal appearances in a Moscow court, is the absence of ideology or religiosity of the radical Islamic type; and ignorance of where their orders and money were coming from, and why. This non-evidence points to the Ukraine as strongly as the road the four shooters were taking when they were caught.
Their subsequent demeanour in brief videoclips after capture, in hospital, and in court confirms what the military blogger Boris Rozhin calls “dumb hysteria…behaviour [that is] typical in a situation where the actions of terrorists do not have a deep ideological basis. This is the case of the Crocus gunmen, where the sole motivation is only money. Already in the moment of flight, the criminals realized what they had committed and, since the terrorist attack was not supported by ideology, the militants were seized with animal fear for their own lives. Therefore, during the interrogation, they are ready to tell everything, cry and so on, just to stay alive.”
The Russian intelligence agency investigations now under way, according to Krutikov, are tracing the “Telegram accounts through which the terrorists received instructions, including during their departure from the crime scene. Most likely, it is this branch which directly links the investigation with the Ukrainian direction due to the indication of a specific square at the border crossing.”
The public recriminations against the Agalarov family are not supported by Alexander Kurenkov, the Emergencies Minister, who told the Kremlin meeting on Monday in a brief, ambiguous report: “The building was equipped with an automatic fire alarm system. This system responded to the fire as expected. There was also a set of four robotized fire-fighting hoses and a software control system, which worked in conjunction with other fire protection systems. They were activated during the terrorist attack, but the arson involved the use of flammable substances. According to experts, the system failed to extinguish the fire due to its wide spread. This is what I wanted to say. We managed to totally extinguish the fire on wall panels, given the materials they were made of, only at 6.40 pm today [March 25]. The search and rescue operations continue. They are expected to be completed by 5 pm tomorrow [March 26]. This concludes my report.”
An Emergencies Ministry (MChS) expert has released data indicating the fire covered 12,900 square metres and more than 900 cubic metres of collapsed structures were removed. In the videoclip the roofless exterior wall can be seen, and the destruction of the inner auditorium.
Source: [https://www.kommersant.ru](https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6594893?from=top_main_1)
A local fire brigade source comments: “this was a Category-5 fire — Class 5 is an extreme fire hazard — and the services did an extraordinarily professional job to contain and extinguish a fire of such intensity.” He said the roof “may have collapsed between 2:30 am and 3:30 am.” This corroborates Emin Agalarov’s report of the timing.
The fire expert explained: “If lots of fuel was spilled in the auditorium among the chairs with synthetic fabric and plastic elements, then even low-inflammable things could start burning. They are resistant to high temperatures, but not to extremely high ones. In this case the sprinkler system can be useless.”
The Moscow region governor, Andrei Vorobiev (Vorobyov), was at the site half an hour after the gang had left. “An operational headquarters has been established. All the details will come later.” At 10:39 on Saturday evening [March 23] he reported by video that the roof was still ablaze and that firefighters were pouring water on it from extension ladders.
Governor Vorobiev is at lower left. Source: [https://t.me/vorobiev_live/6164](https://t.me/vorobiev_live/6164)
Six hours later, at 04:43, Vorobiev posted a new video clip from inside the building in which he confirmed with firemen that the roof had fallen in. “The collapse of structures continues now,” Vorobiev reported. “There are still some pockets of fire, but most of the fire has been eliminated. Rescuers were able to enter the auditorium, where the temperature had been high for a long time and where, apparently, the epicentre of the fire was. The roof over the auditorium has collapsed, and the debris is still being dismantled.”
Source: [https://t.me/vorobiev_live/6170](https://t.me/vorobiev_live/6170)
Delyagin was asked to say if he wished to correct his initial report and modify his allegations against the Agalarovs; he has not answered.
The political repercussions of the attack have been amplified in the Moscow media. But at a meeting of the Prosecutor-General’s Office Board on Tuesday, Putin played down his claim about “radical Islamists” of the day before. “As you know,” he said, “the perpetrators responsible for this mass murder have been arrested, and our law enforcement agencies are diligently investigating the circumstances surrounding this barbaric crime. They are piecing together the details of the attack, determining the roles and culpability of each individual involved, and analyzing the findings provided by criminalists and experts. The Federal Security Service [FSB], alongside other intelligence services, is actively addressing pertinent issues in coordination with the National Anti-Terrorism Committee.”
The president added: “I trust that the prosecutors, within the scope of their authority, will ensure that justice is served when charging the accused and during the legal proceedings.” This appears to be a response to western media reports that the four gunmen were beaten up and tortured after their capture.
Prosecutor-General Igor Krasnov said to Putin: “These atrocities have a common goal – to intimidate people, to destroy the unity of our people. Their performers, customers and curators will inevitably be punished. That is why the most important task for Russia remains to achieve the goals of a special military operation.” Putin had said the same thing the day before: “Their goal, as I mentioned, is to sow panic in our society while demonstrating to their own people that not all hope is lost for the Kiev regime. All they need to do is follow the orders of their Western patrons, fight until the last Ukrainian, obey Washington’s commands, endorse the new mobilization law, and form something resembling a new version of the Hitler Youth. To comply with all of this, they will seek new weapons and additional funds, much of which will likely be embezzled and, as is customary in Ukraine today, put into their own pockets.”
As more time has elapsed and the interrogations of the attack group have produced no new official evidence, the Russian media have been publishing angry calls to restrict migration into Russia, both legal and illegal; attacks on ethnic communities like the Tajiks; and on the corruption of Russian officials providing them with entry, residence, and work permits. The Kremlin has responded with a brief communiqué of a telephone call between Putin and the Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon: “During the conversation, Vladimir Putin and Emomali Rahmon noted that the security services of Russia and Tajikistan were working closely together to counter terrorism and that they would build up their cooperation.”
Konstantin Malofeev (Malofeyev), owner of the Tsargrad media group in Moscow, has published several policy calls under the slogan, “the internal threat has turned out to be no less serious than the external one”. “There should be no xenophobia towards Ukrainians, Jews, and Muslims,” according to Malofeev. “We are a multinational country. That’s the only reason she became an Empire. Because she is not only strong, but also kind. And xenophobia is the lot of the weak. The strong are not afraid. But a competent migration policy, of course, must be carried out. There should be no migration enclaves. There should be no diasporas which try to replace the government, whom the government consults and fears. Members of these diasporas should not be above the law. If they come to Russia, then the main thing for them should be the law.”
“Imagine what three million ‘hardworking’ migrants would do in Moscow, for example, if they all came out at once… It’s not a bell anymore – it’s a bell ringing, a rumble. It’s time to take up migration legislation. Only in this case will we be able to protect ourselves. Fortunately, I have evidence that the people in power who are responsible for migration have heard this ringing. I hope this will affect our streets and our safety. I hope that we will no longer have to catch Tajiks a hundred kilometres from the Ukrainian border who cannot speak Russian, but at the same time live freely in Russia.”
Home page of _Tsargrad_ illustrated with a collage of armed Tajik fighters appearing to pose in front of the Kremlin; Konstantin Malofeev is pictured at upper [right](https://tsargrad.tv/articles/vsegda-ulybalis-terroristy-iz-krokusa-okazalis-ne-prosto-migrantami-ubivali-uzhe-sograzhdan_977563). For more on how Malofeev made his first fortune, click to read [this](https://johnhelmer.net/the-window-of-opportunity-vtb-accuses-itself-of-ripoff-and-is-told-by-the-uk-courts-to-take-its-case-to-the-russian-prosecutor/) and the [archive](https://johnhelmer.net/?s=malofeev).
Putin responded swiftly in his speech to prosecutors on Tuesday; the State Duma followed. “[Prosecutors should] consider implementing a system of additional preventive and anti-crime measures,” the president said, “including supervision of compliance with migration legislation. The situation in this area, which is very important and of great concern to millions of people, must be closely monitored.” The same day, Vyacheslav Volodin, the Duma Speaker, told a parliamentary session that he is appointing a multi-party working group “that will analyze the entire range of legislation that is relevant to the challenges of today, and legislation in the field of migration.”
Pro-US reporters in Moscow reverse the direction of the crackdown Malofeev and his supporters advocate. “Russians will likely face the security crackdown that, ironically [sic], they have largely avoided over two years of war in Ukraine. That would mean a further tightening of the screws on speech and make it much harder to use public transportation or gather in large groups. Communities of migrant workers will likely face a real crackdown… the tactics once adopted to deal with terrorists became quickly accepted as a new norm to treat political dissent. Thus the torture the Russian security services used against four suspects might be used against all sort of people in the country. This is the most direct consequence of the attack.”
Malofeev and the Tsargrad group are not alone in saying the Crocus City Hall attack should lead to intensification of the military operations in the Ukraine. “They struck at us, at our civilians” Malofeev has written, “in the very center of our Homeland. This is an act of war. It needs to be answered as we have said many times. It must finally be answered with the massive real use of weapons that will allow us to win this war. We must give the civilian population [in the Ukraine] 48 hours to leave the cities and then strike with all our might. Then the war will end quickly, which means that the sponsorship of terrorist attacks will stop. No Americans and British, without the Armed Forces of Ukraine, without Kiev, without the current war, will sponsor terrorist attacks on the territory of Russia.”
For the time being, there has been no impact of the Crocus attack and the Moscow media debate on the operational or strategic plans under way in the Ukraine. The intensification of the General Staff’s offensive along the line of contact in the Donbass; in the electric war against Kharkov and other cities east of the Dnieper River; and in the missile attacks on targets from Kiev to Lvov – reported here — commenced before the Moscow events; they are continuing as planned.
“Those in political command who have been favouring an outcome to the war that falls short of regime change in Kiev and extension of demilitarization to the Polish border,” observes a Moscow political source, “have lost their voice since Saturday night.”
Point to point navigation describes the long-lost art of celestial navigation, the ability to use the stars to chart a course across the open seas in the age before compasses. The key to successfully executing point to point navigation lay in fixing one’s position vis-à-vis the North Star. Failure to do so meant risking sailing aimlessly about a sea with no fixed reference points, an act that leads to death or, perhaps worse, becoming a castaway on some unchartered point on earth.
After a storm, a ship’s captain and his navigator would scan the skies for the North Star, from which they could establish not only what direction true north was, but also where they were in reference to the position of the North Star in the sky, so that they might navigate to safety.
When special operations forces are compromised behind enemy lines, they conduct what they call “escape and evasion,” the act of avoiding detection and probable death or capture, while making their way to a pre-designated haven from which they can regroup or be extracted. The CIA trains its operations officers in similar skill sets. Both colloquially refer to such actions as “finding their true north.”
The perpetrators of the horrific attack on the Crocus City Hall and Concert Center in Krasnogorsk, a metropolitan community located to the northwest of Moscow, were no different than any other terrorist/militant before them; after their act of mass murder, they sought out their “true north” to make good their escape.
Western governments, analysts, and pundits have loudly proclaimed that the men who carried out the attack on the Crocus City Hall had nothing whatsoever to do with Ukraine, and instead have collectively embraced a narrative that paints the men as members of the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K). ISIS is an off-shoot of Al-Qaeda-Iraq (AQI) which emerged in 2013 when core AQI members relocated to Syria. In 2014 ISIS declared itself to be a caliphate and began a series of operations which saw it take control on a third of Syria and a quarter of Iraq before being driven back and ultimately defeated by a coalition which included Iraq, the United States and Iran.
In 2014 Central Asian fighters affiliated with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan formed a branch of ISIS in Afghanistan known as ISIS-K, where they stood for Khorasan (ISIS-K). Khorasan is an ancient term for the territory encompassed by modern day Iran, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan. ISIS-K continues to operate today in Afghanistan and Iran, as well as inside the former Soviet Central Asian republics, including Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
Terrorists attacking the Crocus City Hall
According to US officials, the United States collected intelligence that ISIS-K was planning an attack on Moscow in early March. This intelligence was behind a public warning issued by the US embassy in Russia on March 7 that “extremists” were planning an imminent attack on large gatherings in Moscow. “US citizens should be advised to avoid large gatherings over the next 48 hours,” the warning, published on the embassy website, stated. American citizens were warned to avoid crowds, including concerts. These US officials likewise claimed (and Russia has acknowledged) that Russia had been informed about the intelligence behind the March 7 warning. This information was shared based upon the “duty to warn” principle where US intelligence about potential terrorist attacks must be shared with the suspected targets. However, rather than passing this information through formal channels, it was done unofficially, through informal channels, significantly diluting the impact of the information.
The attackers posted a photograph of them reciting the Shahada, or Islamic oath and creed ("I bear witness that there is no deity but God, and I bear witness that Muhammad is the Messenger of God") which, if made sincerely, is all that is required to be identified as a Muslim in the eyes of God. While Islamic scholars note that it is only necessary to recite the words, for jihadists reciting Shahada accompanied by a raised right index finger, has become de riguere—Osama Bin Laden delivered it in this fashion, as did Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the founder of the Islamic State.
Shahada is a ritual, and those who make Shahada must understand its importance for it to have any meaning. As such, if one incorporates the raising of the right index finger as part of the Shahada ritual, it must be done piously. The use of the right hand is critical—in the Muslim faith, the right hand symbolizes all that is good, and the left is reserved for unclean acts: “No one among you should eat with his left hand or drink with it, for the shaytaan (devil) eats with his left hand and drinks with it.”
The four attackers delivered this oath by raising their left hands.
They also published this photograph with their faces blurred—they were shielding their identity.
There can be no subterfuge when reciting Shahada—it is an oath made before God and in the eyes of men.
Moreover, the blurring of their faces indicated that the attackers intended to survive their mission.
media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb502a5cf-1c6b-4c2f-9cd2-4517db0cc116_772x472.png)
The Crocus City Hall attackers making Shahada
For most militants affiliated with ISIS-K, true north is the path to martyrdom, a one-way ticket to paradise. Their goal is to inflict as much harm as possible before being dispatched from this mortal earth, an act that is usually made certain using a suicide vest detonated at a time when more death and destruction can be wrought.
The perpetrators of the Crocus City Hall attack, however, did not wear suicide vests. Indeed, they had no intention of losing their lives, but rather to live and be able to enjoy the fruits of their labor, a purported $5,500 payment for services rendered.
These weren’t Islamist militants.
These were mercenaries who disguised themselves as Islamic militants.
The Crocus City Hall attackers in their getaway car
And when they finished their murderous rampage, the purported ISIS-K fighters jumped into their car and headed toward their “true north.”
Ukraine.
Ukraine. The source of their money.
Ukraine. The source of their motivation.
The Russian investigation into the terror attack is still in its early stages. There are many facts left to be uncovered.
But there is a plethora of data which allows one to populate the puzzle with enough pieces to begin to see a discernable shape take form.
Russian authorities went out of their way to make sure that all four perpetrators were captured alive.
The perpetrators are in the process of being interrogated. Many of the techniques being used by Russia would not be permitted in the United States as they could readily be classified as torture. And many intelligence professionals—me included—discount the value of any confession made under severe duress.
But the Russian interrogations are aided by the fact that the Russian investigators are not engaged in a fishing expedition, but rather are guided by specific facts derived from the forensic examination of the cell phones of the four terrorists, which are currently in the possession of Russian authorities. One of these phones was recovered at the crime scene, and the data contained on this phone was used by Russian security officials to track the terrorists as they drove out of Moscow, toward Ukraine. Telephone numbers contained on the recovered phone allowed the Russians to zero in on the remaining phones, and monitor phone calls made by the terrorists in real time—including numerous calls to persons inside Ukraine who were working to create a gap in the Russian-Ukrainian border that the terrorists could escape through.
The Russians have been able to identify the core structure of a support network in Moscow which provided the four terrorists with transportation and housing.
Eleven arrests have been made in this regard.
The Russians have identified a network operating in Turkey who were affiliated with the recruitment, training and logistical preparation and support of the terrorist operation in Moscow.
Forty arrests have been made as a result.
But more importantly, Russia has gathered enough information to issue a warrant for the head of the Ukrainian security service, Vasyl Malyuk, on charges of public incitement of terrorism. Likewise, the head of the Russian security service, Alexander Boritnikov, has stated that when it comes to delivering justice to Ukrainians who may have been involved in the attack on the Crocus concert venue, “Everything is ahead of us.”
Russia, it seems, is navigating point to point.
Not toward a safe haven, but rather on a path of retribution.
And its “true north” is the same as that of the terrorists.
Ukraine.
Vasyl Malyuk, the head of the Ukrainian SBU
From Russian Wikipedia - Nechay, Mikhail Mikhailovich:
...
Mikhail Nechay often called himself the last Carpathian molfar who once entered the Karlfara circle, where « issues inaccessible to the understanding of mere mortals » were discussed[2]. . According to the evidence of the fellow villagers, he provided all those who wanted medical assistance with conspiracies and herbs. At the same time, he was called not so much « the wizard » as a very well-read person[eleven]. . Sometimes Nechay returned part of the money that he was offered for services[eleven], but never set his own prices[8]. . In some interviews, he stated that taking money for the provision of such services was considered a sin[9]. . He also said that even after long persuasion he did not agree to do something bad at the request of the client in relation to any person[6].
...
Follow the link to the Video to hear the prophesy.
The group that murdered 25,000 Palestinians in Gaza is not representative of Jews in general. It is the heir to an ideology that has been committing such crimes for a century. Thierry Meyssan traces the history of the "revisionist Zionists" from Vladimyr Ze’ev Jabotinsky to Benjamin Netanyahu.
Voltaire Network | Paris (France) | 25 January 2024
Deutsch ελληνικά Español français italiano Nederlands Português русский
Josep Borrell denounces the links between Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas.
Josep Borrell, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, receiving an honorary doctorate in Valadolid, declared: "We believe that a two-state solution [Israeli and Palestinian] must be imposed from outside to bring about peace. Even if, and I insist, Israel reaffirms its refusal [of this solution] and, to prevent it, has gone so far as to create Hamas itself (...) Hamas has been financed by the Israeli government in an attempt to weaken the Fatah Palestinian Authority. But if we don’t intervene firmly, the spiral of hatred and violence will continue from generation to generation, from funeral to funeral".
In so doing, Josep Borrell broke with the official Western line that Hamas is the enemy of Israel, which it attacked by surprise on October 7, justifying the current Israeli response and the massacre of 25,000 Palestinian civilians. He asserted that enemies of Jews can be supported by other Jews, Benjamin Netanyahu in particular. He rejected the communitarian reading of history and examined personal responsibilities.
This narrative shift was made possible by the UK’s exit from the European Union four years ago. Josep Borrell knows that the European Union has financed Hamas since its 2006 coup, yet today he is free to say what’s on his mind. He didn’t mention Hamas’s links with the Muslim Brotherhood, whose "Palestinian branch" the organization claims to be, or with MI6, the British secret service. He simply suggested withdrawing from the mess.
Gradually, the veil is being torn away. A historical reminder is in order here. The facts are known, but never linked, nor listed in sequence. They have an illuminating cumulative effect. They take place mainly during the Cold War, when the West turned a blind eye to the crimes it needed, but they actually began twenty years earlier.
In 1915, the British Jewish Home Secretary, Herbert Samuel, wrote a memorandum on the Future of Palestine. He wanted to create a Jewish state, but a small one so that it "could not be large enough to defend itself". In this way, the Jewish diaspora would serve the long-term interests of the British Empire.
He tried unsuccessfully to convince the Prime Minister, the then Liberal H. H. Asquith, to create a Jewish state in Palestine at the end of the World War. However, following Herbert Samuel’s meeting with Mark Sykes, just after the conclusion of the Sykes-Picot-Sazonov Agreements on the colonial division of the Middle East, the two men pursued the project, gaining the support of "Protestant Nonconformists" (today we would say "Christian Zionists"), including the new Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. He and his cabinet issued the famous Balfour Declaration, clarifying one of the points of the Sykes-Picot Sazonov Accords by announcing a "Jewish national home".
At the same time, Protestant Nonconformists, through U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, persuaded President Woodrow Wilson to support their project.
Also during the First World War, during the Russian Revolution, Herbert Samuel proposed integrating Jews from the former Russian Empire fleeing the new regime into a special unit, the Jewish Legion. This proposal was taken up by a Ukrainian Jew, Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who imagined that a Jewish state in Palestine could be his post-war reward. Herbert Samuel entrusted him with recruiting soldiers from among Russian émigrés. Among them was the Pole David ben Gourion (then a Marxist), who was joined by the Briton Edwin Samuel, Herbert Samuel’s own son. They distinguished themselves in the lost battle against the Ottomans at Gallipoli.
At the end of the war, the fascist Jabotinsky demanded a state as his due, but the British had no desire to part with their Palestinian colony. So they stuck to their commitment to a "national home", and nothing more. In 1920, a section of Palestinians led by Izz al-Din al-Qassam (the tutelary figure of the armed wing of today’s Hamas, the al-Qassam brigades) rose up and savagely massacred Jewish immigrants, while a Jewish militia responded. This was the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. London restored order by arresting fanatics, jihadists and Jews alike. Jabotinsky, at whose home an arsenal was discovered, was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
However, David Lloyd George’s "Protestant Nonconformist" government appointed Herbert Samuel governor of Palestine. Upon his arrival in Jerusalem, he pardoned and released his friend Jabotinsky. He then appointed the anti-Semite and future Reich collaborator Mohammad Amin al-Husayni as Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.
Fresco in homage to Vladimir Jabotinsky in Odessa (Ukraine).
Jabotinsky was elected director of the World Zionist Organization (WZO). But he returned to the former Russian Empire, where Symon Petliura had just created a Ukrainian People’s Republic. Jabotinsky and Petlioura signed a secret agreement to carve out a place for themselves in the lands of the Bolsheviks in the East and Nestor Makhno’s anarchists in the South (present-day Novorossia). Petliura was a fierce anti-Semite, and his men were used to massacring Jewish families and villages in their own country. Petlioura was the protector of the Ukrainian "integral nationalists" and their mentor, Dmytro Dontsov, who later became administrator of the Reinhard Heydrich Institute responsible for carrying out the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" [1].
When word spread that Jabotinsky had formed an alliance with "Jew-killers", the World Zionist Organization summoned him for an explanation. But he preferred to resign his community office rather than answer questions. He then founded the Alliance of "Revisionist Zionists" (mainly present in the Polish and Latvian diaspora) and its militia, Betar. He turned away from the British Empire and became enthusiastic about Fascist Italy. He set up a military academy for the Betar near Rome, with the support of duce Benito Mussolini.
Betar honor guard in front of Jabotinsky’s portrait at the Ze’ev citadel.
In 1936, Jabotinsky devised an "evacuation plan" for Jews from Central and Eastern Europe to Palestine. He won the support of the Polish head of state, Marshal Józef Piłsudski, and his foreign minister, Józef Beck. But also that of the Hungarian regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy, not forgetting that of the Romanian prime minister, Gheorghe Tătărescu. The plan never came to fruition, however, because the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe were frightened by Jabotinsky’s allies, and because the British Empire opposed mass emigration to Palestine. In the end, Chaim Weizmann, then president of the World Zionist Organization, assured that Jabotinsky was involved in the Franco-Polonian-Nazi plan to deport the Jews to Madagascar.
It was during this period that Vladimir Jabotinsky prophesied the Holocaust to astonished Jewish audiences. According to him, by refusing his evacuation plan, the Diaspora would provoke a surge of violence against it. To everyone’s surprise, this is what his friends actually carried out: the extermination of millions of Jews.
Vladimir Jabotinsky (right) and Menachem Begin (left), at a Betar meeting in Warsaw.
In 1939, Jabotinsky drew up a plan for an uprising of the Jews of Palestine against the British Empire, which he sent to the local section of the "Revisionist Zionists", the Irgun. World War II postponed this project. Jabotinsky did not settle in Fascist Italy, but in the then-neutral United States, where one of his disciples joined him to become his private secretary. He was Benzion Netanyahu, father of Benjamin Netanyahu.
During the war, Vladimir Jabotinsky and Benzion Netanyahu were visited by a Chicago philosophy professor, Leo Strauss. He was also a Jewish fascist. He had been forced to leave Germany because of Nazi anti-Semitism, but remained a staunch fascist. Leo Strauss went on to become the standard-bearer for "neo-conservatives" in the USA. He created his own school of thought, assuring his few disciples after the Second World War that the only way for Jews to prevent another Shoah was to create their own dictatorship. His pupils included Paul Wolfowitz and Elliott Abrams, the man who today stands behind Benjamin Netanyahu and financed his "reform of institutions" this summer.
Vladimir Jabotinsky died in New York in 1940. David ben Gourion opposed the transfer of his ashes to Israel, but in 1964, Israel’s Prime Minister, the Ukrainian Levi Eshkol, authorized it.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pays tribute to his hero, Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky.
After World War II, the "revisionist Zionists" of the Irgun declared war on the British Empire for restricting Jewish emigration to Palestine. Under the command of the future Prime Minister, the Byelorussian Menachem Beguin, they organized a series of attacks, including one on the King David Hotel, which killed 91 people, and the Deir Yassin massacre, which claimed at least a hundred victims.
In November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a plan to divide Palestine into two zones, Jewish and Arab, in order to form a bi-national state. Taking advantage of the slowness of the intergovernmental organization, David ben Gourion unilaterally proclaimed the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. The Arab states reacted by taking up arms, while Jewish militias began the Nakba, the expulsion of 750,000 Palestinians. Concerned by these rapid developments, the General Assembly sent a Swedish emissary, Count Folke Bernadotte, to demarcate the two federated states. But on September 17, 1948, other "revisionist Zionists" belonging to the Lehi (known as the "Stern Group"), under the command of another future prime minister, the Byelorussian Yitzhak Shamir, assassinated him. They were all convicted by an Israeli court. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Moshe Shertok (or Sharett), wrote to the General Assembly requesting Israel’s membership of the United Nations. He "declared that the State of Israel hereby accepts, without any reservation whatsoever, the obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations, and undertakes to observe them from the day it becomes a Member of the United Nations". Under these express conditions, Israel became a member of the UN on May 11, 1949. In the days that followed, Yehoshua Cohen, Count Bernadotte’s assassin, was discreetly released. He became the bodyguard of Prime Minister David ben Gourion.
Benjamin Netanyahu as a young man and Yitzhak Shamir.
From 1955 to 1965, Yitzhak Shamir headed a department of Mossad, the foreign secret service of the new state. Without informing his superiors, he organized the secret police of the Shah of Iran, the Savak. Some two hundred of his men came to teach torture alongside former Nazis [2].
Then, in 1979, while negotiating the Camp David Accords with Egypt, he moved the men he had sent to Iran to the Congo. Probably with the support of the US CIA, they now supervised Mobotu Sese Seko’s secret police. He went there to check them out.
As part of the Cold War, Yitzhak Shamir also helped the Taiwanese dictatorship [3].
This time, unbeknownst to the United States, he set up a terrorist group in New York, Rabbi Meir Kahane’s Jewish Defense League [4]. He supervised a campaign for the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, attacks on the Soviet delegation to the UN and, finally, on the legation of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
He forged alliances with South Africa [5]. He took part in the creation of "Bantustans", false African states that enabled South Africa to treat its black population not as nationals, but as emigrants; a model that "revisionist Zionists" would later apply to the Palestinians.
In this vein, he had Israel finance the research of President Pieter Botha’s personal physician, Dr. Wouter Basson. Basson, at the head of 200 scientists, intended to create diseases that would affect only blacks and Arabs (Project Coast [6]) [7].
One crime leading to another, he also supported Rhodesia [8] and the fight against the independence of the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola.
In Guatemala, Yitzhak Shamir became close to the dictatorship of General Rios Montt. He not only supplied him with weapons, but also supervised his secret police. He set up a computer institute to monitor water and electricity consumption, enabling him to detect and locate clandestine activities. He organized the Mayan population into kibbutzim so as to make them work and keep an eye on them without having to carry out agrarian reform. Thus protected, Rios Montt murdered 250,000 people. [9]; a model that revisionist Zionists wish to apply to the Palestinians. Relations between Israel and the United States regarding the Guatemalan experiment were channeled through the Straussian Elliott Abrams.
Throughout the Cold War, the "revisionist Zionists" did not act in the interests of the Western camp; they used the opportunities presented to them to do what Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky had always done: exercise power by force with no regard for anyone else.
Towards the end of the Madrid Conference, the Israeli delegation brought out this old poster from the British police in Mandatory Palestine: it asks for information on the Lehi terrorist group. Top left: Menachem Beguin.
At the end of the Cold War, President Bush Sr. convened the Madrid Conference to finally resolve the Israeli-Palestinian question. During the conference, the Israeli delegation, chaired by Yitzhak Shamir, now Prime Minister, demanded the repeal of UN General Assembly resolution 3379 [10] before any further discussions could take place. This states that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination". "With an open heart, we call on Arab leaders to take the courageous step and respond to our outstretched hand in peace", declaims Shamir, grandiloquently. Anxious to reach an agreement, the General Assembly complied. But, deceiving its interlocutors, Israel made no commitments and even did everything in its power to defeat George H. Bush’s bid for a second term.
Before concluding, I’d like to say a few words about today’s personalities.
Ukrainian Jewish President Volodymyr Zelenski and "white führer" Andriy Biletsky
The alliance of Ukrainian "revisionist Zionists" and "integral nationalists" was reformed with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. A mafia oligarch, the Jew Ihor Kolomoïsky, propelled a young Jewish humorist, Volodymyr Zelensky, into politics, while financing the integral nationalist militias that besieged and bombarded the Russian-speaking Ukrainian populations of the Donbass. Refuznik Natan Sharansky, a former minister under Ariel Sharon, organized meetings between Jewish world figures and the Ukrainian president’s cabinet. While Voldymyr Zelensky entrusted the command of the two major battles of Marioupol and Bakhmout to Andriy Biletsky, the "white führer".
On July 19, 2018, on the initiative of "revisionist Zionists", the Knesset passed a law proclaiming Israel as a "Jewish state", with Hebrew as its sole official language and unified Jerusalem as its capital. Jewish settlements in Palestinian territory were deemed to be in the "national interest".
Four years later, Benjamin Netanyahu formed a government with a coalition of followers of Rabbi Kahane. In 2022, Itamar Ben-Gvir, chairman of Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power Party), declared that he would expel the Arabs from Palestine. Members of his party launched an attack on the West Bank village of Huwara in February 2023, seven months before the Palestinian attack of October 7. In the space of a few hours, they set fire to hundreds of cars and 36 houses. They attacked the inhabitants, injuring 400 people and killing one man before the eyes of the Israeli army, which surrounded the village without intervening in the face of their exactions.
This brief historical summary shows us that there is no Arab-Israeli problem any more than there is a Ukrainian-Russian problem, but a huge problem of all of us with an ideology which, in different places and times, has done nothing but sow suffering and death. We must open our eyes and no longer accept to mobilize with false-flag actions and other lies.
Translation
Roger Lagassé
[1] “Who are the Ukrainian integral nationalists ?”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Roger Lagassé, Voltaire Network, 15 November 2022.
[2] «SAVAK: A Feared and Pervasive Force», Richard T. Sale, Washington Post, May 9, 1977. Debacle: The American Failure in Iran. Michael Ledeen, Vintage (1982).
[3] תמכור נשק." ש’ פרנקל, העולם הזה, 31 באוגוסט 1983.".Israel: Foreign Intelligence and Security Services. CIA, March 1979.
[4] The False Prophet: Rabbi Meir Kahane, From FBI Informant to Knesset Member, Robert I. Friedman, Lawrence Hill Books (1990).
[5] The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa, Sasha Polakow-Suransky, Vintage (2011). The Unnatural Alliance: Israel and South Africa, James Adams, Quartet Books (1984).
[6] Project Coast: Apartheid’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, Chandré Gould & Peter Folb, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR/2002/12. The Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Program, Dr. Stephen F. Burgess & Dr. Helen E. Purkitt, USAF Counterproliferation Center (2001).
[7] “South Africa, a former secret biological terrorism lab for a few “democratic” countries”, Voltaire Network, 28 October 2002. Dr la Mort, enquête sur un bio-terrorisme d’État en Afrique du Sud, Tristan Mendès France, Favre (2002).
[8] «The Rhodesian Army: Counter-insurgency 1972-1979» in Armed forces and modern counter-insurgency, Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott, Croom Helm (1985).
[9] «Israeli Connection Not Just Guns for Guatemala», George Black, NACLA Report on the Americas, 17:3, pp. 43-45, DOI: 10.1080/10714839.1983.11723592
[10] « Qualification du sionisme », ONU (Assemblée générale) , Réseau Voltaire, 10 novembre 1975.
Thierry Meyssan
Political consultant, President-founder of the Réseau Voltaire (Voltaire Network).
Latest work in English – Before Our Very Eyes, Fake Wars and Big Lies: From 9/11 to Donald Trump, Progressive Press, 2019.
John Mearsheimer, the eminent political scientist who has warned for years that NATO’s Ukraine policy would lead to disaster, joins Aaron Maté to assess the state of the Ukraine proxy war and the dangers ahead.
Guest: John Mearsheimer. R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago.
Read “The Darkness Ahead: Where The Ukraine War Is Headed” by John Mearsheimer
Video:
Audio:
TRANSCRIPT
AARON MATÉ: Welcome to Pushback. I’m Aaron Maté. Joining me is John Mearsheimer. He is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, now writing on Substack. Professor Mearsheimer, thanks so much for joining me.
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: It’s my pleasure to be here, Aaron.
AARON MATÉ: I want to get your response to this from The Wall Street Journal. This just came out, and it says this about the state of Ukraine’s wildly hyped counteroffensive and the Western efforts to encourage it. It says this, quote, “When Ukraine launched its big counteroffensive this spring, Western military officials knew Kiev didn’t have all the training or weapons—from shells to warplanes—that it needed to dislodge Russian forces. But they hoped Ukrainian courage and resourcefulness would carry the day. They haven’t.” Unquote.
So, that’s from The Wall Street Journal, basically admitting that the West pushed Ukraine into this counteroffensive, knowing that Ukraine did not have what it needed to come anywhere close to success. I’m just wondering, having long predicted that this US effort to drive Ukraine into NATO, turn Ukraine into a NATO proxy, would lead to Ukraine’s decimation. Your response to this candid admission in this establishment news outlet.
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, it seems to me that anybody who knows anything about military tactics and strategy had to understand that there was hardly any chance that the Ukrainian counteroffensive would succeed. I mean, there were just so many factors that were arrayed against the Ukrainians that it was almost impossible for them to make any significant progress. Nevertheless, the West encouraged them, pushed them hard to launch this offensive. In fact, we wanted them to launch the offensive in the spring, and you sort of say to yourself, ‘What’s going on here?’ This is like encouraging them to launch a suicidal offensive which is completely counterproductive. Wouldn’t it make much more sense for them to remain on the defensive, at least for the time being? But I think what was going on here was that the West is very fearful that time is running out, that if the Ukrainians don’t show some significant success on the battlefield in the year 2023, public support for the war will dry up and the Ukrainians will lose—and the West will lose. So, I think what happened here is that we pushed very hard for this offensive, knowing that there was a slim chance at best that it would succeed.
AARON MATÉ: In that same vein, we also integrated Ukraine as a de facto proxy of NATO without formally promising it—or without formally giving it—NATO membership, and that was a major factor in this, in Russia’s invasion to begin with.
But then you have this recent NATO Summit in Lithuania, and I’m wondering your take on this. At the end of the summit, the pledge that was given to Ukraine, it seems to me that it actually made future NATO membership for Ukraine even more distant than it was when it was first promised back in 2008. Because this time the final communique—and this was apparently done at the behest of the US—said that we will admit Ukraine when allies agree and when conditions are met, but it didn’t specify what those conditions are. And so accordingly, it seems to me that Ukraine is even further away from NATO than it was back when it was first promised back in 2008. I’m wondering if you agree with that assessment, and what you make of this very vague pledge from NATO.
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: I agree with what you said, but I’d take it a step further. The Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, made it very clear that Ukraine would not be admitted into NATO until it had prevailed in the conflict. In other words, Ukraine has to win the war before it can be brought into the alliance. Well, Ukraine is not going to win the war, and therefore, Ukraine is not going to be brought into the alliance.
This war is going to go on for a long time. Even if you get a cold peace, it will linger right below the surface and there will be an ever-present danger that a hot war will break out. And in those circumstances, I find it hard to imagine the United States or any West European country agreeing to bring Ukraine into NATO. And the simple reason is that if you bring Ukraine into NATO in the midst of a conflict, you are in effect committing NATO to defending with military force Ukraine on the battlefield. And that’s a situation we don’t want. We do not want NATO boots on the ground, or to be more specific, we don’t want American boots on the ground. So, it makes perfect sense for Stoltenberg to say that Ukraine has to win. In fact, Ukraine has to win a decisive victory over the Russians within the borders of Ukraine. That is not going to happen, in my opinion, and therefore, as you were saying, Ukraine is not going to become part of NATO.
AARON MATÉ: So, given that, I mean, do you think it’s fair to speculate that the US policy in Ukraine was even more cynical than it appeared? Because basically this war was largely fought because the US refused to agree to neutrality for Ukraine, saying that, ‘Well, we have an open door for NATO; we don’t take people’s membership off of the table.’ But yet, when given the opportunity, the US won’t commit to granting Ukraine a road map to joining NATO, which leads me to conclude that, possibly, what if the aim was never to actually admit Ukraine into NATO but just use the future pledge of NATO membership to de facto turn Ukraine into a NATO proxy, without the obligation, the part of the US and its allies, to actually defend it?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: It’s possible that’s true. It’s hard to say without a lot more evidence.
I have a slightly different view. I don’t think it was so much cynicism. I think it was stupidity. I think you can’t underestimate just how foolish the West is when it comes to the whole question of Ukraine—and all sorts of other issues as well. But I think that the West believed—and here we’re talking mainly about the United States—that if a war did break out between Ukraine and Russia, that the West plus Ukraine would prevail, that the Russians would be defeated. I believe we thought that was the case.
If you look at the run-up to the war in early 2022, what’s really striking to me is that it was quite clear that war was at least a serious possibility, yet the United States and the West more generally did virtually nothing to prevent the war. If anything, we egged the Russians on. And I find this hard to imagine. What was going on here? And I think that we believed that if a war broke out, we had trained up the Ukrainians and armed the Ukrainians up enough that they would hold their own on the battlefield. Number one. And number two, I think, we felt the magic weapon was sanctions, that we’d finished the Russians off with sanctions, and the Ukrainians would end up defeating the Russians, and they would then be in a position where we could admit them into NATO. That is what I think is going on. I don’t think it’s really a case of cynicism as you portray it. It may be. Again, this is an empirical question. We just need a heck of a lot more evidence to see whether your interpretation is correct or mine is. But my sense is, this is worse than a crime. This is a blunder, to put it in [French diplomat] Talleyrand’s famous rhetoric.> Visit source: grayzone.com
AARON MATÉ: On the issue of the sanctions, it was recently reported that Russia had a milestone in selling its oil above the price cap that the US and its allies tried to impose on the price of Russian oil. Why do you think the US sanctions policy has not worked, and did that surprise you? Did you expect Russia to take more of a hit than it has?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: I thought it would take more of a hit than it has. I think the Russians themselves thought that. That’s my sense from sort of keeping abreast of this conflict. I think the Russians have done better than they even expected, and certainly better than I expected. But my view, Aaron, is that even if we had been more successful with the sanctions, we would not have brought the Russians to their knees. We would not have ended up inflicting a significant defeat on them. And the reason is very simple.
The Russians believe that they’re facing an existential threat in Ukraine, and when you’re facing an existential threat, or you think you’re facing an existential threat, you’re willing to absorb huge amounts of pain to make sure that you’re not defeated on the battlefield. So, I think the sanctions were doomed from the beginning. I think when you look carefully at what has happened since then, it’s quite clear that the Russians were in an excellent position to beat the sanctions, by and large. And it shouldn’t have been surprising to anyone who spent a lot of time studying how sanctions work, that it was not going to do much against a country like Russia, which was so rich in natural resources and had all sorts of potential trading partners that could replace the ones that it lost in the West. I certainly don’t fit in that category as an expert on sanctions, but I would imagine that people who study this issue carefully understood that it was going to be of limited utility against the Russians. And it certainly has been.
This, by the way, was a major miscalculation, I believe, on the West’s part. In the literature in the West on the war, if you read the mainstream media carefully, people like to dwell on Putin’s miscalculations, and they completely ignore the West’s miscalculations. But I think if you look at our behavior in the run-up to the war and what has subsequently been happening in the conflict, it’s quite clear that we miscalculated in a big way.
AARON MATÉ: On the point, let me ask you to respond to what Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently said on CNN. He’s talking about what he says are Putin’s objectives in Ukraine, and he says Putin has already lost.
Anthony Blinken: In terms of what Russia sought to achieve, what Putin sought to achieve, they’ve already failed, they’ve already lost. The objective was to erase Ukraine from the map, to eliminate its independence, its sovereignty, to subsume it into Russia. That failed a long time ago.
AARON MATÉ: That’s Anthony Blinken, Professor Mearsheimer. Do you think those were Putin’s objectives in Ukraine?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: No. I mean, it’s the conventional wisdom in the West, for sure, that these were Putin’s aims. But as I have said on countless occasions, there is no evidence. Let me emphasize here: zero evidence to support the claim that Putin was bent on conquering all of Ukraine and incorporating it into a Greater Russia. You can say that a million times, but it’s simply not true. Because there is no evidence that Putin had any interest in conquering all of Ukraine and that he believed when he invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, that that is what he was going to try to do.
But that just takes care of his intentions. You also have to look at his capabilities. The idea that that small force, that small Russian force that went into Ukraine in February 2022 could conquer all of the country is a laughable argument. To conquer all of Ukraine, the Russians would have needed an army that had a couple million men in it. This is a huge piece of real estate. When the Germans went into Poland in 1939—and remember when the Germans went into Poland in 1939, the Soviets went in a few weeks later, so, the two countries, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were a tag team against Poland. Nevertheless, the Poles… I mean the Germans invaded Poland with roughly 1.5 million men.
The Russians had at most 190,000 men when they invaded Ukraine in February 2022. No way they had the capability to conquer the country. And they didn’t try to conquer the country. And again, as I said, Putin’s intentions were manifestly clear before the war that he had no interest in conquering Ukraine. He fully understood that conquering that whole country would be like swallowing a porcupine.
AARON MATÉ: And if you compare the Russian invasion of Ukraine to how the US went into Baghdad 2003, the first thing they do is attack the capital. They try to knock out the head of government, Saddam Hussein.
Russia obviously didn’t do that. There were no missile strikes on the presidential office in Kiev, no missile strikes on basic infrastructure, and the railroads even left intact, even though those railroads supply military equipment. But what Putin did get, though, in those early stages was negotiations, which apparently went somewhere to the point of a tentative deal reached between Ukraine and Russia, in which Russia would have withdrawn to its pre-invasion lines and Ukraine would have basically pledged neutrality.
We know from various reports that the West stood in the way. Boris Johnson reportedly came over, told Zelensky that, ‘If you sign a deal with Russia, we’re not going to back you up with security guarantees.’ Putin recently produced a document when he was speaking before some African leaders that he said was signed by Ukraine, and he also accused the West of sabotaging this deal. Based on the evidence you’ve seen, do you think that’s a fair rendering of events, that there was a serious deal reached but the West stood in the way?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Couple of points. I think there was a potential deal. Whether it could have been worked out had the West not interfered remains to be seen. There’re some very complicated issues that had to be resolved here, and they weren’t fully resolved in the negotiations at Istanbul. So, I would say it was a potential deal; it had real promise, for sure.
I do think that the West moved in, the British and the Americans, to sabotage the negotiations, because as I said earlier, Aaron, I think that we felt we could defeat the Russians. When those negotiations were taking place in March, at that juncture it looked like the Ukrainians were holding their own on the battlefield, and that simple fact coupled with our belief in sanctions made us think we had the Russians right where we wanted them, and the last thing we wanted was a deal. This was time to inflict a significant defeat on Russia, so I think that’s what was going on.
Now, just to go back to what you said about Putin’s goals going into Ukraine, I think you’re exactly right, that he was not interested in conquering Ukraine, as I said. What he wanted to do was coerce the Ukrainians into coming to the negotiating table and working out a deal. That’s what he wanted. He did not even want to incorporate the Donbass into a Greater Russia. He understood that would be a giant headache. He preferred to leave the Donbass inside of Ukraine. But what happened here is that the West moved in when it looked like a possible deal was there to be had, and the West made sure that the Ukrainians walked away from the negotiations and that the war went on. And here we are today.
AARON MATÉ: A major goal of Russia is, it seems to me, on top of getting Ukraine to commit to neutrality, to not joining NATO, was to get Ukraine to implement the Minsk Accords—the deal that it had signed back in 2015 to end the war in the Donbass. And I’m wondering what you make of the admissions that have come out since Russia invaded, from NATO leaders like Angela Merkel of Germany and François Hollande of France, who helped broker the Minsk Accords, where they said—and this mirrors what Ukrainian leaders like [Petro] Poroshenko said, too—that Minsk wasn’t intended to actually make peace; it was intended to buy time for Ukraine to build up its military to fight the Russian-backed rebels in the east of Ukraine and Russia itself. Do you buy that from Merkel and Hollande, or do you think they’re maybe just trying to save face and reject criticism from hawks who believe that their efforts to try to broker peace and end the war on the Donbass somehow enabled Russia and Putin?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: It’s really hard to know what to think, for sure. I mean, the fact is that Hollande, Poroshenko, and Angela Merkel have all said very clearly that they were not serious at the time about negotiating some sort of settlement in accordance with the Minsk II guidelines. If they say that, it would seem to me to be true. Is it really the case that they’re all lying now to cover up their past behavior so that they don’t damage their reputations in the West? I guess that’s possible. I don’t know how you would prove one way or the other where the truth lies. But my tendency in these situations is to believe what people say, and if Angela Merkel tells me that she was just pretending in the Minsk negotiations because she wanted to help arm up the Ukrainians, I tend to believe her. But maybe she’s not telling the truth. Who knows for sure?
AARON MATÉ: And going back to what you said earlier, about how the US did nothing to prevent this war and in some ways may have even egged it on before February 2022, given that the Biden Administration refused to address Russia’s core concerns of NATO expansion and the NATO military infrastructure surrounding Russia, which Russia and its draft treaties that it had submitted in December 2021 proposed, that NATO basically roll back its NATO military infrastructure around Russia to pre-1997 lines. Given that, the Biden Administration pretty much refused to discuss any of that with maybe some minor exceptions, from a realist perspective, is there any room now for the Biden Administration to go back on that and to actually discuss the issues that it wouldn’t discuss prior to the invasion? And if they won’t discuss those issues, then what kind of future are we looking at?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, let me make a quick point. I think your description of the American position in December 2021 and in the run-up to the war in February 2022 is correct. But it’s also important to emphasize—and people in the West don’t want to hear it, but it is true—that the Russians were desperate to avoid a conflict. The idea that Putin was chomping at the bit to invade Ukraine so he could make it part of Greater Russia, it’s just not a serious argument. The Russians did not want a war, and they did, I believe, everything possible to avoid a war. They just couldn’t get the Americans to play ball with them. The Americans were unwilling to negotiate in a serious way. Period. End of story.
Now, what can we do today? In effect you’re asking whether we can go back to where we were before the war broke out, or maybe even where we were in March 2022, shortly after the war broke out, when the negotiations in Istanbul were ongoing. I think we are well past the point where we can work out any kind of meaningful deal. I think that first of all, both sides are so deeply committed to winning at this point in time that it’s hard to imagine them negotiating any kind of meaningful peace agreement. Both sides can win and both sides are committed to winning, so negotiating the deal now at the general level is, I think, not possible.
But when you get into the details, the Russians are bent on keeping the territory that they have now conquered, and I believe the Russians are intent on conquering more country, more of Ukraine. The Russians want to make sure that Ukraine ends up as a dysfunctional rump state and cannot become a viable member of NATO at any time in the future. So, I think that what the Russians will end up doing is cleaving off a huge chunk of Ukrainian territory, and then going to great lengths to keep Ukraine in a terrible—both economic and political—situation. They’ll do everything they can to continue strangling the Ukrainian economy, because they do not want Ukraine to be in a position where it becomes a viable member of the Western alliance. So, the idea that the Russians would now agree to give up the territory that they’ve conquered and pull back to the borders that existed in February of 2022, I think is almost unthinkable.
Now, you may say they would do this if Ukraine became a neutral state, it gave up its aspirations to become a part of NATO. First of all, I don’t think that Ukraine is anytime soon going to agree to become a neutral state. It’s going to want some sort of security guarantee, and the only group of countries that can provide that security guarantee are NATO countries. So, it’s hard to see that bond between Ukraine and NATO being completely severed.
Furthermore, the Russians are going to worry about the fact that Ukraine will one day say, ‘We’re neutral,’ and then the next day they’ll change their mind and form some sort of alliance with the West, and the end result is the Russians will have given up all that territory and Ukraine will no longer be neutral. So, I think from a Russian point of view what makes sense is just to conquer a lot of territory in Ukraine and make sure you turn Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state. I hate to say this because it portrays such a dark future for Ukraine and also for international relations more generally, but I think the mess that we have created here, the disaster we have created here, cannot be underestimated in terms of its scope.
AARON MATÉ: There was a recent acknowledgment in The New York Times from NATO officials that pretty much said the same thing, that their policy, they acknowledge, incentivizes Russia to continue the war and take more territory. I’ll read you the passage.
They’re talking about the US policy of rejecting any territorial deal with Russia inside Ukraine, and also this policy of leaving an open door for Ukraine to join NATO. This is what The New York Times says, quote, “…as several American and European officials acknowledged during the Vilnius summit,”—the NATO Summit in Lithuania—”such commitments make it all the more difficult to begin any real cease-fire or armistice negotiations. And promises of Ukraine’s eventual accession to NATO—after the war is over—create a strong incentive for Moscow to hang onto any Ukrainian territory it can and to keep the conflict alive.”
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: That’s exactly right. But that raises the question, why don’t Western leaders change the policy regarding bringing Ukraine into the alliance?
I mean, they’re exactly right, and if you go back to what caused this war, the principal cause of this war, as the evidence makes perfectly clear, is the idea that we were going to bring Ukraine into NATO. And if we had abandoned that policy before February 2022, we probably wouldn’t have a war today. Then once the war starts, we keep doubling down on bringing Ukraine into NATO. We’ve refused to give up on that. But the end result is, that just incentivizes the Russians more and more to make sure that that never happens, or if it happens, Ukraine is a dysfunctional rump state.
So, we are playing—we, meaning the West—are playing a key role here in incentivizing the Russians to destroy Ukraine. It makes absolutely no sense to me from a strategic point of view or from a moral point of view. You think of the death and destruction that’s being wrought in Ukraine, and you think that this could have easily been avoided. It makes you sick to your stomach just to contemplate it all.
AARON MATÉ: What do you make of US policy so far when it comes to weaponry? There’s been so many times where the Biden Administration says publicly that certain weapons are not going to Ukraine, but then later on they relent and send those weapons, and now it looks like F-16s will be the latest on that list. And by contrast, recently John Kirchhofer, who is with the US Defense Intelligence Agency, said that unlike what Biden and Blinken are saying, he said the war is at a stalemate. And he also said that none of these heavy weapons are going to make a difference to allow Ukraine to break through.
John Kirchhofer: Certainly, we are at a bit of a stalemate. We do see incremental gains by Ukraine as they commit to this counteroffensive over the summer, but we haven’t seen anything to really help them break through, for example, to drive to the Crimea. It’s interesting to me, we tend to focus on some of the munitions that we, the West, provides to Ukraine as they fight this out, and we look at some of them as holy grails as they play out. So, if you think of HIMARS, certainly that led to some sensational tactical events. And then you see the Storm Shadow missile doing the same thing, and now we’re talking about dual purpose improved conventional munitions or cluster bombs. None of these, unfortunately, are the holy grail that Ukraine is looking forward to, that I think will allow them in the near term to break through.
AARON MATÉ: So, you have that being acknowledged by somebody with the Defense Intelligence Agency. But that doesn’t seem to have entered the thinking of the White House, which keeps sort of slowly drip-feeding these heavy weapons systems that had previously been taken off of the table.
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, I think there’s no question that we’re desperate here. You used the word ‘stalemate.’ In a way it’s a stalemate. If you focus on how much territory each side has conquered, it looks like a stalemate. But I don’t look at territory conquered as the key indicator of what’s going on in this war.
In a war of attrition like this, the key indicator is the casualty exchange rate. That’s what you want to pay attention to. You want to focus on how many people each side has available to draft, to put in the military, and then you want to focus on the casualty exchange rate. And, in my opinion, the casualty exchange rate decisively favors the Russians who also happen to have many more people than the Ukrainians do. This is a disastrous situation for Ukraine. It makes it almost impossible for Ukraine to win this war, and it makes it likely that the Russians will prevail.
So, the question is, if you’re the West, how do you rectify this situation? What do you do to keep the Ukrainians in the fight? And you want to remember here that the Russians have a formidable industrial base, and they have lots of military equipment—lots of heavy equipment, lots of artillery, lots of tanks. They have assembly lines that are churning out lots of equipment. The Ukrainians have hardly any assembly lines at all; they’re completely dependent on the West for weaponry.
So, the question then becomes, what can we give them? And there’re real limits to what we have, right? We don’t have that much more artillery to give them. So, it’s no surprise that therefore we’re giving them cluster munitions. It’s no surprise that in recent months we’ve emphasized giving them tanks when what they really needed was artillery. So, you see, we’re in a pickle here, in that we’ve picked a fight with a country that has a huge industrial base that can produce lots of weaponry, and our ally—the country that’s doing the fighting for us, the dirty work on the battlefield—does not have weaponry of its own, so we have to supply it. And again, we have real limits to what we can give them.
So, what’s going on is that we give them HIMAR missiles, and everybody says this is the magic weapon, it’s going to rectify the casualty exchange ratio, it’s going to help the Ukrainians prevail on the battlefield. That proves not to be the case, right? And then we start talking about giving them sophisticated tanks. We give them sophisticated tanks, be they Leopard 2s, Challengers, or what have you, and they’re supposed to be the magic weapons. And that doesn’t work out. Then we talk about training nine brigades and creating a Panzer Forest that can punch through the Russian defenses, to do to the Russians what the Germans did to the French in 1940. And, of course, on June 4th of this year the Ukrainians launched their counteroffensive, and they used a lot of those NATO-trained and -armed troops—and it didn’t work. They didn’t even get to the first defensive lines of the Russian forces. They ended up fighting in the gray zone and suffering huge casualties.
So, what’s the solution? Well, we’ve got to give them F-16s and we’ve got to give them ATACMS [Army Tactical Missile Systems, long-range guided missiles], and if we give them that, that will reverse the balance of power between these combatants, reverse the casualty exchange ratio, and the Ukrainians will end up prevailing on the battlefield.
This is a pipe dream. It’s hard to believe that people in the Pentagon who study war for a living believe that F-16s or ATACMS are going to change the balance of power on the battlefield. They are doing this in large part because we have to do something, and this is really all we can do. So, we can’t quit, we got to stay in the fight, we got to continue to arm the Ukrainians. This is the only game in town. So, what we’re doing here, giving them weapons that we can publicly say and then the media can repeat it, that these are war-winning weapons, and once the Ukrainians get these weapons and learn how to use them, once they learn how to fly F-16s, the balance of power will be rectified, and we’ll live happily ever after.
Again, this is not going to happen. The Ukrainians are in deep trouble. We have led them down the primrose path, and there is nothing we can do at this point in time to rectify that situation.
AARON MATÉ: Well, speaking of which, that was your famous warning back in 2015, that the West is leading Ukraine down the primrose path and, according to you, the end result is that Ukraine is going to get wrecked.
John Mearsheimer: What’s going on here is that the West is leading Ukraine down the primrose path, and the end result is that Ukraine is going to get wrecked. And I believe that the policy that I’m advocating, which is neutralizing Ukraine and then building it up economically and getting it out of the competition between Russia on one side and NATO on the other side, is the best thing that could happen to the Ukrainians.
AARON MATÉ: This was your warning back in 2015. Why were you so confident of this? What made you so sure that this was the inevitable path?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, I thought it was very clear when the crisis first broke out in February 2014. Remember the crisis breaks out on February 22, 2014, and at that point in time it’s clear that the Russians view Ukraine in NATO as an existential threat. They make no bones about that. And furthermore, it’s clear that if we persist to try to bring Ukraine into NATO, if we persist to try to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s borders, that the Russians will destroy Ukraine, they’ll wreck Ukraine. They make that clear at the time.
So, that’s in 2014, and then if you look at what happens from 2014 up till 2022, when the war breaks out, when it goes from being a crisis to a war, if you look at what happens then, the Russians make it clear, at point after point, that Ukraine in NATO is an existential threat, but what do we do? We double down at every turn. We continue to commit ourselves more forcefully each year to bringing Ukraine into NATO. And my view in the very beginning was that this was going to lead to disaster.
Now, a lot of people like to portray my views as anomalous. I’m one of a handful of people, folks like me, Jeffrey Sachs, Steve Cohen [Stephen F. Cohen], who make these kinds of arguments. But if you think about it, back in the 1990s, when the subject of NATO expansion was being debated, there were a large number of very prominent members of the foreign policy establishment who said that NATO expansion would end up in disaster. This included people like George Kennan, William Perry—who at the time was the Secretary of Defense.
AARON MATÉ: He almost resigned, he says.
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Pardon?
AARON MATÉ: He almost resigned, he says, over the issue of NATO expansion. When Clinton expanded NATO, he said he considered resigning, I believe.
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Yes, that’s exactly right. And, by the way, there was widespread opposition to NATO expansion inside the Pentagon at that point in time. And all this is to say that those people were right.
And one of my favorite examples is Angela Merkel. When the decision was made in April 2008 at the Bucharest Summit—the Bucharest NATO Summit—to bring Ukraine into NATO, Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy, who was then the French leader, both of them were adamantly opposed to bringing Ukraine into NATO. This is when the trouble started, April 2008. Angela Merkel was bitterly opposed, and she subsequently said that the reason that she was opposed was that she understood that Putin would interpret it as a declaration of war. Just think about that. Angela Merkel said that in 2008, when she opposed the idea of bringing Ukraine—and Georgia, by the way—into NATO, she opposed it. She opposed it because she understood that Putin would interpret it as a declaration of war. So, there are a lot of people besides Jeff Sachs, Steve Cohen, and John Mearsheimer who understood that this whole crusade to expand NATO eastward was going to end up in disaster.
AARON MATÉ: Let me ask you a personal question. You were friends with Steve Cohen, who I knew very well. He was a hero of mine and a friend. I’m wondering, it seems to me that since his passing [in 2020] and since the Ukraine War escalated with Russia’s invasion, you should have taken his place as Enemy Number One in the US academy in terms of someone willing to speak out and counter the establishment point of view. I’m just wondering whether you agree with that, and whether it’s given you any more empathy for Stephen, and what that’s been like for you, and what you make of the space for debate and how it compares to previous controversial issues that you’ve spoken out on. You’re very critical of the Israel Lobby. You spoke out against the Iraq War, how all that compares to the climate we’re in today.
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, just to talk about Steve Cohen for a minute, I think Steve was out front on this issue before I was. He was out front on the issue before 2014, when the crisis broke out. That’s when I first got involved. I wrote a well-known piece in Foreign Affairs in 2014 that said the crisis which broke out in February that year was the West’s fault, but Steve had been making the argument before I came into the game. And then he and I were involved in a number of different events where we were on the same side, making the same argument. And then, of course, Steve passed, and his presence in this debate is greatly missed, for sure. I think you could say that people like me and people like Jeff Sachs are in effect replacing Steve, where we’re making the arguments that he made for a long time. So, I think there is a lot of truth in that.
Now, with regard to your question about how receptive people are today to hearing the argument that I have to make or that Jeff Sachs has to make, where the argument that Steve was making when he was alive, I think there’s no question that it is more difficult to be heard today than it was when the Iraq War, for example, took place in 2003. I was deeply opposed to the Iraq War in a very public way, in late 2002 and up until March 2003, when the war started. And it was tough to make a case against the war in public in those days. It was tough to be heard, but it is much tougher to be heard today. The climate is much more Orwellian.
And I would note, by the way, Aaron, that Steve, who I talked to obviously about these issues a lot when he was still alive, told me on more than one occasion that during the Cold War, when he would sometimes make arguments that one might categorize as pro-Soviet or sympathetic to the Soviet position, it was much easier then to be heard in the mainstream media, in places like The New York Times, for example, than it was in 2014 or 2016 in The New York Times. The cone of silence here is really quite remarkable. The extent to which people like Steve, people like Jeff Sachs, and people like me have sort of [been] kept out of the mainstream media is really quite remarkable. We have a conventional wisdom here, and the mainstream media is committed to policing the marketplace to make sure that people who disagree with that conventional wisdom are not heard, or if they are heard their arguments are perverted or countered immediately. It’s a terrible situation. It’s not the way life is supposed to work in a liberal democracy. You have to have some semblance of a marketplace of ideas if you want to have smart policies, because the fact is that governments often times do stupid things, or they pursue policies that look like they’re correct at the time but prove to be disastrous, and you want to have lots of people who disagree with those policies having an opportunity to voice their opinions before the policy is launched and after the policy is launched. But in this day and age, that’s very difficult to do, and that’s very depressing and distressing.
AARON MATÉ: Turning back to the battlefield today, are you at all concerned about a new front opening up? There’s recently been some heated rhetoric between Russia and Poland, Putin warning Poland not to attack Belarus, Belarus now hosting Wagner fighters and some of them talking about going back into Ukraine, or maybe opening up a new front with Poland. What do you make of all that talk, and does it possibly threaten a new front opening up, or is that overblown?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, that’s just one possible front. Another front is the Black Sea. It’s quite clear that the Russians are now moving towards blockading Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, and the potential for conflict there is real. Then there’s the whole question of Moldova, and there’s all sorts of talk about a possible conflict there. Then there is the Baltic Sea. The Russians care greatly about the Baltic Sea because it’s the only way they can get to Kaliningrad. And if you look at all of the countries besides Russia that surround the Baltic Sea, they are now all NATO members now that Sweden and Finland have been brought into the alliance. If you look at the Arctic, looking down the road, the Arctic makes me very nervous. There are eight countries that are physically located in the Arctic. One is Russia, of course. The other seven are all NATO members now that Finland and Sweden are in the alliance. And with the ice melting and all sorts of questions about control of water and territory coming into play up there, the potential for conflict is very real. And the Russians and NATO are bumping into each other.
So, you have the Arctic, the Baltic Sea, Moldova, the Black Sea, and then the issue that you raised, which, at this point in time appears to be the one of most concern, and that is Poland coming into the war mainly in Belarusia. There’s also the question of what happens if Polish troops enter into western Ukraine. [Alexander] Lukashenko, who, of course, is the leader of Belarus, has made the argument that this is basically unacceptable to the Belarusians, so one can imagine a situation where Poland comes into western Ukraine and the Belarusians end up in a fight, and the Russians end up in a fight with the Poles in western Ukraine. I’m not saying that’s likely, but it’s possible.
And then if you look at the Polish-Belarusian border, as you pointed out, there are Wagner forces very close to that border, and not surprisingly the Poles have moved up their own forces to make sure that the Wagner forces don’t do anything against Poland. So, you have Wagner forces and Polish forces eyeball-to-eyeball on the Belarusian-Polish border. This is not a good situation. Who knows what the chain of command looks like with [Yevgeny]Prigozhin, who’s in charge of those Wagner forces, as best we can tell. So, there’s just all sorts of potential for trouble here.
And the general point I like to make is that we’re not going to get a meaningful peace agreement between Ukraine and the West on one side and the Russians on the other side. The best we can hope for is a cold peace, and a cold peace where the Russians are constantly looking for opportunities to improve their position, and the Ukrainians and the West are constantly looking for opportunities to improve their position. In both cases this means taking advantage of the other side. When you get into a cold peace, where both sides are operating that way, the potential for escalation and returning to a hot war is great. And you want to think about that in the context of the different possible fronts where war could break out that we were just discussing. There’s just a lot of potential for escalation in this area of the world. So, I think the situation between Russia on one side and the West on the other side, and of course Ukraine, is going to be very dangerous for a long time to come.
AARON MATÉ: Finally, Russia has already annexed four Ukrainian oblasts during its invasion, on top of Crimea in 2014. You mentioned earlier that you think Russia wants to take more territory. Where do you think Russia would be satisfied stopping its incursions? Where do you think its territorial ambitions end?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, on a very general level, Aaron, I think it’s important to understand that the Russians will want to take territory if they can do it militarily, and that remains to be seen. If they can do it militarily, they’ll want to take territory that has lots of Russian speakers and ethnic Russians in them. This is why I think they’ll take Odessa if they can, and Kharkiv if they can, and two other oblasts as well. But I think they will stay away from the oblasts or the areas of Ukraine that have lots of ethnic Ukrainians, because the resistance to a Russian occupation will be enormous. So, I think the demography of Ukraine limits how much territory the Russians can take.
Furthermore, I think military capability limits how much of Ukraine that they can take—that they don’t have the military capability to take all of it. And I think they’ll have to actually increase the size of the existing Russian army if they’re going to take the four oblasts. This includes Kharkiv and Odessa that are to the west of the four oblasts that they now control. But I think that they will try to take those eight oblasts, plus Crimea. Those eight oblasts, they already control four and they’ve taken Crimea; that represents about 23 percent of Ukrainian territory, before 2014. If they take the additional four oblasts to the west of the four they now have annexed, that will represent about 43 percent of Ukrainian territory that will have fallen into the hands of the Russians. And that I think will leave the Russians in a position where they are dealing with a Ukraine that is a truly dysfunctional state.
I hate to say that this is the likely outcome because it’s a such a terrible outcome from Ukraine’s point of view, but I think in all honesty that that is where this war is headed. I think the Russians are now playing hardball, where, as I said to you before, well past the situation that existed in March of 2022, or certainly in the period before the war broke out in February of 2022, where it’s possible to imagine a situation where the Russians pulled out of Ukraine in return for Ukrainian neutrality. Those days are gone, and a Russia that’s playing hardball is a Russia that’s going to conquer more territory if it can and do everything it can to wreck Ukraine.
AARON MATÉ: One more question, because we haven’t discussed this issue yet and it’s existential, and that’s the nuclear threat. There was a recent article by a Russian namedSergei Karaganov, who was an academic with the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. He’s said to be close to Putin. And I don’t know if you caught this essay, but he basically said that Russia needs to adopt a more bellicose nuclear posture, needs to embrace the use of First Use, and even threaten to use it in Ukraine in order to sufficiently scare the West. I don’t know if you caught that essay, but if you did, what did you make of it? And overall, is the nuclear threat, the threat of nuclear war something that you think is still a possibility when it comes to this war itself?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, I think that nuclear war is most likely if the Russians are losing. If the Russians are losing, if the Ukrainian military is rolling up Russian forces in eastern and southern Ukraine, and the sanctions are working and the Russians are on the verge of being knocked out of the ranks of the great powers, in that situation I think it’s likely that the Russians would turn to nuclear weapons, and they would use those nuclear weapons in Ukraine. They would not dare use them against NATO, but they would turn to nuclear weapons. I think, given the fact that the Russians are not losing and, if anything, are winning, therefore the likelihood of nuclear war is greatly reduced. I don’t want to say it’s been taken off the table for one second, but I think as long as the Russians are on the upside of the battle, not on the downside, the likelihood of nuclear use is very low.
Now, with regard to the Karaganov article, I read that to say that the Russians are likely to prevail, but to use rhetoric I’ve used, it’s going to be an ugly victory. I think he understands that the Russians are not going to win a decisive victory. They’re not going to end up with a neutral Ukraine, and they’re not going to end up in a situation where the West backs off. I think that Karaganov understands that even if the Russians capture more territory, and even if they turn Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state, that you’re going to get at best a cold peace that’s going to be very dangerous. I referred to this in my Substack article as an ugly victory. And I think what he is basically saying is that it’s not clear that’s acceptable to the Russians over the long term. It’s not clear that Russia can afford to live in such circumstances over the long term. And if Russia were to use nuclear weapons, it might be a way of sending a wake-up message to the West. It might be a way of telling the West that they have to back off.
In other words, what’s going on here is Karaganov is talking about using nuclear weapons for coercive purposes. He’s interested in limited nuclear use for the purpose of getting the West to back off, getting the West to change its behavior and put an end to this ugly victory, and allow the Russians to have some sort of meaningful victory and to help create some sort of meaningful peace agreement. I think that he is right. The Russians at best can win an ugly victory. I think it’s just important to understand that. He senses, I think, quite correctly, the Russians are not going to win a decisive defeat. There’s no real happy ending to this story, that’s what he’s saying. And he’s saying that’s probably not acceptable, and we’ve got to figure out a way to move beyond a cold peace, and nuclear coercion may be a way to do that.
Now, is that an argument that’s likely to sell? I think it’s impossible to say, because we don’t know exactly what an ugly victory will look like, number one. Number two, we don’t know who will be in control in Russia in the future, who will have his or her finger on the trigger in Moscow when this ugly victory is becoming almost intolerable, and we certainly don’t know whether that person would be bold enough to countenance using nuclear weapons.
Is that possible, that someone might countenance using nuclear weapons, because Russia is in an intolerable situation? Yes, it’s one, but it’s an ugly victory, and that’s not acceptable. It is possible. I think there’s a non-trivial chance that there’ll be someone like Sergei Karaganov in power and who will think about using nuclear weapons. I bet that that will not happen, but who knows for sure? As you well know, it’s incredibly difficult to predict the future, especially when you’re talking about scenarios like that. But I think that’s what’s going on here—and again this just highlights how much trouble we’re in, no matter how this war turns out. As I said before, if the Russians are losing, I mean, they’re seriously losing the war, that’s where nuclear use is likely. And what Karaganov is saying is, even if we win it’s going to be an ugly victory and we may have to use nuclear weapons anyway. You want to think about where that leaves us.
And then there’s the whole question of, if Ukraine is really losing, let’s assume that the Ukrainian military cracks, let’s assume that the beating that it’s taking leads to a situation like the one that faced the French army in the spring of 1917—this is when the French army cracked, it’s when the French army mutinied—let’s assume that that happens, and the Ukrainians are on the run. Again, I’m not saying that’s going to happen, but it is a possibility. What is NATO going to do? Are we going to accept the situation where Ukraine is being defeated on the battlefield in a serious way by the Russians? I’m not so sure. And it may be possible in those circumstances that NATO will come into the fight. It may be possible that the Poles decide that they alone have to come into the fight, and once the Poles come into the fight in a very important way, that may bring us into the fight, and then you have a great power war involving the United States on one side and the Russians on the other. Again, I’m not saying this is likely, but it is a possibility. What we are doing here is, we’re spinning out plausible scenarios as to how this war can play out over time. And almost all the scenarios that one comes up with have an unhappy ending. Again, this just shows what a huge mistake we made not trying to settle this conflict before February 24, 2022.
AARON MATÉ: Well, based on this answer alone, I can see why you called one of your most recent pieces “The Darkness Ahead: Where the Ukraine War is Headed.” Very apt. John Mearsheimer, thank you so much for joining me.
John Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, now writing on Substack.
Professor Mearsheimer, thanks so much.
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: It was my pleasure. Thank you for having me, Aaron.